績(jī)效報(bào)酬與對(duì)高層管理的激勵(lì)外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯-資料下載頁(yè)
【導(dǎo)讀】如果股東完全關(guān)于CEO的活動(dòng)和公司的投資機(jī)會(huì),他們能設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)合同規(guī)。定和執(zhí)行管理采取動(dòng)作在每一個(gè)狀態(tài)的世界。機(jī)會(huì)實(shí)行嚴(yán)格的管理措施,然而,完美的。在這種情況下,代理理論預(yù)測(cè)補(bǔ)償政策將設(shè)計(jì)給經(jīng)理激勵(lì)實(shí)施行為選擇增。的下降-每當(dāng)研究中的作用預(yù)期回報(bào)超過(guò)預(yù)期的成本。可是總裁只有他的個(gè)人所得和。如果一個(gè)人擷取的CEO影響風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避、補(bǔ)償政策,把s股。經(jīng)營(yíng)者的,供需條件、公共政策。期權(quán)、績(jī)效解雇的決定。摘要本研究的目的是計(jì)算的大小提供激勵(lì)每一個(gè)這樣的機(jī)制。下董事會(huì)75¢/1000美元股東財(cái)富的變化。因此股票的價(jià)值屬于平均首席執(zhí)行官每當(dāng)美元變化企業(yè)的價(jià)值1000. 增加解雇由于糟糕的表現(xiàn)和概率相關(guān)的懲罰被解雇都是小的。1．平均每個(gè)1000美元與變化增加股東財(cái)富在今年的明年的薪水和獎(jiǎng)金約兩美分。票的形式期權(quán)的收益價(jià)值確定，15￠每1,000美元。1000美元的股東損失，對(duì)于所有的樣本來(lái)說(shuō)，連續(xù)兩年凈50%的市場(chǎng)回報(bào)率是30￠,為充分樣本,對(duì)大公司是5￠，對(duì)小公司來(lái)說(shuō)是美元。
【正文】 out 75￠ per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth for the full sample (45￠ and $ per $1,000 for large and small firms, respectively). 3. The largest CEO performance incentives e from ownership of their firms39。 stock, but such holdings are small and declining. Median 1986 inside stockholdings for 746 CEOs in the Forbes pensation survey are percent, and 80 percent of these CEOs hold less than percent of their firms39。 shares. Median ownership for CEOs of large firms is percent and for small firms is percent. Adding the incentives generated by median CEO stockholdings to our previous estimates gives a total change in all CEO pay and stockrelated wealth of $ per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth for the full sample, $ per $1,000 for large firms, and $ for small firms. 4. Boards of directors do not vary the payperformance sensitivity for CEOs with widely different inside stockholdings. 5. Although bonuses represent 50 percent of CEO salary, such bonuses are awarded in ways that are not highly sensitive to performance as measured by changes in market value of equity, accounting earnings, or sales. 6. The low variability of changes in CEO pensation reflects the fact that in spite of the apparent importance of bonuses in CEO pensation, they are not very variable from year to year. The frequency distributions of annual percentage changes in CEO salary plus bonus and total pay are parable to that of a sample of 10,000 randomly selected workers. Thus our results indicating a weak relation between pay and performance are not due to boards of directors using measures of managerial performance that are unobservable to us. 7. Median CEO inside stockholdings for the 120 largest NYSE firms fell by an order of magnitude from percent in 1938 to percent in 1984. 8. The average standard deviation of pay changes for CEOs in the top quartile 44 (by value) of all NYSE firms fell from $205,000 in 193438 to $127,000 in 197486. 9. The payperformance sensitivity for topquartile CEOs fell by an order of magnitude from ￠ per $1,000 in 193438 to ￠ per $1,000 in 197486. 10. The average salary plus bonus for topquartile CEOs (in 1986 dollars) fell from $813,000 in 193438 to $645,000 in 197486, while the average market value of the sample firms doubled. The lack of strong payforperformance incentives for CEOs indicated by our evidence is puzzling. We hypothesize that political forces operating both in the public sector and inside anizations limit large payoffs for exceptional performance. Truncating the upper tail of the payoff distribution requires that the lower tail of the distribution also be truncated in order to maintain levels of pensation consistent with equilibrium in the managerial labor market. The resulting general absence of management incentives in public corporations presents a challenge for social scientists and pensation practitio44
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