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【導(dǎo)讀】CorporateFinance1-0©ProfessorHo-MouWu. threequestions:. firmengagein?3.Howmuchshort-termcashflowdoesa. 1-1CorporateFinance©ProfessorHo-MouWu. CurrentAssets. FixedAssets. 1Tangible. 2Intangible. Shareholders’。Equity. Current. Liabilities. Long-Term. Debt. 1-2CorporateFinance©ProfessorHo-MouWu. CurrentAssets. FixedAssets. 1Tangible. 2Intangible. Shareholders’。Equity. Current. Liabilities. Long-Term. Debt. Whatlong-. term. investments. shouldthe. firmengage. in?1-3CorporateFinance©ProfessorHo-MouWu. Howcanthefirm. raisethemoney. fortherequired. investments?CurrentAssets. FixedAssets. 1Tangible. 2Intangible. Shareholders’。Equity. Current. Liabilities. Long-Term. Debt. 1-4CorporateFinance©ProfessorHo-MouWu. Howmuchshort-. termcashflow. doesapany. needtopayits. bills?Net. Working. Capital. Shareholders’。Equity. Current. Liabilities. Long-Term. Debt. CurrentAssets. FixedAssets. 1Tangible. 2Intangible. 1-5CorporateFinance©ProfessorHo-MouWu. CapitalStructure. bethoughtofasapie.pie.pie.matters.50%. Debt. 50%. Equity. 25%. Debt. 75%. 70%30%. Equity. 1-6CorporateFinance©ProfessorHo-MouWu. Cashflowfromfirm(C). Ta. xe. s(D. Firm. Government. Retainedcashflows(F)Investsinassets. Dividendsand. debtpayments(E). Currentassets. Fixedassets. Financial. markets. Short-termdebt. Long-termdebt. Equityshares. Ultimately,thefirm. mustbeacash. Thecashflowsfrom. thefirmmustexceed. thecashflowsfrom. 1-7CorporateFinance©ProfessorHo-MouWu. FinancialMarkets. PrimaryMarket. SecondaryMarkets. toanother.1-8CorporateFinance©ProfessorHo-MouWu. FinancialMarkets. Firms. Investors. Secondary. Market. money. securities. SueBob. Stocksand. Bonds. Money. PrimaryMarket. 1-9CorporateFinance©ProfessorHo-MouWu. 1-10CorporateFinance©ProfessorHo-MouWu. Investment. ＝。Acti
【正文】 F,$X] Algebraically, the shareholder’s claim is: Max[0,$X – $F] 114 Corporate Finance 169。 Professor HoMou Wu Combined Payoffs to Debt and Equity $F $F Combined Payoffs to debt holders and shareholders Value of the firm (X) Debt holders are promised $F. Payoff to debt holders Payoff to shareholders If the value of the firm is less than $F, the shareholder’s claim is: Max[0,$X – $F] = $0 and the debt holder’s claim is Min[$F,$X] = $X. The sum of these is = $X If the value of the firm is more than $F, the shareholder’s claim is: Max[0,$X – $F] = $X – $F and the debt holder’s claim is: Min[$F,$X] = $F. The sum of these is = $X 115 Corporate Finance 169。 Professor HoMou Wu Corporate Governance Separation of Ownership and Control Board of Directors Management Assets Debt Equity Shareholders Debtholders 116 Corporate Finance 169。 Professor HoMou Wu Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs ? There is asymmetric information between shareholders and managers. ? How to induce managers to act in the shareholders’ interests ? – The shareholders can devise contracts that align the incentives of the managers with the goals of the shareholders. – The shareholders can monitor the managers behavior. ? (Agency Cost) This contracting and monitoring is costly.
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