【文章內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介】 行貨幣政策的研究團(tuán)隊(duì) 2005）。進(jìn)入20082009年的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，對(duì)利率的再次控制促進(jìn)了大規(guī)模的反周期投資驅(qū)動(dòng)器。如圖2所示，中國(guó)人民銀行在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷時(shí)繼續(xù)保證銀行業(yè)穩(wěn)健的利率傳導(dǎo)。移除貸款利率的上限，銀行通過貸款賺更多的錢。因此，當(dāng)中央要求銀行于2008年11月為4萬億人民幣經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激方案提供融資，銀行以極大的熱情回應(yīng)。導(dǎo)致2009年中國(guó)的貸款向上急速膨脹，比上年增長(zhǎng)了驚人的30％。中國(guó)人民銀行在2009年原本設(shè)臵信貸配額是5萬億人民幣向上一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)。到今年年底，銀行已經(jīng)做出了歷史上最大量的新增貸款，總額近10萬億人民幣（潘克赫斯特,鄭,和王 2009）。銀行持有的存款利率低于基準(zhǔn)利率而貸款利率高于基準(zhǔn)利率，實(shí)際上可收獲可觀的利潤(rùn)，即使在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退期間（漢2009）。因此，貸款利率上界的自由化得益于所有有關(guān)的政治人物。高層的技術(shù)專家保留為最大的反周期投資驅(qū)動(dòng)湊集資金的能力，這在中國(guó)的歷史上是相對(duì)容易的。銀行仍然防止“毀滅性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”，并繼續(xù)享有穩(wěn)健的貸款利率傳導(dǎo)。由于銀行為經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激計(jì)劃提供資金的意愿，財(cái)政部不需要發(fā)行很多的債務(wù)，從而限制財(cái)政赤字的規(guī)模。雖然一些大型國(guó)有企業(yè)由于釋放出的貸款利率可能付出更高的借貸成本，銀行急于提供大量的融資額給他們，使他們向其他實(shí)體轉(zhuǎn)貸資金而賺取利潤(rùn)。隨著世界逐步擺脫經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)，由于前兩年的快速信貸擴(kuò)張，通貨膨脹的壓力在中國(guó)建立的非常迅速。2011年初，通貨膨脹調(diào)轉(zhuǎn)進(jìn)入危險(xiǎn)的境況。然而中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在危機(jī)模式下，利率進(jìn)一步自由化的任何談話被擱臵。另一位金發(fā)的時(shí)刻必須在下一輪利率自由化之前提出，使其可以被理解。結(jié)論雖然中國(guó)并沒有回應(yīng)外部強(qiáng)加給我們的政策改革壓力，但是它已經(jīng)開始自身的重大經(jīng)濟(jì)改革。在城市里，許多規(guī)模較小的國(guó)有企業(yè)被私有化或關(guān)閉了，而私營(yíng)部門被允許自由成長(zhǎng)（諾頓1996）。大多數(shù)商品和服務(wù)價(jià)格已經(jīng)被放開（韋德曼2003）。盡管中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化，但是國(guó)家將繼續(xù)以控制社會(huì)的宏觀的經(jīng)濟(jì)杠桿，允許它通過重要的途徑影響經(jīng)濟(jì)效果。中央級(jí)的技術(shù)專家可以通過控制資金的流動(dòng)和投資方向，確保通脹不上升至無法控制的地步，而增長(zhǎng)依然強(qiáng)勁。同時(shí)，這些手段也允許他們購(gòu)買被其他政治局成員保護(hù)的利益支持，包括當(dāng)?shù)毓賳T和國(guó)有企業(yè)管理人員，特別是在經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯的時(shí)候。為了保持這些手段的有效性，他們需要儲(chǔ)戶在中國(guó)的國(guó)家金融體系的抵押品。如果私人銀行出現(xiàn)為存款人提供更高的利率，國(guó)有銀行必須匹配上更高的利率，從而增加了成本，為大規(guī)模的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激計(jì)劃提供資金。盡管強(qiáng)大的激勵(lì)促使頂級(jí)技術(shù)專家保持現(xiàn)狀，但是利率市場(chǎng)化改革在中國(guó)已經(jīng)取得了一些進(jìn)展。即使在20世紀(jì)80年代，非正式的銀行也提供著很高的存款利率。進(jìn)入20世紀(jì)90年代，央行行長(zhǎng)感受到西方關(guān)于貨幣政策以及中國(guó)人民銀行政治性角色的擔(dān)憂，開始認(rèn)真的推行利率市場(chǎng)化。他們?cè)谕ㄘ浥蛎浀?，?jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)強(qiáng)勁的時(shí)候推進(jìn)自由化改革。雖然方便政策制定者制定政治目標(biāo)，但是中國(guó)的利率管制將繼續(xù)使中國(guó)的儲(chǔ)戶以及一些國(guó)外的制造商肩負(fù)重但。只要銀行爭(zhēng)奪存款被禁止，數(shù)以百萬的儲(chǔ)戶將繼續(xù)被人為壓低存款利率，來補(bǔ)貼國(guó)有銀行的盈利能力。國(guó)家以較低的成本調(diào)動(dòng)大量資金的能力，也有對(duì)世界的負(fù)面影響。大部分剩余的國(guó)有企業(yè)主要集中在重工業(yè)和大宗商品部門。因此，就如中國(guó)政府智囊團(tuán)指出的那樣，通過寬松的信貸政策，使他們得以保留，而在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的時(shí)候，或者在某些情況下，他們甚至擴(kuò)大自己的能力（國(guó)際金融研究中心2009年）。這加劇了全球的產(chǎn)能過剩，并導(dǎo)致中國(guó)某些行業(yè)的商品，特別是鋼材，在世界市場(chǎng)上引起傾銷。因此，政府的持續(xù)努力以操縱利率，這種行為的一個(gè)重要受害者是中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)的全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者。第三篇：Audit Office Size, Audit Quality, and AuditPricing JongHag Choi, Chansog(Francis)Kim, JeongBon Kim, and YoonseokZang SUMMARY: Using a large sample of client firms over the period 2000–2005,this paper investigates whether and how the size of a local practice office within anaudit firmhereafter, office size is a significant, engagementspecific factor determiningaudit quality and audit fees over and beyond audit firm size at the national level andauditor industry leadership at the city or office our empirical tests, audit qualityis measured by unsigned abnormal accruals, and the office size is measured in twodifferent ways: one based on the number of audit clients in each office and the otherbased on a total of audit fees earned by each results show that the officesize has significantly positive relations with both audit quality and audit fees, even aftercontrolling for nationallevel audit firm size and officelevel industry relations support the view that large local offices provide higherquality auditspared with small local offices, and that such quality differences are priced in themarket for audit :audit office。office size。audit quality。audit Availability:Data are publicly available from sources identified in the way we think about an accounting firm changes dramatically when we shift the unit of analysisaway from the firm as a whole, to the analysis of specific citybased offices within a termsof DeAngelo’s1981b argument, a Big 4 accounting firm is not so big when we shift to theofficelevel of example, while Enron represented less than 2 percent of Arthur Andersen’s national revenues from publicly listed clients, it was more than 35 percent of such revenues in the Houston As alluded to in the above quote, the size of a citybased audit engagement office could bea more crucial determinant of audit quality and thus audit feesthan the size of anationallevel audit firm because the citybased office is a semiautonomous unit withinan audit firm with its own client is an officebased engagement partner or audit team, notnational headquarters, who actually administers and implements individual audit engagement contracts, including the delivery of audit services and the issuance of an audit this regard,Wallman(1996)and Francis(2004)argue that the assessment of auditor independence needs tofocus more on the individual office level rather than the entire firm level because most of the auditdecisions with respect to a particular client are made within each individual anecdotalevidence on the collapse of Enron, which was audited by the Houston office of Arthur Andersen,is a good example that demonstrates the importance of officelevel audit , much of extant audit research has focused its attention on two nationallevel audit firm characteristics asfundamental determinants of audit quality, namely: audit firm size(., Simunic and Stein 1987。Becker et 。Francis and Krishnan 1999。Kim et 。Choi and Doogar 2005), andauditor industry leadership(., DeFond et 。Balsam et 。Krishnan 2005).These studies find, in general, that large audit firms with international brand names(., Big4 auditors)or industry expertise provide higherquality audit services than small audit firms which lack such brand names or industry in this line of research is the assumptionthat audit quality is homogeneous across offices of various sizes located in different cities withinthe same audit a result, we have little evidence on crossoffice differences in audit quality,and in particular, whether and how the size of a local engagement office has an impact on auditquality and/or audit natural questiontoaskis:Istheofficesizean additionalengagementspecific factor determining audit quality and thus audit pricing over and beyond auditfirm size and industry leadership? We aim to provide direct evidence on this unexplored recent studies provide indirect evidence suggesting that audit quality may differacross different engagement offices within an audit example, in the first thatuses each engagement office as the unit of analysis, Reynolds and Francis(2000, 375)find thatwhen client size is measured at the office level using officespecific clienteles, “Big 5 auditorsreportmoreconservativelyforlarger clients.”Further,Ferguson et al.(2003)and Francis et al.(2005)find that cityspecific, officelevel industry leadership, when bined with the nationallevel leadership, generates the highest audit fee pr