【正文】 it a result, we have little evidence on crossoffice differences in audit quality,and in particular, whether and how the size of a local engagement office has an impact on auditquality and/or audit natural questiontoaskis:Istheofficesizean additionalengagementspecific factor determining audit quality and thus audit pricing over and beyond auditfirm size and industry leadership? We aim to provide direct evidence on this unexplored recent studies provide indirect evidence suggesting that audit quality may differacross different engagement offices within an audit example, in the first thatuses each engagement office as the unit of analysis, Reynolds and Francis(2000, 375)find thatwhen client size is measured at the office level using officespecific clienteles, “Big 5 auditorsreportmoreconservativelyforlarger clients.”Further,Ferguson et al.(2003)and Francis et al.(2005)find that cityspecific, officelevel industry leadership, when bined with the nationallevel leadership, generates the highest audit fee premiums and thus, by inference, higher auditquality in the Australian and markets, respectively, while nationallevel industry leadership alone has no , Francis et al.(2006)document that client earningsquality proxied by abnormal accruals is higher when auditors are citylevel industry leaders alone,or they are both citylevel and nationallevel industry differently, their results indicatethat nationallevel industry leadership alone has no significant impact on audit , Choi et al.(2007)show that the geographical proximity of the citybased engagementoffice to clients’ headquarters is positively associated with the accrual quality of clients, suggesting that the geographical location of the auditor’s office is an important engagementspecificdeterminant of audit above findings, taken together, suggest that citybased, officelevel characteristics may play an important role in determining audit quality and thus audit should be pointed out, however, that none of these studies has paid attention to the question ofwhether the size of a local engagement office is systematically associated with audit quality andfees paid to bridge this gap in our knowledge, we investigate a hitherto underresearched question ofwhether, and how, the size of a local engagement office hereafter, office sizeis associated withaudit quality and audit first hypothesize that office size is systematically associatedwith audit quality even after controlling for audit firm size at the national level and auditorindustry expertise at the office will be further elaborated in the next section, one would observe a positive association if the audits by large offices are of higher quality than the audits bysmall , we also examine the association between the office size and audit research shows that audit quality is priced in the market(Choi et 。Kreps and Wilson 1982。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)中，審計(jì)質(zhì)量是由異常應(yīng)計(jì)來(lái)衡量的，辦事處規(guī)模則有兩種衡量方法：一個(gè)是基于每個(gè)辦事處的審計(jì)客戶(hù)數(shù)量，另一個(gè)是基于每個(gè)辦事處掙得的審計(jì)費(fèi)用總額。關(guān)鍵字：審計(jì)事務(wù)所，辦事處規(guī)模。這正相關(guān)關(guān)系印證了規(guī)模大的本土辦事處相對(duì)規(guī)模小的辦事處來(lái)說(shuō)，能過(guò)提供更高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)。Francis et 。Ferguson et 。Choi and Doogar 2005), andauditor industry leadership(., DeFond et 。audit Availability:Data are publicly available from sources identified in the way we think about an accounting firm changes dramatically when we shift the unit of analysisaway from the firm as a whole, to the analysis of specific citybased offices within a termsof DeAngelo’s1981b argument, a Big 4 accounting firm is not so big when we shift to theofficelevel of example, while Enron represented less than 2 percent of Arthur Andersen’s national revenues from publicly listed clients, it was more than 35 percent of such revenues in the Houston As alluded to in the above quote, the size of a citybased audit engagement office could bea more crucial determinant of audit quality and thus audit feesthan the size of anationallevel audit firm because the citybased office is a semiautonomous unit withinan audit firm with its own client is an officebased engagement partner or audit team, notnational headquarters, who actually administers and implements individual audit engagement contracts, including the delivery of audit services and the issuance of an audit this regard,Wallman(1996)and Francis(2004)argue that the assessment of auditor independence needs tofocus more on the individual office level rather than the entire firm level because most of the auditdecisions with respect to a particular client are made within each individual anecdotalevidence on the collapse of Enron, which was audited by the Houston office of Arthur Andersen,is a good example that demonstrates the importance of officelevel audit , much of extant audit research has focused its attention on two nationallevel audit firm characteristics asfundamental determinants of audit quality, namely: audit firm size(., Simunic and Stein 1987。因此，政府的持續(xù)努力以操縱利率，這種行為的一個(gè)重要受害者是中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)的全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者。國(guó)家以較低的成本調(diào)動(dòng)大量資金的能力，也有對(duì)世界的負(fù)面影響。進(jìn)入20世紀(jì)90年代，央行行長(zhǎng)感受到西方關(guān)于貨幣政策以及中國(guó)人民銀行政治性角色的擔(dān)憂(yōu)，開(kāi)始認(rèn)真的推行利率市場(chǎng)化。為了保持這些手段的有效性，他們需要儲(chǔ)戶(hù)在中國(guó)的國(guó)家金融體系的抵押品。大多數(shù)商品和服務(wù)價(jià)格已經(jīng)被放開(kāi)（韋德曼2003）。然而中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在危機(jī)模式下，利率進(jìn)一步自由化的任何談話被擱臵。由于銀行為經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激計(jì)劃提供資金的意愿，財(cái)政部不需要發(fā)行很多的債務(wù)，從而限制財(cái)政赤字的規(guī)模。銀行持有的存款利率低于基準(zhǔn)利率而貸款利率高于基準(zhǔn)利率，實(shí)際上可收獲可觀的利潤(rùn)，即使在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退期間（漢2009）。因此，當(dāng)中央要求銀行于2008年11月為4萬(wàn)億人民幣經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激方案提供融資，銀行以極大的熱情回應(yīng)。為了給中國(guó)人民銀行信貸，促使城市商業(yè)銀行和農(nóng)村信用社貸款利率的市場(chǎng)化，通過(guò)提供更多高利率的貸款給在私營(yíng)部門(mén)的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的的借款人，提供融資給原先被凍結(jié)的正規(guī)銀行系統(tǒng)分部（中國(guó)人民銀行貨幣政策的研究團(tuán)隊(duì) 2005）。在此期間，通過(guò)存款利率上限和貸款利率的下限，銀行之間的“毀滅性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”仍然受到嚴(yán)格的限制。在存款方面，存款利率上下限的去除主要是象征性的，因?yàn)殂y行沒(méi)有理由去不必要地降低利率，使其低于他們的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手所提供的利率。一些驚喜，在2004年10月29日，對(duì)貸款利率的上限被解除，允許銀行以他們想要的高利息收費(fèi)（人民日?qǐng)?bào)2005）。這是一種新產(chǎn)品推出時(shí)所必須經(jīng)歷的階段?！叭f(wàn)豪”國(guó)際集團(tuán)命名了“Fairfield”這樣一個(gè)連鎖賓館（“萬(wàn)豪”國(guó)際集團(tuán)并且還擁有對(duì)消費(fèi)者消費(fèi)更加便宜的“Ramada”連鎖旅店）。再次，“寶潔”公司就是這種多品牌策略的典型代表，在美國(guó)“寶潔”公司有多達(dá)十幾種品牌的洗滌用品活躍在市場(chǎng)上。這種多品牌策略的基礎(chǔ)可以解釋為在某個(gè)市場(chǎng)上12個(gè)品牌商品的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中生產(chǎn)商占有3個(gè)品牌比生產(chǎn)商在某個(gè)市場(chǎng)上10個(gè)品牌商品的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中生產(chǎn)商占有1個(gè)品牌商品更能多的占有市場(chǎng)份額（即使采用的多品牌在市場(chǎng)中僅僅只有一個(gè)能被市場(chǎng)接納）。品牌的延伸也存在橫向和縱向的延伸。最常見(jiàn)的例子就要屬英特爾公司了，在個(gè)人電腦的市場(chǎng)上“英特爾”電腦常常被稱(chēng)為“電腦里面的英特爾”。雖然在產(chǎn)品上有一個(gè)標(biāo)有“無(wú)印良品”集團(tuán)的標(biāo)簽，但是“無(wú)印良品”集團(tuán)的產(chǎn)品仍然是沒(méi)有任何品牌宣傳的。在2000本關(guān)于營(yíng)銷(xiāo)的書(shū)籍中沒(méi)有商標(biāo)品牌的品牌化態(tài)度營(yíng)銷(xiāo)被描述為“迷信戰(zhàn)略”。 Decker”）或者是一系列品牌的輔助工具（比如美國(guó)的“吉百利牛奶”、“吉百利玉米片”、“吉百利手套”）。品牌所有者將尋求縮小商標(biāo)圖象和品牌身份之間的差距。例如普通的食用