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【文章內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介】 e.216。All sequential move games are of this type.Imperfect Information216。Partial or no information concerning the opponent is given in advance to the player’s decision.216。Imperfect information may be diminished over time if the same game with the same opponent is to be repeated.Key Area of Interest216。chance216。strategyMatrix NotationNotes: Player I39。s strategy A may be different from Player II39。s.P2 can be omitted if zerosum gamePrisoner’s Dilemma Other famous gamesA sample of other games:MarriageDisarmament (my generals are more irrational than yours)Prisoner’s DilemmaNotes: Higher payoffs (longer sentences) are bad.Noncooperative equilibrium ? Joint maximumNCEJt. max.Games of Conflict216。Two sides peting against each other216。Usually caused by plete lack of information about the opponent or the game216。Characteristic of zerosum gamesGames of CooperationPlayers may improve payoff through216。municating216。forming binding coalitions agreements 216。do not apply to zerosum games Prisoner’s Dilemma with CooperationPrisoner’s Dilemma with Iteration216。Infinite number of iterations167。 Fear of retaliati
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