【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 ne . moral legitimacy and constrain the superpower in a web of multilateral institutions and treaty regimes—not what standard realist theory predicts. These conceptual difficulties notwithstanding, realism is alive, well, and creatively reassessing how its root principles relate to the post9/11world. Despite changing configurations of power, realists remain steadfast in stressing that policy must be based on positions of real strength, not on either empty bravado or hopeful illusions about a world without conflict. In the runup to the recent Iraq war, several prominent realists signed a public letter criticizing what they perceived as an exercise in American hubris. And in the continuing aftermath of that war, many prominent thinkers called for a return to realism. A group of scholars and public intellectuals (myself included) even approach. Its statement of princi ples argues that “the move toward empire must be halted immediately.” The coalition, though politically diverse, is largely inspired by realist theory. Its membership of seemingly odd bedfellows—including for mer Democratic Sen. Gary Hart and Scott McConnell, the executive editor of the American Conservative magazine—illus trates the power of international relations theory to cut through often ephemeral political labels and carry debate to the underlying assumptions. THE DIVIDED HOUSE OF LIBERALISM The liberal school of international relations theory, whose most famous proponents were German philosopher Immanuel Kant and . President Woodrow Wilson, contends that realism has a stunted vision that cannot account for progress in relations between nations. Liberals foresee a slow but inexorable journey away from the anarchic world the realists envision, as trade and finance forge ties between nations, and democratic norms spread. Because elected leaders are accountable to the people (who bear the burdens of war), liberals expect that democracies will not attack each other and will regard each other’s regimes as legitimate and nonthreatening. 因為當選的領導者們對人們（那些肩負起戰(zhàn)爭的人們）負責，自由派期望民主國將不會相互攻擊對方，并且將相互之間的政體看作是一種合法和對其不構成威脅的政體。Many liberals also believe that the rule of law and transparency of democratic processes make it easier to sustain international cooperation, especially when these practices are enshrined in multilateral institutions.很多自由主派也相信法律的統(tǒng)治和民主進程的透明使得維持國際間的合作變得更加容易，尤其是當這些實踐莊嚴地載入了多邊體系中，Liberalism has such a powerful presence that the entire . political spectrum, from neoconservatives to human rights advocates, assumes it as largely selfevident. 自由主義擁有這樣一個頗具影響力的范疇，以致整個美國政治范圍內(nèi)，從新保守主義者到人權倡導者，很大程度上都認為它是顯而易見的。Outside the United States, as well, the liberal view that only elected governments are legitimate and politically reliable has taken hold. 同樣地，除了美國之外，這樣一個自由的觀點：只有當選的政府才是合法的，并且在政治上才是可靠的，已經(jīng)站穩(wěn)了腳跟了。So it is no surprise that liberal themes are constantly invoked as a response to today’s security dilemmas. 因此，自由的主題不斷地被引用作為對于當今的安全困境的回應，這并不會讓人感到驚訝。But the last several years have also produced a fierce tugof war between disparate strains of liberal thought. 但是在過去的幾年里，在不同的自由思想的緊張之間也產(chǎn)生了一個激烈的競爭。Supporters and critics of the Bush administration, in particular, have emphasized very different elements of the liberal canon. 支持者們和布什政府的批評家們尤其強調(diào)自由準則的不同因素。For its part, the Bush administration highlights democracy promotion while largely turning its back on the international institutions that most liberal theorists champion. 對其來說，當很大程度上拋棄了絕大多數(shù)自由主義理論者擁護的國際機構的時候，布什政府強調(diào)民主提升了。The . National Security Strategy of September 2002, famous for its support of preventive war, also dwells on the need to promote democracy as a means of fighting terrorism and promoting peace. 美國國家2002年九月份的安全策略，以其對預防戰(zhàn)爭的支持而聞名，也詳述了促進民主作為促進和平和打擊恐怖主義的一種方法的需要。The Millennium Challenge program allocates part of . foreign aid according to how well countries improve their performance on several measures of democratization and the rule of law.千年挑戰(zhàn)計劃根據(jù)國家關于民主化和法規(guī)的幾個措施改善其表現(xiàn)的程度，分派部分美國國外幫助。The White House’s steadfast support for promoting democracy in the Middle East—even with turmoil in Iraq and rising antiAmericanism in the Arab world—demonstrates liberalism’s emotional and rhetorical power. 美國白宮對于中東地區(qū)提倡民主堅定的支持—甚至在伊拉克地區(qū)還處于騷亂狀態(tài)，并且在阿拉伯存在日益增長的反美主義— 證明了自由主義令人動情的，用詞華麗的力量。In many respects, liberalism’s claim to be a wise policy guide has plenty of hard data behind it. 很多方面，自由主義宣稱是一個明智的政策引導在其背后已經(jīng)有很多確切的數(shù)據(jù)支持著這么一個理論了。During the last two decades, the proposition that democratic institutions and values help states cooperate with each other is among the most intensively studied in all of international relations, and it has held up reasonably well. 在過去的二十年期間，民主的機構和價值幫助國與國之間相互合作這樣的一個提議在所有的國際關系中，是最值得集中研究的，而且這樣的一個提議已經(jīng)相當合理地被擱置。Indeed, the belief that democracies never fight wars against each other is the closest thing we have to an iron law in social science.的確，民主國家相互之間永遠不會發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭這樣的一個信念是一件我們所擁有的，并且離我們最近的事情，這件事情是相對于一個在社會科學中的剛強的法律而言的。But the theory has some very important corollaries, which the Bush administration glosses over as it draws upon the democracypromotion element of liberal thought.但是，那個理論有一些非常重要的推論，布什政府一直掩飾著這樣的一個理論，因為布什政府利用了了自由思想促進民主的因素。Columbia University political scientist Michael W. Doyle’s articles on democratic peace warned that, though democracies never fight each other, they are prone to launch messianic struggles against warlike authoritarian regimes to “make the world safefor democracy.”哥倫比亞大學政治學家Michael W. Doyle在關于 民主和平的文章警告說：“雖然民主國家相互之間沒有戰(zhàn)爭，但是這些民主國家傾向于 與 那些喜好戰(zhàn)爭的獨裁主義政權做救世主般的斗爭，從而讓這個世界在對于民主這個范疇來講的時候，是安全的?！盜t was precisely American democracy’s tendency to oscillate between selfrighteous crusading and jaded isolationism that prompted early Cold War realists’ call for a more calculated, prudent foreign policy. 精確來講，正是在偽善的改革運動和疲憊不堪的孤立主義之間的美國民主主義猶豫不決的趨勢促使了早期冷戰(zhàn)現(xiàn)實主義者呼吁一個更有計劃的，有遠見的外交政策。Countries transitioning to democracy, with weak po