【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 ights of less than half that). Acquisitions are thus only possible via “club” deals, in which several buyers band together and regulators police the arrangement to ensure they are not acting in concert thereafter.對于收購方更大的問題是，對非金融機構(gòu)接管銀行長期存在的限制。那些不愿意成為持股銀行的公司(為此將接受額外的監(jiān)管)將最多只能得到33%的股權(quán)(且投票權(quán)則不能超過股權(quán)的一半)。因此，將只有可能通過“俱樂部式并購”實現(xiàn)，即幾個買家捆綁在一起，監(jiān)管者將監(jiān)督整個安排以確保他們沒有幕后交易。Alternatively, investors can use their personal wealth to buy entire banks. Christopher Flowers, a specialist in bank buyouts, did just that, splashing out on a small Missouri lender and rebranding it Flowers Bank. But these solo buyers are barred from tapping their firms39。 funds for expansion, greatly limiting the appeal of such moves.另一種方法是，投資者們可以用其私人財富來買下整個銀行。，銀行并購的專家，就是這樣做的，買下一個小貸款機構(gòu)，并重整品牌為弗萊沃銀行。但是這些個人買家被禁止用他們公司的資金來進行擴張，這極大地限制了這種方式的吸引力。As the crisis has rumbled on, regulators have reluctantly ceded some ground to the barbarians at the banks39。 gates. They can now, for instance, appoint more directors without this being deemed to constitute control. Clubs of investors are being precleared so they can pick up bank charters quickly when opportunities arise. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which regulates nationally chartered banks, has even developed a “shelf charter”, which such groups can secure in advance of deals. It has already handed out two. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which handles failed banks and is expected to release new guidelines on privateequity investment soon, has also softened its stance. Sheila Bair, its chairman, believes buyout firms should be considered eligible bidders if they show they can run a bank prudently and are “good corporate citizens”.隨著金融危機的車輪繼續(xù)滾滾向前，監(jiān)管者也不情愿地將通往銀行大門前的土地割讓給所謂的野蠻人。例如他們現(xiàn)在可以任命更多的董事而不為視為是機構(gòu)控制。投資者團體可以被事先審查，這樣當(dāng)機會出現(xiàn)時，他們可以迅速獲得銀行執(zhí)照。負責(zé)監(jiān)管全國性銀行的貨幣監(jiān)理署官員甚至發(fā)明出了“執(zhí)照貨架”，這些團體可以確保是交易安全的。他們已經(jīng)遞出了兩個。負責(zé)解決破產(chǎn)銀行的聯(lián)邦存款保險公司，也放低了姿態(tài)，他們可能會在近期出臺對私人股本投資的新指導(dǎo)方針。，并且是好的企業(yè)公民的話，就可以考慮被認為是合格的投標(biāo)人。The Office of Thrift Supervision, which watches over lenders with around $1 trillion of assets, has gone even further. It recently permitted a single buyout shop, MatlinPatterson, to take over a thrift in Michigan and has indicated that it will wave through similar deals.儲蓄機構(gòu)監(jiān)理局(他們負責(zé)監(jiān)管擁有10000億美元資產(chǎn)的貸款機構(gòu))更是大刀闊斧。它最近允許一個單一收購者MatlinPatterson接管了密歇根的一個儲蓄機構(gòu)，并宣稱還會有類似的并購案浪潮。This puts it at odds with the more cautious Federal Reserve, which oversees the holding panies that sit atop most banks. The Fed will not permit a firm that is not regulated as a bank to own a controlling stake in one, even if the investment is ringfenced. The central bank worries about mixing merce and finance, which have been legally separated for decades in America.這一切都使得美聯(lián)儲(負責(zé)監(jiān)管大多數(shù)銀行控股公司)的更加審慎的態(tài)度顯得奇怪。美聯(lián)儲將不允許任何一個不是被作為銀行來監(jiān)管的公司取得銀行控股權(quán)，即便投資是專項的。央行擔(dān)心幾十年以來一直被分開監(jiān)管的商業(yè)和金融業(yè)混為一談。Most investors accept that banks, unlike thrifts, are out of bounds to lone buyers. Some plain that not being able to control a bank forces them to demand a higher return, which will raise the cost of recapitalising the industry. But there will still be money to be made, says Mr Kanas, because even minority investors will be able to meet their hurdle rates of return if the government is generous enough in its risksharing. Mr Flowers, unable so far to make much progress at home and licking his wounds from setbacks abroad, believes riches lie ahead. As he colourfully predicted earlier this year: “Lowlife gravedancers like me will make a fortune.”大多數(shù)投資者也認為，銀行不像是儲蓄機構(gòu)，如果被單獨買家買下是有些越軌的。一些人抱怨，如果不能夠控股一家銀行，就會迫使它們要求更高的資本回報，這將會提高調(diào)整產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的成本。但是還是有錢可賺，喀納斯說，因為如果政府能夠慷慨的分擔(dān)風(fēng)險，總是會有少數(shù)的投資人能夠達到要求的回報率。截至目前弗拉沃還在舔那些國外的創(chuàng)傷，家里的生意也還沒有什么大的起色，但是他相信，財富就在前方。正如他今年早些時候所預(yù)言的那樣，“像我這樣下層的掃墓舞者會發(fā)財?！弊g者注：墳?zāi)刮枵邅碓从谏侥窛蔂?Sam Zell)，一位將資產(chǎn)建立在業(yè)界周期之上的地產(chǎn)投資大師。澤爾有個著名的別號叫“墳?zāi)刮枵摺?the grave dancer)。澤爾說，這個詞來自于他曾撰寫的一篇文章的標(biāo)題，該文闡述了市場經(jīng)歷過熱投資帶來的必然經(jīng)濟泡沫后，他怎樣從蕭條房產(chǎn)市場得利的策略。澤爾說這篇文章展示了他是怎樣“在他人錯誤的尸骸上起舞的”。經(jīng)濟學(xué)人雜志雙語閱讀：Muffled signals模糊的信號Sovereign creditdefault swaps主權(quán)信用違約掉期Muffled signals模糊的信號Jun 11th 2009 | WASHINGTON, DCFrom The Economist print editionCredit derivatives on countries are behaving oddly主權(quán)信用衍生品市場表現(xiàn)奇異GOVERNMENTS in the rich world are announcing recordbreaking deficits and their credit ratings are under threat. Yet the market that should be most worried is not. An index of creditdefaultswap (CDS) spreads on the seven biggest rich economies maintained by Credit Derivatives Research (CDR), a research outfit, has widened in recent weeks, but still signals half the risk it did in February, before the full scale of the damage to public finances became clear (see chart). The trend holds true even for Britain, which is threatened with a creditrating downgrade, and Ireland, which on June 8th suffered its second sovereign downgrade in three months.發(fā)達國家的政府們正在不斷宣布著打破紀(jì)錄的赤字額，他們的信用評級也正面臨著危險。然而理應(yīng)最為人們所擔(dān)心的(信用違約)市場卻沒有顯示出相應(yīng)風(fēng)險。(盡管)一項由信用衍生品研究機構(gòu)(CDR)提供的、基于七個最大最富有經(jīng)濟體的信用違約掉期利差在最近幾周內(nèi)有所擴大，但是在公共財政面臨的全方位威脅一覽無余之際，信用違約掉期利差仍然僅顯示出相當(dāng)于其今年二月時所顯示的一半的風(fēng)險。(如圖。即“僅從信用違約掉期利差的走勢圖中，并未顯示出與利差走勢相適應(yīng)的公共財政風(fēng)險”)這一趨勢即使對英國和愛爾蘭也是如此，英國正面領(lǐng)著信用評級遭降級的威脅，而愛爾蘭在6月8日那天遭到其三個月中第二次主權(quán)信用降級。Dave Klein at CDR admits to being puzzled by the trend. He reckons that investors associate sovereigndefault risk with overall financial risk because governments now backstop so much of the system. When America bailed out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the country39。s two big mortgage agencies, its CDS spreads widened sharply. Conversely, a recovering economy means fewer bank failures, so government balancesheets are less likely to be strained by bailouts.信用衍生品研究機構(gòu)(CDR)的Dave Klein承認他對這一趨勢感到困惑。他認為由于政府如今對于金融系統(tǒng)做了如此多的增援支持，投資者會將主權(quán)違約風(fēng)險和總體金融風(fēng)險聯(lián)系起來。當(dāng)美國對國內(nèi)最大的兩家房屋抵押貸款機構(gòu)房利美和房地美實行救市計劃時，其信用違約掉期的利差迅速擴大。反之，經(jīng)濟復(fù)蘇意味著更少的銀行倒閉事件，因此政府的資產(chǎn)負債表被救市計劃拖累的可能性也就越小。Sovereign CDSs are in any case harder to interpret than corporate CDSs. Richcountry defaults are extremely rare (emerging markets, less so) which makes it difficult for investors to estimate how much they would recover in bankruptcy, a key determinant in CDS pricing. Moreover, payouts on the swaps are triggered in different ways. 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