【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 may lose jobs and the economy can be disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a ?rm’s ?nancial distress, non?nancial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing business with a ?rm having a high(er) potential for ?nancial difficulties. This understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed ?rm creates a cost that can deter a ?rm from undertaking excessive debt ?nancing even when lenders are willing to provide it on favorable terms. These considerations by non?nancial stakeholders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the tradeoff theory ， since these stakeholders in?uence the indirect costs of ?nancial distress. As the tradeoff theory (excluding agency costs between managers and shareholders) and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and Titman assumes shareholder wealth maximization as the single corporate objective. Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies have been produced. See . Harris and Raviv or a systematic overview of this literature. More recent studies are . Sunder and Myers, testing the tradeoff theory against the pecking order theory, Kemsley and Nissim estimating the present value of tax shields, Andrade and Kaplan estimating the costs of ?nancial distress and Rajan and Zingales investigating the determinants of capital structure in the G7 countries. Rajan and Zingales explain differences in leverage of individual ?rms with ?rm characteristics. In their study leverage is a function of tangibility of assets, markettobook ratio, ?rm size and pro?tability. Barclay and Smith provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels , Rajan and Zingales ,Barclay and Smith and Wald model capital structure mainly in terms of leverage and then leverage as a function of different ?rm (and market) characteristics as suggested by capital structure theory. We do the opposite. We do not analyze the effect of several ?rm characteristics on capital structure, but we analyze the effect of capital structure on variables that codetermine shareholder value. In several decisions, including capital structure decisions, these variables may get the role of decision criteria. Other Objectives and Considerations A lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in the interest of the shareholders. Neither the static tradeoff theory nor the pecking order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers [41] () states that “Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these ?rms ?nancing choices is limited.”Results of several surveys reveal that CFOs do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth maximizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not e as a surprise. The survey by Graham and Harvey ?nds only moderate evidence for the tradeoff theory. Around 70% have a ?exible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 10% have a strict target ratio. Around 20% of the ?rms declare not to have an optimal or target debtequity ratio at all. In general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated and dividend paying ?rms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the . is fairly important in issuing foreign debt decisions. Little evidence is found that personal taxes in?uence the capital structure. In general potential costs of ?nancial distress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to Graham and Harvey this last ?nding could be