【正文】 Lieutenant General Wang Guosheng, Lanzhou MR。 and Lieutenant General Zhang Youxia, Shenyang MR. These new manders reflect the PLA’s modernization priorities and efforts to promote officers who are younger, better educated, and trained according to the PLA’s evolving professional military education guidelines. . Regarding Taiwan, President Hu’s 17th Party Congress speech did not emphasize military threats, but affirmed the importance of continuing China’s military modernization and urged the Party to “accelerate the revolution in military affairs with PLA characteristics [and] ensure preparations for military struggles….” . Hu’s speech also included an offer to hold consultations with Taiwan, based on Beijing’s One China principle, toward “reaching a peace agreement.” Taiwan President Chen Shuibian rejected the offer. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 中國最大管理資源中心 第 17 頁 共 120 頁 . In an August 2020 speech celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the PLA, President Hu called for accelerating the modernization of weapons and equipment, enhancing personnel training, and strengthening bat skills through “ coordinated development between national defense building and economic construction.” China began to use this language in the late 1990s, reflecting the CCP’s strategy of balancing economic growth and military modernization, as opposed to privileging one over the other. . In December 2020, China announced the elevation of Hainan Province’s Xisha Islands office to a countylevel office named “Sansha City,” which would hold administrative jurisdiction over the Paracel and Spratly island groups, and Macclesfield Bank – claims disputed by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. A PRC spokesperson asserted that China has “indisputable sovereignty” and effective jurisdiction over the islands of the South China Sea “and the adjacent waterways.” In reaction to China’s declaration, hundreds of Vietnamese protesters demonstrated outside the Chinese embassy in Hanoi. Developments in China’s Military Forces China’s longterm, prehensive transformation of its military forces is improving its capacity for force projection and antiaccess/area denial. Consistent with a nearterm focus on preparing for Taiwan Strait contingencies, China deploys many of its most advanced systems to the military regions opposite Taiwan. China describes operating under “informatized” conditions and improving “integrated joint operations” capabilities as the primary objectives for the PLA’s buildup. Informatized conditions are operating environments characterized by munications jamming, electronic surveillance, and precision weaponry. “Integrated joint 中國最大管理資源中心 第 18 頁 共 120 頁 operations” is the PLA’s term for multiservice, bined arms operations. Ballistic and Cruise Missiles. China has the most active ballistic missile program in the world. It is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. . By November 2020, the PLA had deployed between 990 and 1,070 CSS6 and CSS7 short range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to garrisons opposite Taiwan. It is increasing the size of this force at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year, including variants of these missiles with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads. . The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, such as the domestically produced groundlaunched DH10 land attack cruise missile (LACM)。 Lieutenant General Zhao Keshi, Nanjing MR。 the Russian SSN22/SUNBURN supersonic antiship cruise missile (ASCM) outfitted on China’s two SOVREMENNYY and two SOVREMENNYY IIclass guided missile destroyers (DDG), also acquired from Russia。 Lieutenant General Zhang Qinsheng, Guangzhou MR。 and, the SSN27B/ SIZZLER supersonic ASCM, outfitted on the last eight of twelve total Russianbuilt KILOclass diesel electric submarines China has acquired. . China is developing an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS5 mediumrange ballistic missile (MRBM) as a ponent of its antiaccess strategy. The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km and, when incorporated into a sophisticated mand and control system, is a key ponent of China’s antiaccess strategy to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers, from great distances. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 中國最大管理資源中心 第 19 頁 共 120 頁 . China is modernizing its longerrange ballistic missile force by adding more survivable systems. Most notably, the DF31 and longer range DF31A are now being deployed to units within the Second Artillery Corps. . China is also working on a new submarine launched ballistic missile, the JL2, for deployment aboard new JINclass (Type 094) nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). The JL2 is expected to reach initial operational capability (IOC) between 20202020. Space and Counterspace. China is developing a multidimensional program to limit or prevent the use of spacebased assets by its potential adversaries during times of crisis or conflict. Although China’s