博弈論資料-英文(25個(gè)文件)syllabus-博弈論(完整版)
【正文】 onalizability L O BENPORATH, E. (1997): “Rationality, Nash Equilibrium, and Backwards Induction In PerfectInformation Games,” Review of Economic Studies 64, 2346 11. Extensive Games: Refinements Forward induction: outside options, burning money. Forward and Backward induction. Iterated weak/conditional dominance and ExtensiveForm rationalizability. R BENPORATH, E. and DEKEL, E. (1992): “Signalling Future Actions and the Potential for Sacrifice,” Journal of Economic Theory 57:3651. L O PEARCE, D. (1984): “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,” Econometrica 52:10291050. BATTIGALLI, P. (1997): “On Rationalizability in Extensive Games,” Journal of Economic Theory 74:4061. Signalling Games and specialized versions of Forward Induction The Intuitive Criterion: a simple test of “reasonableness.” “Monotonicity” of signals: Dn, divinity and friends. R CHO, I. and KREPS, D. (1987): “Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102: 179221. 12. Invariance and NormalForm refinements The Interplay between Normal and Extensiveform analysis Invariance Perfect and Proper Equilibria. Proper and Sequential equilibria. L Strategic Stability and the “axiomatic approach” A list of desiderata, and the need for setvalued solutions. “True perfection” and the “Nearby games, Nearby equilibria Principle.” R KOHLBERG, E. and MERTENS, JF., (1986): “
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