【正文】 so opposed the project (Hirsch, 1998). Finally, the Chicago Motor Club organized acampaign against the closing of Cottage Grove Avenue, arguing that the street was essential tomaintaining an adequate flow of traffic on the South Side (Neil, 1952).To the dismay of New York Life officials, the various city agencies and governing bodies witha stake in the project could not e to an agreement on how to proceed. The Land ClearanceCommission initiated efforts to gain control over the 100acre site. However, the Chicago PlanCommission was ―unceasingly difficult,‖ debating the closure of Cottage Grove Avenue for more than a year before finally making a weak remendation that the street be vacated (MHPC,1949。 O‘Connor, 1993。 Mollenkopf, 1983。 本科畢業(yè)設(shè)計 外文文獻及 譯文 文獻、資料題目： URBAN RENEWAL POLICY IN CHICAGO 文獻、資料來源： 期刊 Journal of Urban Affairs 第 31期 文獻、資料發(fā)表（出版）日期： 院 （部）： 管理工程學(xué)院 專 業(yè)： 工程管理 班 級： 工管 081 姓 名： 李洪硯 學(xué) 號： 2020021014 指導(dǎo)教師： 亓霞 翻譯日期： 山東建筑大學(xué)畢業(yè)設(shè)計外文文獻 及譯文 1 外文 文獻 ： Advanced Encryption Standard REGIME BUILDING, INSTITUTION BUILDING: URBAN RENEWAL POLICY IN CHICAGO, 1946–1962 JOEL RAST University of WisconsinMilwaukee ABSTRACT: Urban regime analysis emphasizes the role of coalition building in creating a capacity to govern in cities. Through a case study of urban renewal policy in postwar Chicago, this article considers the role played by political institutions. Conceptualizing this historical period as one of regime building, I show how existing political institutions were out of sync with the city’s new governing agenda of urban renewal and redevelopment following World War II. Creating a capacity to govern in urban renewal policy required both coalition building and a fundamental reworki ng of formal governing institutions. It was spring 1964, and Chicago was in the midst of its greatest construction boom since therebuilding effort following the Great Chicago Fire of 1871. In the third of a series of articles on Chicago‘s postwar revitalization, the Chicago Tribune celebrated the acplishments of the past 10 years: more than six million square feet of new office space constructed downtown。 Levine, 1989。 Mantel, 1970。 Sturdy, 1950).6Several other city agencies—including the Chicago Transit Authority,the Department of Streets and Electricity, and the Park District—registered their opposition to the street closure (Neil, 1952). Meanwhile, a group of South Side aldermen opposed theproject altogether, arguing it would create unacceptable hardships for current residents of the area(Chicago Tribune, 1950b).By spring 1950, New York Life had begun to lose patience. In a letter to Mayor Kennelly,pany vicepresident Otto Nelson warned that ―fatal delay and eventual failure will result if thevarious agencies of the city who are involved yield to the temptation to promise and placateat every point where some individual or small group is affected adversely‖ (Nelson, 1950). Withthe fate of the city‘s first urban renewal project hanging in the balance, Kennelly made a rareappearance before city council to express his support for the development (Buck, 1950a). The following month, the council voted 31–12 to approve the project (Buck, 1950b). In February1952, nearly four years after the development was first announced, ground was finally broken onthe city‘s first renewal project. Although urban renewal proponents celebrated this milestone, thelengthy delays experienced by New York Life sent a strong message to private investors that urbanrenewal in Chicago under the present political conditions would require tremendous another wellpublicized case also illustrating the 山東建筑大學(xué)畢業(yè)設(shè)計外文文獻 及譯文 9 problems of administrative decentralizationfor urban renewal policy, a West Side alderman persuaded the Plan Commission to reclassify hisward from a ―blighted‖ area to a ―rehabilitation‖ area over the objections of the Land Clearance Commission (New York Times, 1950). The change meant that renewal efforts would have to takeplace through rehabilitation of existing structures—a method preferred by ward residents—ratherthan through slum clearance. The Plan Commission‘s decision preempted the efforts of the Land Clearance Commission, which was in the process of surveying the West Side to determine itsselection of slum clearance sites. Commission Chairman John McKinlay urged the mayor todelay action on the matter until the survey was pleted (McKinlay, 1950). MHPC PresidentFerd Kramer warned the mayor of the ―devastating effects of [the Plan Commission‘s] actionon the entire redevelopment program‖ (MHPC, 1950a). However, this time Kennelly declined tointervene, and the city council planning mittee approved the Plan Commission‘s decision by a252 vote. According to a 1950 MHPC report, such actions by the Plan Commission to ―sabotage‖the city‘s slum clearance program ―have discouraged some of the topranking planners who were persuaded to e to Chicago on the promise that ?things were going to happen here.‘ Duringthe past two years, nine professionals have called it quits and gone elsewhere‖ (MHPC, 1950b,p. 3). GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION: PHASE I By the early 1950s, urban renewal advocates in Chicago had identified the fragmentation ofthe city‘s urban renewal powers as a principal cause of Chicago‘s sluggish redevelopment one civic group put it, ―It is obvious that Chicago has too many agencies working on differentsegments of its housing problem, and that this creates pointless rivalries, overall administrativeinefficiency, excessive costs and public confusion‖ (Citizens Committee to Fight Slums, 1954,p. 23). In 1951, the city council Committee on Housing missioned a study of the organization andadministration of the city‘s urban redevelopment program. The study was initiated by mit