【正文】 erfulmayor such as Daley of Chicago. While a focus on informal governing arrangements—in particular, the mobilization of resourcesthrough regime building—explains much about how governing capacity was created in postwarcities, informal arrangements are not the whole story. As Skocpol (1992) has argued, policyoutes are determined in part by the ―fit‖ between the goals of politically active groups and existing political institutions. Governing institutions serve as ―staging grounds‖ or ―rules of thegame‖ for political action, favoring certain political actors and courses of action over others (Bridges, 1997, p. 14). According to Skocpol (1992, p. 54), The overall structure of political institutions provides access and leverage to some groupsand alliances, thus encouraging and rewarding their efforts to shape government policies,while simultaneously denying access and leverage to other groups and alliances . . . . Thismeans that the degree of success that any politically active group or movement achieves 山東建筑大學(xué)畢業(yè)設(shè)計外文文獻(xiàn) 及譯文 3 isinfluenced not just by the selfconsciousness and ―resource mobilization‖ of that social forceitself. In general, the governing institutions of cities immediately following World War II were illsuited to the task of largescale redevelopment. Urban renewal and redevelopment required strongexecutive leadership and centralized planning and development authority. In many cases, however,the powers of city government were highly fragmented. Political machines, while typically indecline, were still a significant presence in many cities, dispersing power among ward bosses(Teaford, 1990). Even in nonmachine cities, the predominance of weakmayor, strongcouncil citycharters left many mayors with little executive authority (Peterson, 1961). In both machine andnonmachine cities alike, planning and development functions were often carried out by numerousagencies with little coordination among them (Gottehrer, 1967。 Banfield, 1955). The organization‘s president, Ferd Kramer, was also presidentof one of Chicago‘s largest real estate firms. Other prominent board members included MiltonMumford, an assistant vicepresident of Marshall Field and Company, and Holman Pettibone,president of Chicago Title and Trust Company. In 1946, MHPC released a report containing a strategy for urban renewal that would ultimatelybe embraced by both city and state policymakers (MHPC, 1946a).2According to the report,Chicago‘s problems stemmed, above all, from the unchecked growth of blight. To reverse the tide,government would have to take steps to make innercity locations attractive once again to privatenvestors. MHPC proposed that a public agency with eminent domain powers be charged withassembling parcels of land in innercity locations and demolishing existing structures (Hirsch,1998). The cleared land would be sold to private developers at a reduced cost, while residentsdisplaced through ―slum clearance‖ would be rehoused in new public housing announced its plans at an October 1946 luncheon whose guests included the publishersof the city‘s major newspapers, the presidents of the city‘s largest banks, and top real estateexecutives (Neil, 1952). During the following months, Milton Mumford, Holman Pettibone, and other members ofMHPC‘s inner circle worked with Republican Governor Dwight Green and Democratic MayorMartin Kennelly to secure bipartisan support for state urban renewal legislation (Hirsch, 1998). These efforts culminated in the passage of two bills, the Blighted Areas Redevelopment Actand the Relocation Act, in July 1947. The bills, which extended eminent domain powers toslum clearance projects and provided state funding for slum clearance and public housing,substantially embodied the program for urban renewal unveiled by MHPC less than a ‘s efforts received a boost with the election of Martin Kennelly as mayor in had been governed since the early 1930s by a powerful Democratic Party machine. Bythe end of World War II, however, a series of scandals implicating current mayor Edward Kellyproduced growing support for reform (Biles, 1984。 Banfield,1955). Without strong executive leadership, an uncooperative alderman or bloc of aldermencould derail plans for new the past, the office of the mayor was strengthened informally through the fusion of politicaland administrative power (Chicago Home Rule Commission, 1972). Previous mayors such asEdward Kelly had dominated city council by forming alliances with party leaders or by servingjointly as mayor and machine boss. Mayor Kennelly, however, distanced himself from machineleaders and made no effort to bring city council under his control. As he put it early in his term,―Chicago is a councilgoverned city . . . . I don‘t think it‘s a function of the mayor to boss thealdermen‖ (quoted in Simpson, 2020, p. 107). With control over urban renewal policy lodged, bydefault, in city council, coordinated action was extremely difficult to these conditions, questions of ―fit‖ between the city‘s governing institutions and the goalsof urban renewal stakeholders became paramount, as illustrated by the following two ‘s first urban renewal project, announced by Governor Green in July 1948, was a proposed100acre development in a black neighborhood on the city‘s South Side (Hirsch, 1998). Planscalled for the construction of 1,400 new housing units on the site. While the project received the endorsement of Mayor Kennelly and strong backing from the city‘s business leadership, it wascontroversial. More than 2,000 families currently living in the area would have to be relocated(Buck, 1949). In addition, the developer, New York Life Insurance Co., insisted on the closureof a fourblock stretch of Cottage Grove Avenue, a major South Side arterial that bisected 山東建筑大學(xué)畢業(yè)設(shè)計外文文獻(xiàn) 及譯文 8 theproject project quickly enc