【正文】 to make innercity locations attractive once again to privatenvestors. MHPC proposed that a public agency with eminent domain powers be charged withassembling parcels of land in innercity locations and demolishing existing structures (Hirsch,1998). The cleared land would be sold to private developers at a reduced cost, while residentsdisplaced through ―slum clearance‖ would be rehoused in new public housing announced its plans at an October 1946 luncheon whose guests included the publishersof the city‘s major newspapers, the presidents of the city‘s largest banks, and top real estateexecutives (Neil, 1952). During the following months, Milton Mumford, Holman Pettibone, and other members ofMHPC‘s inner circle worked with Republican Governor Dwight Green and Democratic MayorMartin Kennelly to secure bipartisan support for state urban renewal legislation (Hirsch, 1998). These efforts culminated in the passage of two bills, the Blighted Areas Redevelopment Actand the Relocation Act, in July 1947. The bills, which extended eminent domain powers toslum clearance projects and provided state funding for slum clearance and public housing,substantially embodied the program for urban renewal unveiled by MHPC less than a ‘s efforts received a boost with the election of Martin Kennelly as mayor in had been governed since the early 1930s by a powerful Democratic Party machine. Bythe end of World War II, however, a series of scandals implicating current mayor Edward Kellyproduced growing support for reform (Biles, 1984。 Stone, 1989). In what Robert Salisbury(1964) called ―the new convergence of power,‖ city officials across the country formed sustained, multiissue alliances with local business leaders around urban renewal and redevelopment. According to urban regime theorists, the success of postwar redevelopment efforts was determinedmore by the strength and cohesiveness of such coalitions—or ―regimes‖—than by the formalpowers of local government (Stone, 1989。 a total of 27 urban renewal projects pleted, under way, or approved for construction。 DeLeon, 1992。 Stoker, 1995。 Chicago Home Rule Commission, 1954). As a prehensive program for urban redevelopment, urban renewal policy required a citywide perspective on the part of local government officials. However, aldermen were frequentlyindifferent to planning and development issues that did not directly concern their situations where their wards were affected, the needs of ward constituents typically came first. If anurban renewal or public housing project was opposed by a substantial number of ward residents,the alderman representing that district was likely to oppose it as well (Meyerson amp。Salisbury, 1961). Urban regime theorists examining development politics in postwar cities have paid scant attention to such institutional shortings. However, the architects of postwar urban redevelopmentwere clearly aware of them. In cities across the country, regime building was acpanied byefforts to reorganize city government and create new governing institutions more conducive tothe new redevelopment agenda. In Philadelphia, New York, St. Louis, Boston, Chicago, and elsewhere, new city charters, charter revisions, and other administrative reforms were proposed tostrengthen and centralize the administrative powers of city reforms, frequently initiated or championed by business leaders and other proponents of redevelopment, were opposed by machine politicians, certain city bureaucrats, and other political actors who stood tobenefit from the status political contests that surfaced over the institutional structures of postwar cities are consistent with Skowronek‘s (1982) observation that new or reformed governing institutions do not materialize simply because new governing demands produce a need for them. In Chicago andother cities, redevelopment efforts were mediated through institutional arrangements that becameobjects of struggle in their own right. The success of postwar regime builders was determined inpart by their ability to craft and successfully advance new institutional arrangements that favoredtheir objectives over those of their political Chicago, the ―fit‖ between the city‘s governing institutions and politically active groupsin urban renewal policy initially favored neighborhood organizations, civil rights 山東建筑大學(xué)畢業(yè)設(shè)計外文文獻(xiàn) 及譯文 4 groups, wardpoliticians, and other opponents of urban renewal policy, allowing such groups to successfully playan obstructionist role. During the Richard J. Daley administration, however, changing political conditions created opportunities for institution building. Reworked governing institutions werebined with Daley‘s informal powers as machine ―boss‖ to produce a new set of governingarrangements that favored proponents of redevelopment. The effectiveness of urban renewalpolicy was greatly enhanced. While the focus of this study is on regime building in postwar Chicago, Chicago‘s urban renewal experience provides lessons for modernday reformers as well. Episodes of regime buildingare conceptualized here as politically contingent periods in which the breakdown of old alliancesand governing agendas has yet to be followed by the consolidation of new governing arrangements. The evidence from Chicago suggests that proponents of regime change in contemporarycities should consider more carefully the role of governing institutions in regime building, sinceproblems of fit between governing agendas and political institutions may surface with increasedfrequency during such episodes. If the fit between the goals of changeoriented groups and political institutions is a poor one, as was initially the case in Chicago, then the mobilization ofresources acplished through regime building may need to be acpanied by parallel effortsto bring institutions in line with ne