【正文】 t were highly fragmented. Political machines, while typically indecline, were still a significant presence in many cities, dispersing power among ward bosses(Teaford, 1990). Even in nonmachine cities, the predominance of weakmayor, strongcouncil citycharters left many mayors with little executive authority (Peterson, 1961). In both machine andnonmachine cities alike, planning and development functions were often carried out by numerousagencies with little coordination among them (Gottehrer, 1967。 Mantel, 1970。 O‘Connor, 1993。Salisbury, 1961). Urban regime theorists examining development politics in postwar cities have paid scant attention to such institutional shortings. However, the architects of postwar urban redevelopmentwere clearly aware of them. In cities across the country, regime building was acpanied byefforts to reorganize city government and create new governing institutions more conducive tothe new redevelopment agenda. In Philadelphia, New York, St. Louis, Boston, Chicago, and elsewhere, new city charters, charter revisions, and other administrative reforms were proposed tostrengthen and centralize the administrative powers of city reforms, frequently initiated or championed by business leaders and other proponents of redevelopment, were opposed by machine politicians, certain city bureaucrats, and other political actors who stood tobenefit from the status political contests that surfaced over the institutional structures of postwar cities are consistent with Skowronek‘s (1982) observation that new or reformed governing institutions do not materialize simply because new governing demands produce a need for them. In Chicago andother cities, redevelopment efforts were mediated through institutional arrangements that becameobjects of struggle in their own right. The success of postwar regime builders was determined inpart by their ability to craft and successfully advance new institutional arrangements that favoredtheir objectives over those of their political Chicago, the ―fit‖ between the city‘s governing institutions and politically active groupsin urban renewal policy initially favored neighborhood organizations, civil rights 山東建筑大學畢業(yè)設(shè)計外文文獻 及譯文 4 groups, wardpoliticians, and other opponents of urban renewal policy, allowing such groups to successfully playan obstructionist role. During the Richard J. Daley administration, however, changing political conditions created opportunities for institution building. Reworked governing institutions werebined with Daley‘s informal powers as machine ―boss‖ to produce a new set of governingarrangements that favored proponents of redevelopment. The effectiveness of urban renewalpolicy was greatly enhanced. While the focus of this study is on regime building in postwar Chicago, Chicago‘s urban renewal experience provides lessons for modernday reformers as well. Episodes of regime buildingare conceptualized here as politically contingent periods in which the breakdown of old alliancesand governing agendas has yet to be followed by the consolidation of new governing arrangements. The evidence from Chicago suggests that proponents of regime change in contemporarycities should consider more carefully the role of governing institutions in regime building, sinceproblems of fit between governing agendas and political institutions may surface with increasedfrequency during such episodes. If the fit between the goals of changeoriented groups and political institutions is a poor one, as was initially the case in Chicago, then the mobilization ofresources acplished through regime building may need to be acpanied by parallel effortsto bring institutions in line with new governing demands. REGIME BUILDING FOR URBAN RENEWAL Following World War II, Chicago faced challenges similar to those of other cities around thecountry. Middleclass residents were moving to the suburbs in growing numbers, leaving behinda population that was increasingly poor and nonwhite. A semicircle of substandard housing and businesses covering roughly 15,000 acres extended outward several miles from the centralbusiness district (MHPC, 1946a). Property values were falling in many areas of the city, includingdowntown Chicago. From 1939 to 1947, the assessed valuation of property in the central businessdistrict fell from $552 million to $481 million, a drop of 13% (Teaford, 1990, p. 19).Downtown business leaders, alarmed about the implications of these trends for their corporateproperty holdings, took the lead in developing an action plan to address the growing crisis. Themost influential business organization at the time was the Metropolitan Housing and PlanningCouncil (MHPC), an 山東建筑大學畢業(yè)設(shè)計外文文獻 及譯文 5 organization founded in 1934 to provide civic leadership in planning anddevelopment policy. Although officially governed by a board of 38 directors representing arange of interests, MHPC was dominated by a small group of downtown business executives(Meyerson amp。 Banfield, 1955). The organization‘s president, Ferd Kramer, was also presidentof one of Chicago‘s largest real estate firms. Other prominent board members included MiltonMumford, an assistant vicepresident of Marshall Field and Company, and Holman Pettibone,president of Chicago Title and Trust Company. In 1946, MHPC released a report containing a strategy for urban renewal that would ultimatelybe embraced by both city and state policymakers (MHPC, 1946a).2According to the report,Chicago‘s problems stemmed, above all, from the unchecked growth of blight. To reverse the tide,government would have to take steps to make innercity locations attractive once again to privatenvestors. MHPC proposed that a public agency with eminent domain powers be charged withassembling parcels of land in innercity locations and demolishing existing structures (Hirsch,1