《戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟》ppt課件-全文預覽
【正文】 ons to obtain the Cournot Nash equilibrium (noting that xi and xj may take on different values): ? – Note that the effects of xj on qi depends on β ? At Stage 1 ? Each firm solves: ? Then ? Equilibrium solution: ? ? Cooperation in Ramp。D合作會提高 Ramp。D與生產(chǎn)都有合作 (“monopoly”) ?? Observations: ? 由于存在正的溢出效應，在沒有 Ramp。D: ?? Twostage model ?Stage 1: 企業(yè)同時選擇 xi ； Stage 2: 企業(yè)同時選擇 qi ? 分析三種情況 : ? 1）沒有合作 (“Ramp。 ?The Model by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (AER 1988) ?? Two firms produce an identical product ?? The inverse demand function: P = a – bQ ?? qi: Output produced by firm i ?? xi: Amount of research undertaken by firm i ?? The cost function of a firm: ?? Assume 0 A a and 0 β 1 ?? Ramp。D has spillover effects ? ? Main conclusion: ? There is no uniform conclusion with regard to the effects of Ramp。（例如，蘋果園與蜜蜂園） ? 在中國，產(chǎn)、學、研戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟成功的例子。（中國的情況，違反壟斷協(xié)議第 13條） 哪些因素導致企業(yè)進行戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟？ ? Relative to mergers, strategic alliances can ? – Be more flexible and easier to dissolve ? – Allow the partners to reap the gains of integrating a portion of their businesses without merging other parts of their operations ? Competition Effects of Strategic Alliances ?? Strategic alliances can affect how firms pete against each other ?? If a strategic alliance lessens petition, it benefits the firms but it may be harmful to consumers ?? Two major strands of literature ? – Ramp。（ reducing the efficiency losses caused by investment holdup problem or externalities (Ramp。 二、為什么實施戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟？ ? 1. 成本的節(jié)省。 ? 合資企業(yè)是一種特殊的戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟 ? 也有將戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟與合資企業(yè)平行來用。II講 戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟 ? 定義 ?為什么實施戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟 ?戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟的競爭效應 ? 結(jié)論 ? （ Qster 1994） An agreement in which two or more
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