【正文】 研究 主要集中 在 合同的激勵機制， 而不僅局限在 資本市場盈余管理的影響，這個 觀點的 假設 是 市場是持續(xù)有效的。 第一個觀點是 被 積極會計理論 的擁護者所 支持。 Schipper 提出了一個有代表性的學術定義，即“盈余管理”。我們將 研究 管理 層 實施操縱利潤 而采用的 不同方法。他們從純經濟的角度來看利潤操縱，并委婉地稱之為“盈余管理 ” 。 為了遏制危機，美國和法國都致力于體制 與 法律 的 改革。tal 2020。 big bath accounting wipes the slate clean for a new appointed director。 中文 3482 字 THE PROFIT AND ITS MANIPULATION Masca Ema Universitatea “Petru Maior”, Tg. Mures, bld. 1 Decembrie 1918, nr. 13/10, 0265266237, Email: In the light of recent corporate scandals, accounting today as an objective way of presenting economic reality is suffering from a real crisis of confidence. Central to the AngloSaxon system of corporate governance, it has been pushed into the public spotlight, where its impartiality and objectivity is being questioned. Keywords: profit, manipulation, management The Positive Accounting Theory and profit manipulation Even though most of the scandals have taken place in the United States, the crisis of confidence has had an impact far beyond . borders, as the AngloSaxon system of governance is spreading throughout continental Europe and particularly in France. In order to contain the crisis, the United States and France are mitted to institutional and legal reform. Moreover, those identified as having perpetrated such manipulation, essentially auditors and financial directors, have been legally sanctioned. We should noheless question whether these legal and legislative measures will be sufficient to restore longterm confidence in the system. Bernard Collase is asking himself if shouldn’t the social dimension of the issue be taken into account? Isn’t it necessary first to understand the reasons behind profit manipulation and how it functions before changing legislation? Tenants of Positive Accounting Theory have represented the mainstream of accounting research since the early 80s. They see profit manipulation, which they euphemistically call “earnings management”, from an exclusively economic standpoint. How and why do management controllers take part in profit manipulation? That shareholder pressure leads management controllers to manipulate their firm’s profits. Going beyond individual responsibility, the organization imposed on a pany by its shareholders with the aim of respecting criteria of AngloSaxon corporate governance is itself the cause of accounting manipulation at all levels. First, we will define the notion of “earnings management”, present a range of practices, and assess the role of management controllers in this phenomenon. We will observe that management controllers implement different methods for manipulating profit. Skill in profit manipulation enables management controllers to gain legitimacy in the eyes of managers working in a cultural context that is traditionally difficult for them. They soon bee indispensable strategic allies playing the role of arbiter between the markets’ shortsightedness and the imperatives of operational management. Schipper proposes a representative academic definition of profit manipulation that she refers to as “earnings management”, similarly to the vast majority of literature on this subject. She defines profit manipulation as: “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”. Healy and Walhen identify two main incentives for profit manipulation: contracts written in terms of accounting numbers。 and the political cost hypothesis (the larger a pany, the more it is in its interest to postpone its profits until a future accounting period to face any risk of burdensome legislation being implemented). The second perspective sugge