【正文】 of the relationship between ownership structure and firmperformance. But empirical evidence on the impact of shareholders with significant equity holdings on corporate performance remains authors using different samples of firms and different empirical strategies obtain different,difficult to pare and sometimes contradictory is increasingly recognized that the problem in disentangling this relationship is largely due to the pervasive endogeneity of ownership which has to be taken into account in order to obtain unbiased the existing empirical evidence also suggests that the relationship between ownership and performance may depend on the type of the firm and on the period of observation in the life of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to explore more in details the determinants of ownership concentration and the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in the context of an economy undergoing important changes in its legal and regulatory frame work,in macroeconomic policy and most of all,in its property rights a panel of firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange(WSE)offers an unusual opportunity for this kind of investigation. The Polish economy was exposed to radical institutional changes in the strategy in Poland was strongly influenced by the willingness to create appropriate ownership structure in privatized firms, ensure that powerful block holders control the large portion of stateowned enterprises was privatized and the conditions for entry of new firms were signific antly of the privatized and newly created 湖南涉外經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院本科生畢業(yè)論文 (設(shè)計 ) 17 firms have entered the stock exchange established in firms are likely to show a lot of ownership structure is likely to be determined by the firm origin and for privatized firms by the method of firms,when they bee listed on the stock exchange are likely to have,at least during the initial years of listing,more concentrated ownership structure than privatized ,new firms established by their founders in a market friendly environment may require less ownership,financial and industrial restructuring than previously stateowned enterprises. The sensitivity of firm performance to firm ownership structure is likely to vary across may also undergo important changes over firms are listed on the stock exchange,reallocation of ownership stakes bees greatly first part of this paper is devoted to the exploration of the determinants of ownership to understand why certain firms have large owners and others have dispersed ownership structure,I build on the extant literature and notably on Demsetz and Lehn (1985)and Himmelberg et al.(1999).The contribution of my paper to the literature consists in taking into account the importance of knowledge related activities. The idea is that analyzing the relationship between managers and shareholders requires different perspectives in firms belonging to the sector of“new economy”than in firms belonging to more traditional industries4 (Audretsch and Lehmann,20xx).In more?mature?industries,it can be assumed that it is well understood what should be done and how and it is important to make sure that managers implement efficiently the objectives agreed such conditions,the dominant concern is indeed about managerial shirking,laziness and laxity(Marshall,1923).Such concern motivates the importance and high value of firms with strong human capital ponent,it is less clear what is the right strategy or the right managers to do a particular thing may be costly since shareholders may not know what the best thing to do such highly uncertain environment,(?uncertain?in the sense of Knight),the crucial issue is less to make sure that the agentmanager realizes a given objective with a maximum effort than to incite the manager to search for the best project. Managers are more likely to show initiative if they have some latitude to make effort and undertake innovative Aghion and Tirole(1997)concentrated ownership provides incentives to monitor,but it also reduces the manager?s initiative or incentive to acquire the importance of managerial initiative is at the heart of the theory of Burkart et al.(1997).They argue that increased monitoring by shareholders may be costly because it may depress initiative displayed by managers:managers are less likely to be active if they know that shareholders are likely to too much monitoring may negatively 湖南涉外經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院本科生畢業(yè)論文 (設(shè)計 ) 18 affect managerial initiative and profitable investment opportunities will be lost. Burkart et al.(1997) view firm ownership structure as an instrument to solve the tradeoff between control and more dispersed ownership structure shareholders mit themselves to weaker intervention which makes managers confident enough that they will not be。最后，感謝我的班主任馬雅芬老師以及大學(xué)四年中給我們授過課的老師，他們不僅讓我學(xué)到了很多知識，也讓我更了解世界，讓我學(xué)會更好的做人做事。在數(shù)據(jù)、資料的收集中，在論文多次的修改中 ，心情是復(fù)雜的，但此刻更多的是喜悅。 結(jié) 論 合理的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對公司績效的提高有重要作用， 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效關(guān)系研究一直是國內(nèi)外研究的熱點， 但國內(nèi)外對股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的關(guān)系研究并未得出一致的結(jié)論。 在我國 國有控股也 僅限于關(guān)系國家經(jīng)濟(jì)命脈的行業(yè)企業(yè)，國家對此類企業(yè)控股有利于 維護(hù)國家經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定。 （四）從實證結(jié)果看，管理層持股與公司績效呈顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，這主要是中小企業(yè)板上市公司大多民營控股股東即為管理者引起的，控股股東沒有專業(yè)的管理知識，容易獨斷專行，做出錯誤決策，建議企業(yè)聘請職業(yè)經(jīng)理人對企業(yè)進(jìn)行管理。 （ 三 ） 股權(quán)集中對公司績效有良好的影響，可以減少小股東“搭便車”現(xiàn)象，提高股東對公司的監(jiān)督效率，有利于公司發(fā)展。 （ 二 ）大力發(fā)展和培養(yǎng)理性機(jī)構(gòu)投資者。從實證結(jié)果還可以看出，公司規(guī)模與公司績效呈顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，規(guī)模越大績效越高，資產(chǎn)規(guī)模大可以形成規(guī)模效應(yīng)，降低營運成本，擴(kuò)大市場占有率，提高公司績效。這可能由于中小企業(yè)板上市公司多為民營企業(yè)，其第一大股東多為公司高管， 對公司事務(wù)親力親為。股權(quán)制衡有利于避免公司控股股東獨裁，提高公司決策的效率；大股東的多元化，可以提高對經(jīng)理人員的監(jiān)督效率，由于利益驅(qū)使大股東都會關(guān)注經(jīng)營者決策；股權(quán)制衡、大股東多元化，股東間的相互監(jiān)督，可以降低控制權(quán)私人收益避免掠 奪掏空行為， 從而提升公司價值。 本文是以 20xx20xx 年 中小板上市公司 數(shù)據(jù) 為樣本 ,對我國中小企業(yè)上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效進(jìn)行了實證分 析。從管理層持股比例看，中小企業(yè)板上市公司管理層持股比例最大值能達(dá)到 78%左右 ，平均值也達(dá)到了 %，這與主板上市公司相比是比較高的 。 本文以最終的 1122個觀測值，來研究中小企業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度、股權(quán)屬性與公司績效之間的關(guān)系。赫芬達(dá)爾指數(shù)，是指公司前 n位大股東持股比例的平方和，本文選取前五大股東持股比例的平方和，記為 HD5，其值越大說明股權(quán)集中度越高。本文則選取經(jīng)營業(yè)績指標(biāo)中的凈資產(chǎn)收益率作為研究中小企業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的因變量指標(biāo)。一方面，大多數(shù)中小企業(yè)板上市公司高級管理