【正文】 contractual structure with: 1) joint input production。In this nexus of contracts perspective, ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept. 在這種契約締結(jié)的視角，企業(yè)所有權(quán)和資產(chǎn)所有權(quán)的概念是不相關(guān)的。 Unless the bonds are risk free, the risk bearing function is in part borne by the bondholders, and ownership of capital is shared by bondholders and ，否則債券持有者只承擔(dān)部分風(fēng)險，資產(chǎn)的所有權(quán)則是債券持有者和股票持有者共同的。Most monly, however, the risk bearers guarantee performance of their contracts by putting up wealth ex ante, with this front money used to purchase capital and perhaps also the technology that the firm uses in its production activities. 然而，更為普通的是，風(fēng)險承擔(dān)者必須事先提供財富要保證契約業(yè)績，如暫墊資金購買企業(yè)生產(chǎn)所需要的資產(chǎn)和技術(shù)。Management is a type of labor but with a special rolecoordinating the activities of inputs and carrying out the contracts agreed among inputs, all of which can be characterized as decision making.管理是一種特殊的勞動——協(xié)調(diào)要素活動和要素間的契約執(zhí)行，這些都具有“決策”的特征。 Instead, the two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur, management and risk bearing, are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a ，而這兩種職能通常被看做是企業(yè)的分離的要素。s security ，這些文獻(xiàn)并不能夠解釋現(xiàn)代大型企業(yè)的情況，現(xiàn)代大型企業(yè)的控制權(quán)在管理者手中，這些管理者基本和企業(yè)的證券持有者是獨立的。 This insight, however, is not carried far enough. 然而，這種見解還不夠。Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the best examples. 最好的例子是阿爾奇安和德姆塞茨（1972）、杰森和梅克林（1976）。Examples of this approach are Baumol (1959), Simon (1959), Cyert and March (1963), and Williamson (1964).例如：鮑莫爾（1959）、西蒙（1959）、希爾特和馬奇（1963）、威廉姆森（1964）。Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm. 企業(yè)的個人參與者，特別是對于管理者而言，在企業(yè)內(nèi)部和外部都需要正視市場為他們的服務(wù)提供的準(zhǔn)則和機(jī)會。We first set aside the presumption that acorporation has owners in any meaningful 。The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern ，至少對大型現(xiàn)代企業(yè)而言是的。Economists have long been concerned with the incentive problems that arise when decision making in a firm is the province of managers who are not the firm39。More recently the literature has moved toward theories that reject the classical model of the firm but assume classical forms of economic behavior on the part of agents within the ，關(guān)于企業(yè)代理者問題，經(jīng)濟(jì)文獻(xiàn)傾向于摒棄古典企業(yè)模型而接受古典的經(jīng)濟(jì)行為的假定。The antecedents of their work are in Coase (1937, 1960). 這些文獻(xiàn)的先驅(qū)是科斯（1976）。In the classical theory, the agent who personifies the firm is the entrepreneur who is taken to be both manager and residual risk ，代理人是企業(yè)的化身，承擔(dān)著管理者和剩余索取者的雙重角色。The main thesis of this paper is that separation of security ownership and control can be explained as an efficient form of economic organization within the set of contracts perspective. 本文的主要觀點是,證券的控制權(quán)和所有權(quán)的分離可解釋為經(jīng)濟(jì)組織的一種有效形式。The firm is disciplined by petition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. 企業(yè)總是有來自外部企業(yè)的競爭，這就不斷促使對于整個團(tuán)隊和企業(yè)內(nèi)部個人成員的表現(xiàn)監(jiān)督機(jī)制不斷進(jìn)步。 To explain the role of the risk bearers, assume for the moment that the firm rents all other factors of production and that rental contracts are negotiated at the beginning of each production period with payoffs at the end of the period. 為了解釋風(fēng)險承受者的角色，暫且假定企業(yè)租用所有的生產(chǎn)要素和簽訂租用協(xié)議都是在生產(chǎn)之前，而支付在生產(chǎn)之后。In this way the risk bearing function is bined with ownership of capital and technology. 這種情況下，風(fēng)險承擔(dān)的職能和資本和技術(shù)的所有權(quán)是緊密相連的。However, ownership of capital should not be confused with ownership of the firm. 然而，資產(chǎn)所有權(quán)和企業(yè)所有權(quán)不應(yīng)該混為一談。Dispelling the tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security holders is important because it is a first step toward understanding that control over a firm39。 2) several input owners。 5) who holds the residual claim。The rationale for separating these functions is not just that the end result is more descriptive of the corporation, a point recognized in both the AlchianDemsetz and JensenMeckling papers. 分離這兩個職能的理由不僅僅是更好地描述了企業(yè)，正如阿爾奇安和德姆塞茨的文章中所承認(rèn)的。 It is true that if the team does not prove viable factors like labor and management are protected by markets in which rights to their future services can be sold or rented to other ，即某要素的未來服務(wù)可以在市場上出售或者出租給其他團(tuán)隊， 那么這是風(fēng)險承擔(dān)者。 Since he holds the securities of many firms precisely to avoid having his wealth depend too much on any one firm, an individual security holder generally has no special interest in personally overseeing the detailed activities of any ，因此其通常很少有興趣關(guān)心某一家公司的具體事務(wù)。For the purposes of the managerial labor market, the previous associations of a manager with success and failure are information about his talents. 對于管理者市場而言，管理者之前的成敗代表著管理者的才能。s management. 企業(yè)證券的持有者提供了一個重要但是非直接的幫助在勞動力市場評價企業(yè)的管理者。The signals provided by an efficient capital market about the values of a firm39。We e now to the central question. 我們現(xiàn)在碰到了核心問題。The Viability of Separation of Security Ownership and Control of the Firm: General Comments 企業(yè)證券所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離的生命力。Moreover, given a petitive managerial labor market, when the firm39。 Less well appreciated, however, is the monitoring that takes place from bottom to top. 然而，這一自上而下的監(jiān)督機(jī)制并沒有受到好評。s outside opportunity wage. 最后，盡管頂層的管理者相對下面的管理者更受企業(yè)表現(xiàn)的影響，但是所有管理者都意識到管理者勞動市場是根據(jù)企業(yè)的表現(xiàn)來決定每一個管理者外部可選擇機(jī)會的工資。A board dominated by security holders does not seem optimal or endowed with good survival properties. 證券持有人支配的董事會并不是最優(yōu)的或者具有強(qiáng)生命力的性質(zhì)。They are most directly in the line of fire from lower managers when the markets for securities and managerial labor give poor signals about the performance of the firm. 當(dāng)證券市場和管理勞動力市場發(fā)出企業(yè)表現(xiàn)不好時，高層管理者最容易受到下面管理者的批評。s performance. 如果他們都競爭企業(yè)的最高位置，他們應(yīng)該是最為熟悉企業(yè)業(yè)績的人，也是企業(yè)業(yè)績最好的評價者。s top ，其任務(wù)是激勵和監(jiān)督企業(yè)高層管理者之間的競爭。 This analysis does not imply that boards of directors are likely to be posed entirely of managers and outside directors. 這種分析并不意味著董事會的董事完全由管理者和外部董事構(gòu)成。All one can say is that in a petitive environment lowercost sets of monitoring mechanisms are likely to survive. 人們可以斷言，在一個競爭的環(huán)境里，更低成本的監(jiān)督機(jī)制可以獲得更好的生存。The perspective suggested here owes much to, but is nevertheless different