【正文】
ive evidence.)在R. v. Chong Kin Cheong, CACC196/1995一案中裁定了:『A judge or jury faced with evidence from the prosecution which is unanswered by testimony from the accused is not required to imagine possible defences of which there is no evidence, but, rather, is required to act upon the evidence available.』在R. v. Tan Siew Gim [1995]1 HKLR299一案中裁定了:『Where the inference of guilt is available to the tribunal of facts and no explanation is given, it is not open to plain on appeal that another inference was available to be drawn, particularly when the facts cry out for an explanation.』」 根據(jù)上訴人的會面記錄,她清楚表示事發(fā)時有關(guān)菜館有營業(yè),亦知道舖前的公共行人道上正在經(jīng)營食物業(yè)一事,並承認當時在舖外的枱櫈是由她經(jīng)營店鋪生意的一部份,又知道現(xiàn)場當時有一?名中國藉女子余?玉?芳正在經(jīng)營食物業(yè),而余?玉?芳則是擬議承讓人的合伙人。上訴人既選擇不作供,裁判官席前缺乏上訴人是從何或何時知悉違規(guī)作為的證供,根據(jù)上述案例,裁判官根本無須憑空為上訴人想像任何可能性的答辯理由,她有權(quán)賦予這些招認證供絕對的比重。 上訴人大律師依賴Berton v. All