金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)capitalstructure課件-在線瀏覽
2024-11-02 06:16本頁(yè)面
【正文】 pothesis ? Jensen (1986) (page 766) ? Example: ? Armand Hammer (Occidental Petroleum) spend $120 m in an art museum ? Why shareholders allow this? ? FCF definition (here): funds available for manageme after financing all projects with NPV0 ? These funds should be paid out (otherwise are likely to be invested in negative NPV projects) ? How can management mit to indeed pay out? ? Debt is a solution: it forces management to pay interest and repay principal Corporate Finance Signaling theories ? Suppose firms are divided into two groups, good and bad firms ? If a bad firm increases debt above a certain level, X*, say, then it goes bankrupt ? If managers are paid according to the perceived quality of their firm (the stock price), managers from good firms will want to carry a debt level above X*, to differentiate themselves from bad firms ? Assumption: managers know more about the firm?s quality than shareholders do Corporate Finance Signaling theories: a simple model ? Type A firms will be worth 100 in one year?s time ? Type B firms will be worth 50 in one year?s time ? Timing: ? Manager chooses level of debt ? Manager gets t1 pensation, V0 (V0 is the expected firm value given de debt level) ? Company goes/does not go bankrupt ? Manager gets t2 pensation depending on V2 (0 if no bankrupcy, C if bankrupcy) Corporate Finance Signaling theories: a simple model ? So, manager?s pensation is: M = V0 – C ? Suppose there is a level of debt, X* (X* 50) such that: ? V0 = 100 if X ≥ X* and V0 = 50 if X X* ? Manager A always chooses X ≥ X* (figure this out) ? If manager B chooses X X*, he gets MB = 10 – C Otherwise: MB = 5 Corporate Finance Signaling theories: a simple model ? So the level of debt works as a signaling device if the manager?s bankrupcy penalty is high enough: 5 10 – C or: C 5 ? Conclusions: ? If managers have more information than shareholders, ? If bankrupcy is costly for them (. they may lose their job), ? Then managers of healthier panies can use debt to signal the firm?s good financial health Corporate Finance Signaling theories The Pecking Order Hypothesis ? In a world with information asymmetries, firms will use less costly funds first to finance new projects ? That is, firms will first use internally generated funds, these being the least costly. If internally generated funds are insufficient, then the firm will issue debt. Equity will be issued as a last resort only Corporate Finance Pecking order theory ? Consider a pany that can be either “good” or “bad” ? Only management knows the the pany?s quality Payoff Do nothing Good Bad Liquid assets 50 50 Assets in place 200 80 Value of the firm 250 130 Issue equity Good Bad 150 150 200 80 350 230 ? The pany is 190 worth, say 19 per share ? Therefore, if the pany is “good”, it is undervalued Corporate Finance Pecking order theory ? Management would want to issue debt, would it? ?Yes, because it can sell for 19 / share, while the “true” value is 13 ?And the other way around: the manager of a good pany has to sell for 19 what is worth 25, so he won?t ?If investors are rational, they anticipate this ?If a pany issues shares, the market infers it is undervalued and there will be a negative stock price reaction Corporate Finance Risk Shifting ? Shareholders have an incentive to undertake too risky projects to realise the upside potential, leaving downside to the bondholders ? Example: ? A firm has one investment project, ? Payoff: 9,000 or 11,000, w/p 50% ? Firm borrows 7,000 ? Debt is riskfree Corporate Finance Risk Shifting ? A new (alternative) investment project appears: ? Payoff 2,000 or 16,000, w/p 50% ? Which project will shareholders choose? Payoff Project 1 Low High Total 9,000 11,000 Shareholders 2,000 4,000 Bondholders 7,000 7,000 Project 2 Low High 2,000 16,000 0 9,000 2,000 7,000 Corporate Finance Risk Shifting ? This is a serious problem only near default ? Managers are risk averse, so they won?t normally gamble ? When a negative shock hits a pany, it may bee important Corporate Finance Underinvestment 10/11 1/11 M. rights: 150 M. rights: 500 Market unfavourable Market favourable Investment: 100 Investment: 100 Repay debt 110 Corporate Finance Underinvestment ? Any new debt must be junior to old one (covenant) ? Notice the project at T = 1 has always a positive NPV ? However, it will not find financing for it: ? It can only pay 40 back, and needs 100 financing Corporate Finance Some empirical regularities ? Most corporations have low debt to asset ratios ? In the sense that they leave tax shelters unused ? Changes in capital structure affect stock prices: ?
環(huán)評(píng)公示相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號(hào)-1