【正文】 n studied from several perspectives, and many models have been proposed for their analysis. However, we consider a vital ingredient of group buying that has received insufficient attention in the literature, namely, the fact that buyers often have distinct preferences for the offerings of different vendors. Most matching models with volume discounts assume that vendor offerings are indistinguishable to buyers, which significantly limits their applicability. For instance,suppose two buyers X and Y are (jointly) paring the offers of two vendors or some item: A offers a price of 10 for one unit, but a discounted price of 8 if both buy from him。外文翻譯 原文 1 Matching Models for Preferencesensitive Group Purchasing Matching buyers and sellers is one of the most fundamental problems in economics and market design. An interesting variant of the matching problem arises when selfinterested buyers e together in order to induce sellers to offer quantity or volume discounts, as is mon in buying consortia, and more recently in the consumer group couponing space (., Groupon).We consider a general model of this problem in which a group or buying consortium is faced with volume discount offers from multiple vendors, but group members have distinct preferences for different vendor offerings. Unlike some recent formulations of matching games that involve quantity discounts, the bination of varying preferences and discounts can render the core of the matching game empty, in both the transferable and nontransferable utility sense. Thus, instead of coalitional stability, we propose several forms of Nash stability under various epistemic and transfer/payment assumptions. We investigate the putation of buyerwelfare maximizing matchings and show the existence of transfers (subsidized prices) of a particularly desirable form that support stable matchings. We also study a nontransferable utility model, showing that stable matchings exist。 and we develop a variant of the problem in which buyers provide a simple preference ordering over “deals” rather than specific valuations—a model that is especially attractive in the consumer space—which also admits stable matchings. Computational experiments demonstrate the efficacy and value of our approach. Categories and Subject Descriptors: [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems。 and B offers a single price of 9 per unit. If A and B are indistinguishable, X and Y should cooperate and buy from A. But suppose X prefers B (with valuation ) to A (valuation 10). In this case, X would prefer to stick with B unless Y offers some payment to switch vendors (Y would gladly share some of her generated surplus with X for this purpose). Without the ability to express preferences over vendors, “group buying” would not emerge even in this trivial example. market design. A wide variety of models and mechanisms have been developed that reflect different assumptions about the demands, valuations/preferences, and knowledge of the market participants and their ability to cooperate. Each leads to its own putational challenges when developing algorithms for puting stable (core) matchings,Nash equilibria, clearing prices or other solution concepts. In this paper, we address the problem of cooperative group buying, in which a group of buyers coordinate their purchases to realize volume discounts, mitigate demand risk, or reduce inventory costs. Group buying has long been used for corporate procurement,via industryspecific buying consortia or broadly based group purchasinganizations (GPOs) [Chen and Roma 2021]. The advent of the Inter, in particular,has helped businesses with no prior affiliation more easily aggregate their demand[Anand and Aron 2021]. Consumeroriented group purchasing has also been greatly facilitatedby the web。 and B offers a single price of 9 per unit. If A and B are indistinguishable, X and Y should cooperate and buy from A. But suppose X prefers B (with valuation ) to A (valuation 10). In this case, X would prefer to stick with B unless Y offers some payment to switch vendors (Y would gladly share some of her generated surplus with X for this purpose). Without the ability to express preferences over vendors, “group buying” would not emerge even in this trivial matching bees much more subtle in such models, assigning buyers to vendors in a way that triggers volume discounts, while remaining sensitive to buyer preferences, offers flexibility and efficiency gains that greatly enhance the appeal of group buying. Consider a group of businesses or buyers working with a GPO to procure supplies within a specific product category (., manufacturing materials, packaging, transportation, payroll services, etc.). The GPO is able to negotiate volume discounts from a handful of suppliers or vendors, possibly with multiple discount thresholds. Buyers generally have different valuations for the offerings of different vendors (., buyers may have slightly different manufacturing specifications。 Gale and Shapley 1962。 unlike our model, the discounts are not “posted prices” in the usual sense, but are merely used as reserve prices. While the mechanism and assumptions are quite different, and putation is not considered, their motivations are similar to ours. LeytonBrown and Shoham [2021] study bidding clubs which collude in auction mechanisms to lower prices, and devise payment schemes that induce participation. A