【正文】 having the state as both official regulator and principal shareholder (IFC 2020, Li et al. 2020)That said, the reform of China’s banks is now well underway and the basic methods employed for restructuring have been large capital injections, the setting up of ‘badbanks’ and asset management panies, initial public offerings, partnerships with foreign banks(with the aim of improving management and IT development) and the inclusion of overseas board members to help improve corporate governance. Some see these moves as part of a broader interest by Chinese officials in developing an economic institutional environment which is more reflective of the international business munity (Guthrie 1998, Wang 2020). And, at a theoretical level, these adjustments raise some important questions about the nature of institutional change in China’s economic transition, such as whether China will develop its own unique form of corporate governance, or whether it will converge towards the more marketbased models monly found in the west. While the opening of the market to western banks has been seen as a key plank of there form program me, at the time of writing, many economies in the western world are struggling to cope with the fallout from the subprime mortgage debacle, and the credibility of western banks is under severe strain (Bloomberg 2020). Some have argued that recent events could see economic power shift from west to east and much attentions now focused on the nature of China’s position in the global economic order (Brown 2020,Time 2020). China’s banks are now very large, with three in the world’s top 10 by However, such large assets should not detract from the problems which remain in the Chinese banking system including a shallow talent pool, a shortage of managerial and technical expertise, a local currency that is not convertible and weak corporate governance mechanisms. This study aims to investigate the institutional forces which affect the adoption of western corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese banks. The data es from a series of indepth qualitative interviews with senior managers who were either employed in western banks with stockholdings in Chinese institutions, held nonexecutive directorships of Chinese banks, or had participated in other financial advisory roles. The following sections will enlarge on the corporate governance literature in relation to both western and Chinese banks and discuss the theoretical frameworks which can help explain how goals, beliefs and organizations are structured by institutions. Next, the research methodology will be outlined and the findings will be introduced structured around the institutional forces which influence both internal and external governance mechanisms as well as related technical assistance projects. The study concludes with a discussion of the importance of legitimacyseeking in motivating Chinese banks to seek collaboration with western institutions and will underscore the importance of local informal institutions in ensuring path dependent change. Finally, some of the key assumptions of western models of governance will be challenged, particularly the belief that market forces alone can ensure the efficient allocation of credit. Theory In the west it is possible to distinguish at least two forms of corporate governance: International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) technical assistance to Chinese banks. Bank Preinvestment At investment Postinvestment Bank of Shanghai Since 1995 IFC supported, with funding form Japan and EU,