低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)論文：低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作博弈分析與機制研究-展示頁
2025-07-06 12:21本頁面
【正文】 結(jié)歸納了常用的三類激勵措施：問題鏈、利益補償機制、社會性激勵機制。本文在對現(xiàn)有碳市場體系分析的基礎(chǔ)上,指出現(xiàn)有碳市場的分散性、獨立性限制了資源的全球配置。對于現(xiàn)階段碳市場交易機制的構(gòu)建,我們應(yīng)該的關(guān)注碳市場基本管理制度的完善,以為碳市場的全球融合奠定基礎(chǔ)。在低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的國際合作中,他們以最大化人類共同利益為目標(biāo),突破了主權(quán)國家對個體短期經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的追求,必將有利于低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作的推進(jìn)?！居⑽恼縒ith the climate problemmore and more severe, the lowcarbon economy has bee a focus in international politics, economy, and Foreign Affairs. Considering externalities of the lowcarbon economy, international cooperation has bee necessary. But the debate about emissionsharing obstructs the international cooperation. Developed countries insist that developing countries also should limit and reduce their emissions. The developing countries insist that developed countries should be primarily responsible for climate issues. Based on the principle of fairness, they should take the lead in emission reduction, and provide developing countries with financial and technical supports. Reduction will bring about adjustment of the existing economic mode, which will spend greatly and constrain economic growth. The debate on reduction is essentially the debate of economic development space. Considering emission as the right to subsistence and development, the debate on emissionsharing has evolved into dispute between fairness and both fairness and efficiency, this paper constructs the allocation model about carbon emission with game theory ”A property, Two distributions”.”A property” r
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