【正文】
similar margin pressures know that most gasoline stations are viable only if they offer generalretail facilities at least as large as a convenience store, in addition to gasoline. This is true in China as well. The highestvolume sites might be made profitable on their fuel revenues alone, but the rest need substantial nonfuel revenues to make a profit.The strategic implications are clear. In China as elsewhere, the first decision for an oil pany is whether to own and operate sites or merely to supply them with gasoline. If the pany opts for ownership, it has a choice: to adopt a retail strategy and pursue nonfuel revenues from a portfolio of retail sites or to target only the highestvolume sites, using them to build a highquality gasoline brand that can also be offered through independent retailers. At present, the Chinese oil majors are pursuing neither strategy。 they have simply rushed to grab any available site, where they sell as much petroleumbased product as possible while ignoring the retail potential. The multinationals have been more judicious in selecting sites for their initial joint ventures, but they too have neglected the strategic choice. Unless all of these panies, domestic and international alike, change tack, their investments in expensive Chinese real estate may unravel.THE MARKET AND SITE ECONOMICS2 / 10China抯 dominant oil panies are Sinopec, in the south and east, and PetroChina, which has the more prehensive refinery and distribution work of the two, in the north and west (Exhibit 1). The two panies aim to capture, between them, 70 percent of China抯 gasoline sales volume by 2022. Since their IPOs, in 2022, they have invested heavily in petroleumrelated infrastructure and in brand building. Having already raised their share of sales to more than 40 percent and secured most of the prime sites in the biggest cities, they are on track to meet this target.Until 2022, multinational panies will be allowed to own outright only the 300 or so sites they now possess through local deals struck before government deregulation of foreign investment in the sector, in the mid1990s, but they can build up their holdings through joint ventures with Chinese panies. BP, ExxonMobil, and Royal Dutch/Shell are establishing joint ventures with PetroChina and Sinopec by contributing capital for the purchase of sites and by supplying highermargin premium fuels。 labor, for example, is relatively cheap if inefficient. Capital costs are largely fixed once a station has been bought. Wholesale margins, on which the Chinese majors have usually relied to subsidize their retail outlets, will probably dwindle to the cost of transport and storage as WTO mitments and other reforms take effect. The truth is that the economics of most sites won抰 work unless there are significant nonfuel sales, for they improve site margins by lifting revenues without raising costs in a parable way (Exhibit 2). Petroleum panies thus have three possibilities: they can focus on the retail opportunity of their sites, concentrate on a highquality fuel service through the highestvolume sites, or ignore retail altogether and be wholesalers of modity fuels.5 / 10THE RETAIL STRATEGYElsewhere in the world, multinational oil panies have pensated for tight margins on gasoline by investing in additional revenue streams. This kind of strategic behavior takes place in the context of a global retail sector moving from ownership of product categories to ownership of retail occasions梩 he waytowork or weekend stop for gasoline and incidentals, routine Saturday shopping, the less frequent household stockup. Gasoline stations are designed to attract customers who want more than just fuel for their cars, and in Europe and the United States these formats now generate as much revenue from extras as from gasoline.In developed economies, this model has been adopted slowly because it takes time to convert or dismantle the legacy assets of a longestablished gasolineonly strategy. Chinese players have an opportunity