【正文】 (Golden and Zajac, 2001。 (4) sufficient incentives, typically achieved through rewards systems to align directors’ and owners’ interests。 (2) current and prehensive information drawn from multiple sources and perspectives。 Lawler, 1986。 Mathieu et al., 2008). Although it has been modified and extended over the years, the basic input–process–output model (IPO) holds that contextual factors and other individual and team level antecedents ‘enable and constrain’ (p. 412) team member interactions and define team processes which in turn drive task effectiveness (Mathieu et al., 2008). In this study, we focus on team inputs using an established model derived from years of research on employee participation and involvement (Cotton, 1993。 Sonnenfeld, 2004a). So rather than develop an original model of boards as teams, we apply previous research on the attributes of highper forming teams to boards of directors (Mohrman et al., 1995). Hence, we recognize that the relationships between group inputs, processes and outes depend on factors that are specific to the type of group under study and the specific criteria of effectiveness that are being considered (Forbes and Milliken, 1999。 Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003。 Shen, 2003). In their seminal theoretical work, Forbes and Milliken (1999) integrated literature on corporate boards and team effectiveness arguing that board effectiveness is identified by the same criteria as many previous models of team effectiveness. Further, they suggest that the various board demographics typically used in board research, such as insider/outsider ratio, board size, and tenure, are expected to influence overall team effectiveness independently. Similarly, Sonnenfeld (2002) describes effective boards as being distinguished by ‘robust, effective social systems’ and contends that board demographics between Forbes Magazine’s (2001) mostadmired and leastadmired panies are actually similar. This suggests that structural characteristics in and of themselves do not differentiate between highperforming and lowperforming boards. Sonnenfeld (2002, p. 106) goes on to state, ‘We need to consider not only how we structure the work of a board but also how we manage the social system a board actually is.’ This is consistent with the conclusion of Papadakis et al. (1998) that decisionspecific and relationship attributes, rather than board demographics, represent the greatest influence on the strategic decisionmaking process. Drawing from both the corporate board and groups/teams research, we argue that the same conditions enabling workgroups to achieve their goals should be related to corporate board effectiveness. Others have acknowledged this relationship, but in a less explicit way (. Daily et al., 2003。 Marks et al., 2001). Extending on the literature regarding team effectiveness, some governance scholars have started to focus on managerial petence and empowerment arguments to help explain organizational performance differences (Davis et al., 1997。degaard,2001.“ Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in Norwegian Listed Firms”, Norwegian School of Management,[19] Lipton,1992.“ Proposal for Improved Corporate Govemance”.Business Lawyer,.[20] G. Tyge Payne,George S, Benson and David ,2009. “Corporate Board Attributes, Team Effectiveness and Financial Performance”. Journal of Management Studies,[21] Demsetz, Lehn, k,1985. “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences”. Journal of Political Economy,.[22] Gorck,R.,Shleifer,1988. “Management Ownership And Market Valuation”.An Empirical of Financial Economics, ,.[23] Fama,E.,Jensen,1983. “Agency problem and residual claims”.Journal of Law and Economics, ,.外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯文題　　目：　 中小板上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的關(guān)系研究　　　一、外文原文原文一：Corporate Board Attributes, Team Effectiveness andFinancial PerformanceA TeamBased Model of Corporate Board EffectivenessThe existing literature examining teams and knowledgebased work groups demonstrates a causal link between team practices or attributes, effectiveness, and outes (Cohen and Bailey, 1997。hren,216。（四）預(yù)期達(dá)到的目標(biāo)課題的主要目標(biāo)是通過有針對(duì)性地對(duì)中小板上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的關(guān)系的相關(guān)的概念和意義以及現(xiàn)狀與存在問題進(jìn)行分析，運(yùn)用多元性回歸分析方法闡明兩者之間的關(guān)系，并對(duì)中小板上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的關(guān)系提出不足的對(duì)策以及展望。技術(shù)路線：中小板上市公司于財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的關(guān)系研究理論研究選取樣本選取財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)背景和意義國(guó)內(nèi)外研究分 析結(jié) 論提出假設(shè)回歸檢驗(yàn)（三）研究難點(diǎn)（1）中小板上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的關(guān)系研究的相關(guān)設(shè)計(jì)。案例研究法。實(shí)證研究法。（二）擬采取的研究方法（技術(shù)路線）：文獻(xiàn)研究法。通過對(duì)至2010年10月份的490家中小板上市公司中的60家進(jìn)行數(shù)據(jù)樣本和數(shù)據(jù)的選取，通過一定的研究方法和研究變量的選取，建立相關(guān)的模型，進(jìn)行相關(guān)性分析和回歸性分析。通過引用大量的文獻(xiàn)，指出國(guó)內(nèi)外對(duì)于財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效與股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)、管理層和其他相關(guān)利益者之間的關(guān)系研究，指出其中的不足，并提出改進(jìn)建議。三、課題的研究?jī)?nèi)容及擬采取的研究方法（技術(shù)路線）、研究難點(diǎn)及預(yù)期達(dá)到的目標(biāo)（一）課題的研究?jī)?nèi)容：本文根據(jù)學(xué)到的財(cái)務(wù)管理理論知識(shí)，對(duì)中小板上市公司勢(shì)力結(jié)構(gòu)與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的關(guān)系進(jìn)行探討的實(shí)證型論文，對(duì)于公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)具有一定的現(xiàn)實(shí)指導(dǎo)意義。而對(duì)于我國(guó)學(xué)者來說，目前其研究的重點(diǎn)仍舊是放在滬深主板市場(chǎng)，對(duì)新興的中小企業(yè)板研究較少，很多學(xué)者也只是從公司治理的單個(gè)方面與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系進(jìn)行分析。第三、經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者的激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制不健全，形成了董事、經(jīng)理等高層管理人員大都是由近親和朋友等人員構(gòu)成的問題。第一、中小板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不夠完善，“內(nèi)部人控制”的現(xiàn)象比較嚴(yán)重，股東的誠(chéng)信意識(shí)未達(dá)到很高的境界，同時(shí)，股權(quán)集中，容易引起利益問題。而且，在發(fā)行規(guī)模方面，總的或是平均的發(fā)行規(guī)模將會(huì)有很大程度的擴(kuò)大，股本也會(huì)有很大的擴(kuò)張。由此看來，預(yù)計(jì)在今后的時(shí)間里，該板塊將遍布各個(gè)行業(yè)，并突破傳統(tǒng)行業(yè)的界限。中小板上市公司的現(xiàn)狀和發(fā)展趨勢(shì)：從2004年5月27日深圳中小企業(yè)板塊正式啟動(dòng)以來，截止到2010年10月份，數(shù)量以及達(dá)到了490家，主要分布在浙江省、廣東省和江蘇省，而且遍布大部分行業(yè)，如制造業(yè)、社會(huì)服務(wù)業(yè)、交運(yùn)倉(cāng)儲(chǔ)業(yè)、信息技術(shù)業(yè)、建筑業(yè)等。研究結(jié)果表明，經(jīng)營(yíng)者持股對(duì)提高企業(yè)績(jī)效的作用越來越明顯，且現(xiàn)階段不存在經(jīng)營(yíng)者利用職權(quán)增加持股比例以牟取私利的現(xiàn)象[13]。劉劍、談傳生(2005)通過研究，認(rèn)為公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效與管理層持股之間存在三次曲線關(guān)系 [12]。3. 管理層與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效胡婉麗、湯書昆、肖向兵(2004)運(yùn)用我國(guó)生物醫(yī)藥上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)研究高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的關(guān)系問題，其研究的結(jié)果表明，高管團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)的薪酬差距也與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)呈顯著正相關(guān)，高管薪酬水平與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)呈顯著正相關(guān)，而高管持股則與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)負(fù)相關(guān)，在統(tǒng)計(jì)上不顯著[10]。結(jié)果表明，獨(dú)力董事的比例與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效之間存在一定的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。白重恩(2005)選擇第一大股東的持股量為股權(quán)集中度的代理變量，托賓Q值和M/B為市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的代理變量，其結(jié)果顯示了企業(yè)的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值托賓Q值和公司的第一大股東持股量之間存在非線性關(guān)系，具體來講他們之間的關(guān)系是呈U形的關(guān)系 [5]。國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)于公司治理與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的關(guān)系研究，也可從如下幾個(gè)方面展開：1. 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效張紅軍(2000)以中國(guó)385家上市公司1998年的截面數(shù)據(jù)，以托賓Q值作為度量公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的指標(biāo)，分析股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系，結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)了股權(quán)集中度與企業(yè)績(jī)效之間存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系[3]。公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)明確規(guī)定了公司的各個(gè)參與者的責(zé)任和權(quán)利分布，諸如董事會(huì)、經(jīng)理層、股東和其他利益相關(guān)者。其研究結(jié)果表明，管理層股權(quán)與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效之間不是單調(diào)的線性關(guān)系，而是呈現(xiàn)區(qū)間效應(yīng)[22]。3. 管理層與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效Demsetz(1983)提出，管理層持股是內(nèi)生變量，它依賴于公司外部環(huán)境和內(nèi)部特征，例如行業(yè)、投資機(jī)會(huì)、成長(zhǎng)性、經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和信息的不對(duì)稱等，是一種反映市場(chǎng)影響的長(zhǎng)期演化結(jié)果，對(duì)公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效不存在影響[21]。當(dāng)董事會(huì)的規(guī)模超過10人時(shí)，或者少于7人時(shí)，董事會(huì)就不易于發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的作用，并易受到CEO的控制[19]。2. 董事會(huì)與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效Lipton和Lorsch(1992)的實(shí)證結(jié)果指出應(yīng)限制董事會(huì)規(guī)模。提高董事會(huì)規(guī)模能減少股份使用性能。degaard（2001)分析了在奧斯陸證