【正文】 s influence and incorporating it into doctrine are separate propositions, however. Chief Justice Rehnq。s inherent power argument was not good, as support for both the Korean War and President Truman was at its nadir. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the tides of public opinion, accelerated and intensified by the rapid movement of the case through the federal judicial system, influenced the Court39。s disposition in the Steel Seizure case. In 1952, President Truman, fearing that a reduction in steel production would hinder the Korean War effort, ordered federal officials to seize and operate several steel production facilities during a strike. Steel panies brought suit and obtained an injunction from the district court enjoining the President from seizing the steel mills. The government obtained a stay from the court of appeals and appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and heard arguments nine days later. The Court rejected the government39。 testimony. Judge Baer was in a nowin situation. There was negative publicity about his original decision to exclude the evidence, and there would be a negative public reaction to a change of position based on his decision to include the evidenceboth of which could undermine public confidence in the impartial nature of the judiciary. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote about the effects of public opinion on the judicial decisionmaking process, concluding that no judge can conscientiously say in so many words, I gave you my best judgment when I decided that the Constitution meant thus and so, but since the public overwhelmingly disagrees with my interpretation of the Constitution, I will therefore change my mind. On its face, this statement appears to reject public opinion as a consideration in constitutional adjudication, a position consistent with much of Rehnquist39。s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.The public and political responses were immediate. The New York Times ran several editorials condemning the ruling. Members of Congress spoke publicly about impeachment, and some even asked President Clinton to add his voice to the criticism. In the meantime, Judge Baer granted a rehearing on the suppression motion. President Clinton declined to ment on the case pending the results of the rehearing. According to the New York Times, a group of Circuit Court judges, and several mentators, the message to Judge Baer was clear: reverse yourself, or risk losing your job, despite the convention against impeaching federal judges because of their decisions. After rehearing the motion, Judge Baer reversed his original decision and admitted the evidence, citing newlyintroduced police reports as additional evidence that pelled him to change his mind. But critics claim that this additional evidence could not have been a sufficient ground for reversal, and may have even hurt the prosecution39。s influence on the judiciary. Finally, it examines the use of opinion polls in Atkins to determine the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment. Part IV examines judicial decisional tools themselves to explain the apparent effect of public opinion on judicial decisionmaking. It first outlines the traditional spectrum of deference, which serves as an example for the contextspecific analysis of whether public opinion could be appropriate as a doctrinal consideration in various contexts. It next examines whether public opinion could be a legitimate consideration in various contexts, including statutory interpretation, mon lawmaking, and several constitutional contexts. The Article concludes by examining the tendency of various doctrines to reflect public opinion, and the effect of recent jurisprudence on the public opinionmirroring ability of those doctrines.II. The Debate over Public Opinion in Judicial DecisionmakingA．Public Opinion as Anathema to Judicial IndependenceThere is widespread agreement that in certain cases, public opinion should not play any role in a judge39。 ability to prohibit such conduct in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Lawrence Court engaged in analysis that bore striking similarities to its Eighth Amendment analysis in Atkins. The Lawrence Court thus pointed to a doctrinal place for public opinion in its substantive due process jurisprudence. Because similar developments have not occurred in the Court39。s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Doctrinal developments in Lawrence v. Texas suggest that public opinion could bee a legitimate and explicit consideration in the substantive due process arena. In the course of striking down Texas39。s power under the Interstate Commerce Clause in which the Court grants Congress substantial deference proves to be an inappropriate doctrine for incorporating public opinion. The reason is twofold. First, there is no reason to believe that the public has any inherent advantage over the judiciary in determining whether an activity substantially affects interstate merce. Second, the Court39。s public values, might influence statutory interpretation depending on the strength of the preference and the strength of other traditional indicators of statutory meaning.Federal mon law is another potential context for the consideration of public opinion. Although the mon law does not always directly reflect public preferences, democratic principles suggest that public opinion could be relevant to determining mon law rules. The mon law context illuminates several instances where public opinion should not be consideredin most cases where the rule may affect the public39。s use of opinion polls in Atkins, moreover, suggests that public opinion can be measured accurately enough to be of use to judges. The traditional spectrum of deference n5 suggests it is possible to make a reasoned evaluation of the appropriateness of public opinion as an influence in various judicial contexts. The spectrum is based on a realistic evaluation of the relative institutional advantages of the judiciary and Congr