【正文】 10. why security analysis can be socially productive even if it does not increase portfolio returns to investors. Theory of the Firm: An Empty Box?While the literature of economics is replete with references to the “theory of the firm,” the material generally subsumed under that heading is not actually a theory of the firm but rather a theory of markets in which firms are important actors. The firm is a “black box” operated so as to meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby maximizing profits, or more accurately, present value. Except for a few recent and tentative steps, however,we have no theory which explains how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought into equilibrium so as to yield this result. The limitations of this black box view of the firm have been cited by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, among others. More recently, popular and professional debates over the “social responsibility” of corporations, the separation of ownership and control, and the rash of reviews of the literature on the “theory of the firm” have evidenced continuing concern with these issues. A number of major attempts have been made during recent years to construct a theory of the firm by substituting other models for profit or value maximization, with each attempt motivated by a conviction that the latter is inadequate to explain managerial behavior in large corporations. Some of these reformulation attempts have rejected the fundamental principle of maximizingbehavior as well as rejecting the more specific profitmaximizing model. We retain the notion of maximizing behavior on the part of all individuals in the analysis that follows. Property Rights An independent stream of research with important implications for the theory of the firm has been stimulated by the pioneering work of Coase, and extended by Alchian, Demsetz, and others. A prehensive survey of this literature is given by Furubotn and Pejovich (1972).While the focus of this research has been “property rights”,the subject matter enpassed is far broader than that term suggests. What is important for the problems addressed here is that specification of individual rights determines how costs and rewards will be allocated among the participants in any organization. Since the specification of rights is generally affected through contracting (implicit as well as explicit), individual behavior in organizations, including the behavior of managers, will depend upon the nature of these contracts. We focus in this paper on the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in the contracts between the owners and managers of the firm. Agency CostsMany problems associated with the inadequacy of the current theory of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of agency relationships in which there is a growing literature. This literature has developed independently of the property rights literature even though the problems with which it is concerned are similar。8. why some industries are characterized by owneroperated firms whose sole outside source of capital is borrowing。6. why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders, and why independent auditors would be engaged by management to testify to the accuracy and correctness of such reports。4. why debt was relied upon as a source of capital before debt financing offered any tax advantage relative to equity。2. why his failure to maximize the value of the firm is perfectly consistent withefficiency。2008,(1).14 [J].南開(kāi)管理評(píng)論,2003,(3).15 [A].中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì),2004,(4).16 王連軍,——基于聯(lián)立方程的經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析[J]. 蘭州商學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào),2009,(6).不要自己寫(xiě)，要利用word來(lái)自動(dòng)生成。參考文獻(xiàn)1 王德祿, 李玲. 我國(guó)上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)的公司治理效應(yīng)分析[A].,(11).2 王凱,唐飛雄. 房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)價(jià)值分析[J].,(1).3 Jensen, and of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs,and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:305360.4 , and . Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].The Journal of ,1993，471517.5 Ren233。最終多元回歸模型以及兩階段最小二乘法的實(shí)證分析結(jié)果表明：我國(guó)上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)公司治理具有負(fù)相關(guān)的影響，其中在這些影響中，股權(quán)治理效則遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于債權(quán)治理效應(yīng)，符合我國(guó)目前上市公司的實(shí)際；而公司治理對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)的影響相對(duì)較小。本文為此截取了房地產(chǎn)上市公司的2007一2009年滬深兩市102家企業(yè)的年報(bào)數(shù)據(jù)，分別從資本結(jié)構(gòu)與公司治理兩方面以各自相關(guān)的指標(biāo)為出發(fā)點(diǎn)進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析。二是研究公司治理如何影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)選擇。債務(wù)資本對(duì)公司治理的影響主要體現(xiàn)在，負(fù)債的硬約束特性，影響著公司治理對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的激勵(lì)機(jī)制和約束機(jī)制。這個(gè)過(guò)程是分兩部分進(jìn)行。結(jié)論本文認(rèn)為，資本結(jié)構(gòu)與公司治理存在一種互為因果的關(guān)系。千萬(wàn)不要?jiǎng)h除行尾的分節(jié)符，此行不會(huì)被打印。說(shuō)明資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率提高，債權(quán)約束加強(qiáng)，公司治理水平會(huì)相應(yīng)的降低；而公司治理良好，又會(huì)要求降低資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率，向資本市場(chǎng)傳遞本公司有很好的發(fā)展趨勢(shì)的信號(hào)，促使外部投資者積極投資，如此循環(huán)，協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展，才會(huì)促使公司價(jià)值最大化的實(shí)現(xiàn)。同樣，聯(lián)立方程中公司治理指數(shù)對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)的影響系數(shù)也從公式 (33) ，但是置信水平的變化，意味著公司治理對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)的影響增強(qiáng)。即每股凈資產(chǎn)反映了對(duì)投資者的保護(hù)能力，每股凈資產(chǎn)越低對(duì)投資者越?jīng)]有保障，投資者就不會(huì)愿意投資，這樣就只能通過(guò)債權(quán)來(lái)融資，資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率相應(yīng)就會(huì)提高。(4)公司規(guī)模T統(tǒng)計(jì)量未能通過(guò)10%顯著性檢，說(shuō)明公司規(guī)模與資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率之間存在非常微弱的負(fù)相關(guān)，公司規(guī)模越大資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率反而會(huì)有所降低。(2) ，在1%置信水平下通過(guò)檢驗(yàn)，說(shuō)明公司價(jià)值對(duì)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率有很強(qiáng)的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，即公司價(jià)值越大的企業(yè)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率越低。20072009年公司治理對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)的多元回歸公式（33）的擬合優(yōu)度(R2和可調(diào)整的R2)比較低。(4)，T檢通過(guò)10%的置信區(qū)間，可能的原因是這些公司管理層持股的比例比較低，未能對(duì)公司治理提供促進(jìn)作用。(3)模型中董事會(huì)規(guī)模變量在1%置信區(qū)間下通過(guò)檢驗(yàn)。股權(quán)構(gòu)成指標(biāo)通過(guò)了檢驗(yàn)，表明國(guó)有控股與公司治理呈正相關(guān)，即國(guó)有控股對(duì)良好的公司治理是有利的。說(shuō)明債權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司治理負(fù)相關(guān)性不是很強(qiáng)，且影響程度不是很大。2007—2009年資本結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)公司治理的多元回歸公式（32）的擬合優(yōu)度（可調(diào)整的)。表36 2007—2009年多元回歸和聯(lián)立方程回歸結(jié)果被解釋變量CGI被解釋變量DR解釋變量OSLSTSLS解釋變量OSLSTSLSC* * ** * *C* * ** * *DRCGI* ** * *H1* * ** * *Q* * ** * *H2* ** *OR**DSHRS* * ** * *TAMRPE* * ** * *D1* * ** * *D1* ** *M**YEAR1控制控制YEAR1控制控制YEAR2控制控制YEAR2控制控制R2(Adj R2)（）（）R2(Adj R2)（）（）注：（*）10%顯著水平；（* *）5%顯著水平；（* * *）1%顯著水平。聯(lián)立方程如下： (32) (33)其中， …， …，是待估計(jì)的系數(shù)，是隨機(jī)誤差項(xiàng)。 模型設(shè)計(jì)與數(shù)據(jù)檢驗(yàn) 模型設(shè)計(jì)本文首先進(jìn)行單方程的多元回歸分析，然后選擇聯(lián)立方程利用兩階段最小二乘法來(lái)分析資本結(jié)構(gòu)與公司治理之間的互動(dòng)關(guān)系，以消除單一方程模型方法造成的信息損失，更真實(shí)的描述兩者的客觀實(shí)際狀況。統(tǒng)計(jì)具體公司數(shù)量顯示，第一大股東持股比例低于 20%的上市公司14家 ,說(shuō)明股權(quán)比較分散的公司較少；20%~50%之間的公司62家 ,說(shuō)明我國(guó)大部分上市公司第一大股東是相對(duì)控股股東；超過(guò) 50%的上市公司26家，說(shuō)明這些公司第一大股東是絕對(duì)控股股東。2009年我國(guó)上市公司第一大股東持股比例總體上是服從正態(tài)分布，為右偏。%，% ，說(shuō)明我國(guó)上市公司第一大股東持股比例波動(dòng)比較大。統(tǒng)計(jì)具體公司數(shù)量顯示，第一大股東持股比例低于 20%的上市公司13家 ,說(shuō)明股權(quán)比較分散的公司較少；20%~50%之間的公司65家 ,說(shuō)明我國(guó)大部分上市公司第一大股東是相對(duì)控股股東；超過(guò) 50%的上市公司24家，說(shuō)明這些公司第一大股東是絕對(duì)控股股東。2007年我國(guó)上市公司第一大股東持股比例總體上是服從正態(tài)分布，為右偏。統(tǒng)計(jì)公司數(shù)量