【正文】
[51] Rosenstein and Sieradzki, supra, note 41 at 392. [52] 同上?! 48] Spiller and Cardilli, supra, note 39 at 75. [49] 同上,第76頁(yè)。 Telemunications Act, Section 309(b). [43] Telemunications Act, Section 309(i). [44] Forster, supra, note 7 at 51. [45] 同上。Economics 1 (1959). [39] Pablo Spiller and Carlo Cardilli, “Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum”, 16 Yale Journal on Regulation 53 (1999). [40] 同上, 第6871 頁(yè)。 Paul David, “Clio and the Economics of Qwerty”, 75 American Economic Review Papers and Proceeding 332 (1985). [30] 1996 Telemunications Act, Section 251. [31] Telephone Number Portability, cc Docket 95116, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rd 8352 (1996). [32] Telephone Number Portability, Third Report and Order, CC Docket No 95116, RM 8535, FCC 9882 (May 12, 1998). [33] Forster, supra, note 7 at 6264. [34] 同上?! 18] Part XIC of the Trade Practice Act. [19] 1996 Telemunications Act Section 251(5)(2). [20] 1996 Telemunications Act, Section 251(d)(4). [21] 1996 Telemunications Act, Section 252. [22] 1996 Telemunications Act, Section 252(b). [23] 1996 Telemunications Act, Section 252(e)(1). [24] 1996 Telemunications Act, Section 252(d). [25] 1996 Telemunications Act, Section 252(d)(2). [26] Implementation of the Local Competition Provision in the Telemunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 15, 499 (1996). [27] Jeffrey Rehlfs, “A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service,” 5 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 16 (1974)。 [14] 同上?! 7] Jane Forster,“Australia” in Jane Forster ed., Telemunications in the Pacific Rim (St. Leonards: Prospect Media Pty Ltd., 1999) at 1617. [8] JeanJacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, Competition in Telemunications (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000) at 99. [9] Robert Willig, “The Theory of Network Access Pricing,” in H. Trebing ed., Issues in Public Utility Regulation (Michigan State University Public Utilities Papers, 1979). [10] William Baumol and Gregory Sidak, “The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors,” 11 Yale Journal on Regulation 171 (1994). [11] C. Armstrong, C. Doyle, and J. Vickers, “The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis,”44(2) Journal of Industrial Economics 131 (1996)。路漫漫其修遠(yuǎn),徑路破而功倍。由于歷史的原因,我國(guó)的電信業(yè)改革將會(huì)是非常艱巨的。這樣的機(jī)制缺乏透明度,有關(guān)利益方如消費(fèi)者也沒(méi)有機(jī)會(huì)表達(dá)意見(jiàn)。還有,《電信條例》沒(méi)有對(duì)互聯(lián)互通的價(jià)格結(jié)算模型的實(shí)體性問(wèn)題進(jìn)行規(guī)定,這不利于限制有市場(chǎng)壟斷能力經(jīng)營(yíng)者的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為。在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)全球化的環(huán)境下,沒(méi)有理由繼續(xù)容忍妨礙效益和技術(shù)進(jìn)步的法律。現(xiàn)有的《電信條例》對(duì)號(hào)碼的可帶性和撥打的平等性沒(méi)有具體的規(guī)定?! ∮捎谄南拗疲疚闹患杏懻摿藝?guó)外電信業(yè)改革中對(duì)互聯(lián)互通、撥打平等性與號(hào)碼可帶性和頻譜資源的分配機(jī)制的改革。從我國(guó)本身的利益出發(fā)也不能說(shuō)明為什么本國(guó)的民營(yíng)或私有企業(yè)不能進(jìn)入電信市場(chǎng)?! ∷摹⒔Y(jié)尾 為了在電信業(yè)引入競(jìng)爭(zhēng)以提高電信企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益和讓消費(fèi)者分享因效益增長(zhǎng)而產(chǎn)生的利益,我國(guó)正在對(duì)傳統(tǒng)的、由國(guó)有企業(yè)壟斷電信服務(wù)的電信業(yè)進(jìn)行重大改革。從這一點(diǎn)看,危地馬拉采用市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)方法分配頻率資源比美國(guó)的機(jī)制具有更大的優(yōu)越性。如美國(guó)在限制被分得的頻譜只能用于無(wú)線(xiàn)電臺(tái)而不能用于無(wú)線(xiàn)電話(huà)時(shí),靜態(tài)福利損失是巨大的。按這一標(biāo)準(zhǔn),新西蘭和危地馬拉的法律機(jī)制優(yōu)越于美國(guó)的?! 拿绹?guó)、澳大利亞、新西蘭和危地馬拉對(duì)頻譜資源使用限制的角度來(lái)看,采用市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)方法要好得多。從福利角度看,政府的拍賣(mài)所得既可用于管制機(jī)構(gòu)的運(yùn)作成本,也可以補(bǔ)貼給某些使用服務(wù)的消費(fèi)者。如果初始獲得許可證的競(jìng)投者不是最有效的,那么頻譜資源在二級(jí)市場(chǎng)的自由流轉(zhuǎn)也能使資源轉(zhuǎn)移到最能有效利用這種資源的人的手中。 [52] 比較而言,在頻譜資源緊缺的情況下,拍賣(mài)或競(jìng)投是最好的分配頻譜資源的方法