股權(quán)制衡論文董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性、股權(quán)制衡與大股東“掏空”行為研究(參考版)
2025-01-16 17:38本頁(yè)面
【正文】 【英文摘要】According to previous research and analysis, both listed panies and nonlisted panies in many countries, it is obvious that large shareholders and minority shareholders have a conflict of interest. In China, due to the special institutional causes, the ownership structure of listed panies and the internal and external governance mechanisms are unreasonable, the board of supervisors is subject to shareholder, legal protection of minority shareholders is still weak, the supervisory of external audit did not play a good role, large shareholders assuming a frequent occupation of the interests of the listed panies through related party transactions is widespread. Number of factors bined makes us transfer our focus from the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers to the conflict of interest between shareholders. In 2006, for our panies, particularly the listed panies are an important year. The pany’s external environment has undergone significant changes:firstly, the promulgation of the new accounting standards。說(shuō)明控股股東為了裝點(diǎn)門面、掩蓋自身“掏空”動(dòng)機(jī),在股權(quán)缺乏制衡的情況下,傾向于選擇聲譽(yù)好的獨(dú)立董事,同時(shí),也說(shuō)明好的獨(dú)立董事聲譽(yù)能提高獨(dú)立董事的責(zé)任感,代表其他股東的利益,監(jiān)督大股東的“掏空”行為。說(shuō)明股權(quán)制衡的環(huán)境更有利于獨(dú)立董事獨(dú)立性的發(fā)揮。(3)根據(jù)上面的分析結(jié)果,本文進(jìn)一步做關(guān)于股權(quán)制衡、董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性與大股東“掏空”行為的研究。獨(dú)立董事聲譽(yù)變量與大股東“掏空”行為負(fù)相關(guān),在10%的水平下通過(guò)了顯著性檢驗(yàn)。其他大股東SH2SH35與“掏空”行為顯著負(fù)相關(guān),說(shuō)明其他大股東對(duì)“掏空”行為具有制衡作用,能夠抑制大股東“掏空”上市公司。同時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)年度控制變量對(duì)大股東占款影響較大,這也提示我們,雖然本文的研究取得了預(yù)期的效果,但是,在今后的研究中要關(guān)注大股東“掏空”方式的變化,研究大股東新的、主要的“掏空”方式,以便加強(qiáng)管理。實(shí)證方面,本文選取了我國(guó)上市公司2005年2008年間的6093個(gè)有效樣本,從大股東占款角度,對(duì)公司治理因素與大股東“掏空”行為的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。本文試圖用代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、股權(quán)制衡理論等理論和實(shí)證方法,從公司治理
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