【正文】 因?yàn)楣景l(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)和相對(duì)少量的抵押證券資產(chǎn)往往都有比較高的市值比率 ,賬面價(jià)值之間存在關(guān)系有可能虛假債務(wù) /市場(chǎng)價(jià)值和這些變量 ,創(chuàng)造統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)顯著性系數(shù)估計(jì)即使 賬面價(jià)值的債務(wù)比例是隨機(jī)選擇。先考慮這樣的情形 ,管理者樹(shù)立他們的債務(wù) 水平根據(jù)一些隨機(jī)選定目標(biāo)測(cè)量比賬面價(jià)值。然而 ,鮑曼表明橫斷式相關(guān)性的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的賬面價(jià)值和債務(wù)很大 ,由于使用賬面價(jià)值 誤差的 措施可能是相當(dāng)少。一些資本結(jié)構(gòu)的有關(guān)理論會(huì)產(chǎn)生不同的影響對(duì)不同類型的債券 ,探討了這些問(wèn)題產(chǎn)生的原因下 ,預(yù)測(cè)系數(shù)在結(jié)構(gòu)模型根據(jù)是否可能與測(cè)量的債務(wù)比例從書(shū)或的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值。在這兩種情況下 ,公司的總利潤(rùn)可保留 ,是重要的決定了其當(dāng)前的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。因?yàn)樗俏ㄒ恢笜?biāo)的波動(dòng)，我們必須假設(shè)它沒(méi)有錯(cuò)誤這個(gè)屬性措施。 將退出利率 ,例如大小的一個(gè)指標(biāo) ,反映出現(xiàn)象 ,并 經(jīng)常大公司提供了更廣泛的職業(yè)發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì) ,對(duì)他們的員工有較低的退出率 。特別是，小企業(yè)比大企業(yè)支付更多的 費(fèi)用發(fā)行新 股票，也較為發(fā)行長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)。華納和卬 ，蔡和 康納 提供證據(jù)表明，直接破產(chǎn)成本似乎構(gòu)成了一個(gè)公司的 價(jià)值作為該值跌幅較大的比例。 E、 產(chǎn)業(yè)分類 泰特曼 指出，企業(yè)要求 使產(chǎn)品的專業(yè)化服務(wù)和零配件供應(yīng)將發(fā)現(xiàn) 特別 昂貴的清算 。不過(guò)，預(yù)計(jì)在較高 退出 率 的 行業(yè)的公司可能是唯一的，因?yàn)楣鞠鄬?duì)較少，產(chǎn)生相對(duì)獨(dú)特的產(chǎn)品往往采用與特定工作的高層次 ， 因此有了它昂貴，給他們的工作人員人力資本。 我們假定 RD/S 措施 ,因?yàn)楣境鍪郛a(chǎn)品獨(dú)特性以接近的替代品少可能去做研究和開(kāi)發(fā)創(chuàng)新 ,因?yàn)樗麄兛梢愿菀椎膹?fù)制 。顧客，工人和生產(chǎn) 公司，具 有獨(dú)特性或?qū)I(yè)化的產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商在事件可能遭受成本相對(duì)較高 。 成長(zhǎng)指標(biāo)包括資本支出超過(guò)的總資產(chǎn)和由在總資產(chǎn)變動(dòng)率測(cè)得的總資產(chǎn)增長(zhǎng)。詹森和麥克林，史密斯和華納，和 格林 認(rèn)為，該機(jī)構(gòu)將降低成本，如果公司發(fā)行可轉(zhuǎn)換債券。與此相關(guān)的代理關(guān)系的成本很可能是在增長(zhǎng)的行業(yè)，這對(duì)他們更對(duì)企業(yè)未來(lái)投資選擇的靈活性更高。（這些變量， 作為 其他屬性的指標(biāo)，在后面討論。因此，非債務(wù)稅盾 公司在其資本結(jié)構(gòu)債務(wù)較少 相對(duì)其預(yù)期的現(xiàn)金流 。它們包括以（ INT/TA）的總資產(chǎn)的比率無(wú)形資產(chǎn)和存貨加上機(jī)器及設(shè)備總值的比例（ IGP/TA）的總資產(chǎn)。因?yàn)閭钟腥耍ɑ蜚y行）傾向于過(guò)度的特殊待遇， 可能 使用較少高杠桿密切監(jiān)察這類公司。如果債務(wù)抵押證券 , 借款人僅限于使用特定項(xiàng)目的資金。發(fā)行債務(wù)與已知 價(jià) 值財(cái)產(chǎn)擔(dān)保避免這些費(fèi)用。 A、 資產(chǎn)抵押品的價(jià)值 大部分資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論認(rèn)為，由一個(gè)以某種方式公司國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的類型會(huì)影響其資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇。s debt level. It is the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating ine (SIGOI). Since it is the only indicator of volatility, we must assume that it measures this attribute without error. H. Profitability Myers cites evidence from Donaldson and Brealey and Myers that suggests that firms prefer raising capital, first from retained earnings, second from debt, and third from issuing new equity. He suggests that this behavior may be due to the costs of issuing new equity. These can be the costs discussed in Myers and Majluf that arise because of asymmetric information, or they can be transaction costs. In either case, the past profitability of a firm, and hence the amount of earnings available to be retained, should be an important determinant of its current capital structure. We use the ratios of operating ine over sales (OI/S) and operating ine over total assets (OI/TA) as indicators of profitability. II. Measures of Capital Structure Six measures of financial leverage are used in this study. They are longterm, shortterm, and convertible debt divided by market and by book values of Although these variables could have been bined to extract a mon debt ratio attribute, which could in turn be regressed against the independent attributes, there is good reason for not doing this. Some of the theories of capital structure have different implications for the different types of debt, and, for the reasons discussed below, the predicted coefficients in the structural model may differ according to whether debt ratios are measured in terms of book or market values. Moreover, measurement errors in the dependent variables are subsumed in the disturbance term and do not bias the regression coefficients. Data limitations force us to measure debt in terms of book values rather than market values. It would, perhaps, have been better if market value data were available for debt. However, Bowman demonstrated that the crosssectional correlation between the book value and market value of debt is very large, so the misspecification due to using book value measures is probably fairly small. Furthermore, we have no reason to suspect that the crosssectional differences between market values and book values of debt should be correlated with any of the determinants of capital structure suggested by theory, so no obvious bias will result because of this misspecificatio