【正文】 在這種方法中 , 港口當(dāng)局不再是中心位置，他們?cè)诩褐卫碇腥云鹬匾饔?，但他們的作用是與私營企業(yè)的活動(dòng)，協(xié)會(huì)及公私機(jī)構(gòu)相互聯(lián)系的。我們已經(jīng)提供了一份分析框架用于分析 (港口 )集群治理。 該組織是一個(gè)正式的為鹿特丹港市的一部分，但是很大一部分有經(jīng)營自主權(quán)?？偟膩碚f ,專家表明這三個(gè)港口是評(píng)分方面相對(duì)較好的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)企業(yè)。 特丹港口群 幾乎所有集群專家們都同意信任是很重要的對(duì)集群治理質(zhì)量這一觀點(diǎn)，如上所述，認(rèn)為信任是最重要的治理變量。在接下來的四個(gè)段落里，我們討論了四個(gè)變量影響集群治理質(zhì)量的實(shí)證結(jié)果。因?yàn)槌杀镜扔谑杖耄咄顿Y水平需要 高的港口費(fèi)用?！巴顿Y評(píng)估” — 是根據(jù)港口當(dāng)局投資的一些準(zhǔn)則作出的投資。 這意味著港口費(fèi)用不需要完全正當(dāng)在基礎(chǔ)投資上獲益對(duì)承租人或船東。租賃費(fèi)用是公司按租約收取的，如碼頭營運(yùn)人倉儲(chǔ)和生產(chǎn)企業(yè)。對(duì)存在的各項(xiàng)費(fèi)用和相對(duì)重要性收取不同的費(fèi)用在不同的港口之間 (Asar, 2021)。此外 ,港口當(dāng)局還征收“港口費(fèi)”。此外 ,它們通常自給自足及投資于整個(gè)集 群的績效。這涉及到一起籌措資金安排于一組特定的受益人公司。一個(gè)“完美”的集群管理者將收到一份增值產(chǎn)生的收入在集群中，比如通過“集群稅”?！? 港口當(dāng)局作為集群管理者 雖然有各種行為者參與集群治理，但港務(wù)局起著最核心的作用。即使在合作的集體利益中實(shí)現(xiàn)集體（目標(biāo)）超過集體成本，這種合作不（總是）自發(fā)發(fā)展的。領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司的行為影響整個(gè)集群的功能，因?yàn)轭I(lǐng)導(dǎo)企業(yè)有能力和動(dòng)力投資于一個(gè)有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的整體公司網(wǎng)絡(luò)。其次，中介機(jī)構(gòu)降低協(xié)調(diào)成本，因?yàn)樗鼈儭斑B接認(rèn)知”。在一個(gè)集群中的信任水平受到聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)的影響。因此一般缺少協(xié)調(diào)無價(jià)?！奔褐g的治理質(zhì)量不同。其次 ,我們討論港口當(dāng)局在港口治理中的作用。盡管港口當(dāng)局在港口中起著核心作用 , 但 我們認(rèn)為分析港口治理對(duì)港口的作用同時(shí)需要關(guān)注（私營）企業(yè)。 ? charges to tenants in the port, including terminal operators。Governance In Seaport Clusters Peter W. de Erlangen 1. Introduction Apart from wellknown physical factors such as the location, maritime accessibility and hinterland infrastructure, the governance of seaports is an important determinant of their performance. An analysis of the governance of seaports has mostly been limited to the role of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports, we argue that an analysis of governance in seaports requires attention for the role of (private) firms. Institutional economic literature offers a useful framework for ana lysing advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance mechanisms and provides a basis for ana lysing the roles of port authorities. In this paper we deal with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustrate our approach with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam.. First, we briefly discuss the theoretical foundations of the cluster governance concept. Second, we discuss the role of port authorities in the governance of seaports. Third, we present empirical results of a survey among 43 cluster experts in Rotterdam on the governance of Rotterdam’s port cluster. We feminality the paper with conclusions. Quality Of Cluster Governance We define cluster governance as ‘the mix of and relations between various mechanisms of coordination used in a cluster’. The quality of the governance differs between clusters. The quality depends on the level of coordination costs and the ‘scope’ of ‘coordination beyond price’. Low coordination costs and much coordination beyond price improve the quality of governance. When the benefits of coordination are distributed unequally, when (the threat of) opportunistic behaviour prevents coordination or when benefits of coordination are uncertain, coordination beyond price does not arise spontaneously or instantaneously, even when benefits of coordination exceed costs. Therefore there is in general a shortage of coordination beyond price. More coordination beyond price improves the quality of the governance of clusters. In clusters where the level of trust is high, (average) transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify contracts and low monitoring costs. Furthermore, costs of coordination beyond price are lower and as a consequence, more coordination beyond price will arise. The level of trust in a cluster is influenced by the importance of reputation effects in a