【正文】 因為這個原因 ,股利政策總是由董事會決定，財務(wù)人員進行了分析現(xiàn)狀后提建議 ,但是會由董事會作出最后的決定。最后 ,如果公司的資本成本會受到負債比率很大程度上影響 ,公司可以提出了更高的股利支付率 ,因為他們在受到壓力下 ,更容易更多的債務(wù)資本來維持資本預(yù)算項目，而不是削減股息或發(fā)行股票。不確定性程度也影響這一決定。但是，分配的股利額應(yīng)當(dāng)維持在一定水平或按計劃增長，除非公司的財務(wù)狀況惡化到不能維持的程度。由于管理者認識到這一點，他們往往努力將股利保持在一個足夠低的水平，這樣在將來不得不降低股利的可能性就會相當(dāng)?shù)匦?。最終的結(jié)果是宣布發(fā)行新股通常會導(dǎo)致股價的 下跌。顯然，在我們討論中可以看到， 股利政策決策時根據(jù)眾多信息進行判斷的活動，而不是能夠基于精確的數(shù)學(xué)的模型來制作的決策。所以 ,管理層在改變公司的股利支付政策要慎重 ,因為這變化可能會導(dǎo)致對現(xiàn)有股東出售所持有的股票 ,迫使股票價格下降。 委托人效應(yīng)一定意義說，股東可以選擇公司的。甚至 ,證據(jù)和邏輯顯示 ,投資者喜歡投資于一個穩(wěn)定、可預(yù)測股利政策的對公司。投資者作為一個整體，不能看出統(tǒng)一的選更高或更低的股利偏好。也就是說 ,樣本公司必須只是股利政策方面有所差異。如果是這樣，那么相對于其他方面類似而支付率高的公司而言，投資者將更加愿意支付率低的公司的股票付更加高的價錢。由于資金時間價值的作用，未來所支付的一美元的所得稅比現(xiàn)在支付的一美元的所得稅的價值更加低。（ 1）第二章說到長期資本利得要繳納 20%的所得稅，而股利收益的稅率卻高達 %。他們認為， Ks 與股利政策是沒有關(guān)系的， 這就說投資者對于 D1∕ P0 和資本利得是沒有偏好。 “一鳥在手”理論 MM 股利無關(guān)理論的主要結(jié)論是：鼓勵政策不影響要求的權(quán)益收益率 Ks。既然稅收和交易費用的存在是必然的，那么鼓勵政策也很可能是相關(guān)的。 要如何理解 MM 理論關(guān)于股利政策無關(guān)的觀點，我們需要認識到，一個股東在理論上都是能構(gòu)建自己的股利政策。如果股利政策沒有顯著的影響，那這個股利政策就是不相關(guān)。因此 ,股利政策有任何改變將有兩個相反的結(jié)果。 that is, the sample panies must differ only in their dividend policies, and(2)we must be able to measure with a high degree of accuracy each firm’s cost of equity. Neither of these two conditions holds: We cannot find a set of publicly owned firms that differ only in their dividend policies, nor can we obtain precise estimates of the cost of equity. Therefore, no one can establish a clear relationship between dividend policy and the cost of equity. Investors in the aggregate cannot be seen to uniformly prefer either higher or lower dividends. Nevertheless, individual investors do have strong preferences. Some prefer high dividends, while others prefer all capital gains. These differences among in dividends help explain why it is difficult to reach any definitive conclusions regarding the optimal dividend payout. Even so ,both evidence and logic suggest that investors prefer firms that follow a stable, predictable dividend policy. Because we discuss how dividend policy is set in practice, we must examine two other theoretical issues that could affect our view toward dividend policy: (1)the information content, or signaling, hypothesis and(2) The clientele effects. MM argued that investors’ reactions to change in dividend policy do not necessarily show that investors prefer dividends to retained earnings. Rather, they argued that price change following dividend actions simply indicate that there is an important information, or signaling, content in dividend announcements. The clientele effects to the extent that stockholders can switch, a firm can change from one dividend payout policy to another and then let stockholders who do not like the new policy sell to other investors who do. However, frequent switching would be inefficient because of(1)brokerage costs,(2)the likelihood that stockholders who are selling will have to pay capital gains taxes, and (3) a possible shortage of investors who like the firm’s newly adopted dividend policy. Thus, management should be hesitant to change its dividend policy, because a change might cause current stockholders to sell their stock, forcing the stock price down. Such a price decline might be temporary, but it might also be permanent if few new investors are attracted by the new dividend policy, then the stock price would remain depressed. Of course, the new policy might attract an even larger clientele than the firm had before, in which case the stock price would rise. In many ways, our discussion of