【正文】 Coefficient.820(**).946(**)Sig. (2tailed).000.000.** Correlation is significant at the level (2tailed).表6資料顯示三個序列排序的結(jié)果存在著高度的正相關，意味著三種設計的總體等級方向之間存在著高度的一致性。七、主要結(jié)論1．樣本公司總體治理狀況較差，%，且公司間差異較大。2．全部ST股以及PT的治理狀況較非ST及PT股差，平均治理指數(shù)相差3個百分點。3．地區(qū)經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平與公司治理的狀況具有一定的正相關性，經(jīng)濟發(fā)展基礎較好的地區(qū)，公司治理水平較高。4．行業(yè)間總體治理指數(shù)存在差異，行業(yè)內(nèi)上市公司間治理狀況差異較大。公用事業(yè)的競爭程度最低，其平均公司治理指數(shù)最高，工業(yè)類的競爭程度最高，其治理狀況最差。5．董事會治理是公司治理的核心，；6．獨立制度初見成效，但是獨立性較差，群體效應難以發(fā)揮。7．利益相關者參與治理仍然定留在理論層面上，沒有全面賦諸實施。%。8．樣本公司獨立董事參與治理的狀況與監(jiān)事會參與治理的程度呈現(xiàn)負相關，但相關系數(shù)很低，人們普遍關注的獨立董事與監(jiān)事會的職能的重疊問題在樣本公司中顯示的并不顯著。9．公司治理狀況與上市公司績效有著密切的關系，樣本公司中治理指數(shù)得分最高的前1/4家公司的凈資產(chǎn)收益率為是后1/。參考文獻：[1] 李維安，《公司治理》，南開大學出版社，天津，2001，2。[2] 李維安. 中國公司治理原則與國際比較. 中國財政經(jīng)濟出版社, 2002.[3] 李維安. 現(xiàn)代公司治理研究: 資本結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理與國有企業(yè)股份制改造. 中國人民大學出版社, 2002.[4] 瑪格麗特M布萊爾著 張榮剛譯《所有權與控制》，中國社會科學出版社，1999。[5] 斯道延坦尼夫, 張春霖. 中國公司治理與企業(yè)改革. 中國財政經(jīng)濟出版社, 2002.[6] 里昂證券(亞洲). 公司治理評分體系(內(nèi)部資料). 2000.[7] 裴武威. 公司治理評價體系研究. 證券市場導報, 2001,[8] 董逢谷等,《上市公司綜合評價——方案設計與應用研究》,上海財經(jīng)大學出版社，2002，12.[9] 張綺、西村昂，提高層次分析法評價精度的幾種方法，系統(tǒng)工程理論與實踐，1997，11.[10] 李存修、柯承恩等，《公司治理與平等系統(tǒng)》，臺灣商智文化事業(yè)股份有限公司，2002年，11月[11] Nikos Vafeas,“Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance,”Journal of Financial Economics 7 (1999)。[12] John M Olin“Independent Directors and the Longterm Performance”,Journal of corporation law,17 (2001)。[13] Berle. A. A. and Means, G. C. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Macmillan .1932[14] Klein, A.. Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure. Journal of Law and Economics XLI, 1998: 275303.[15] Cadbury Committee. Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Lodon: GEC, 1992.[16] Charreaux, G233。rard。 Desbri232。res, Philippe. Corporate governance: Stakeholder Value Versus Shareholder Value. Journal of Management and Governance, 2001, (5): 107128.[17] Demsetz, H.。 Lehn, Structure of Corporate Ownership: Cases and Consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 1985, (93): 11551177.[18] Fama, E. F.. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 1980, (88): 134145.[19] Fama, E. F。 Jesen, M. C. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, (26): 301349.[20] Henderson, J.。 Cool, K. Corporate Governance, Investment Bandwagons and Overcapacity: An Analysis of the Worldwide Petrochemical Industry, 197595. Strategic Management Journal, 2003, (24): 349373.[21] Lehmann, JeanPierre. Comparative Perspective of Corporate Governance: Europe and East Asia, Global Economic Review, 1997, 26(3): 333.[22] Leker, Jens。 Salomo, Sen. CEO Turnover and Corporate Performance. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 2000, (16): 287303.[23] Main, B. G. M.。 Johnston, J.. Remuneration Committees and Corporate Governance. Accounting and Business Research, 1993, (23): 351362.[24] Rechner, P. L.。 Dalton, D. R.. CEO Duality and Organizational Performance: A Longitudinal Study. Strategic Management Journal, 1991, (12): 155160.[25] Rosenstein, S.。 Vishny, and J. G. Wyatt, “Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth. ”Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, (26): 175191.[26] Rosenstein, S.。 Vishny and J. G. Wyatt, “Inside Directors, Board Effectiveness and Shareholder Wealth.” Journal of Financial Economics, 1997, (44): 299250.[27] Williamson, Oliver E.. Strategy Research: Governance and Competence Perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 1999, (20): 10871108. [28] Jesen, M. C.。 Meckling, W. H.. Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, (13): 3053360. [29] Amin,Ash。Cohendet, Patrick. Organizational Learning and GovernanceThrough Embedded Practices. Journal of Management and Governance, 2000, (4): 93116.[30] Yeh,.,2002,July,”Board Composition and the Separate of Ownership from Control,” The 2002 Asia Pacific Finance Association Annual Conference, Tokyo, Japan.作者簡介：李維安，南開大學國際上學院院長，南開大學公司治理研究中心主任，博士生導師，長期從事公司治理與企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略研究。A Study of Corporate Governance Index for Chinese Listed Companies and Its Application The project Team of the Research Center of Corporate Governance of Nankai UniversityAbstract: Corporate Governance Index for Chinese Listed Companies(CCGI) is the barometer of corporate governance state. Based on the analysis of CCGI’s function, we construct the CCGI according to the corporate governance appraisal theory. We also analysis the status of corporate governance in China and test our CCGI. Key words: Corporate Governance Index( CCGI ) Function Contingency Theory。 Multiobjective Programming Theory Positive Analysis