經(jīng)濟學(xué)原理第三版習(xí)題答案(i)-資料下載頁
2025-06-07 21:43本頁面
【正文】 lusion). If that happened, consumers would lose because prices would be higher and quantity would be lower.9. a. If Jones has 10 cows and Smith has 10, for a total of 20 cows, each cow produces $4,000 of milk. Since a cow costs $1,000, profits would be $3,000 per cow, or $30,000 for each farmer.If one farmer had 10 cows and the other farmer had 20 cows, for a total of 30 cows, each cow produces $3,000 of milk. Profits per cow would be $2,000, so the farmer with 10 cows makes $20,000。 the farmer with 20 cows makes $40,000. If both farmers have 20 cows, for a total of 40 cows, each cow produces $2,000 of milk. Profit per cow is $1,000, so each farmer39。s profit is $20,000. The results are shown in the table:Jones’ Decision10 cows20 cowsSmith39。sDecision10 cows$30,000 profit for Jones$30,000 profit for Smith$40,000 profit for Jones$20,000 profit for Smith20 cows$20,000 profit for Jones$40,000 profit for Smith$20,000 profit for Jones$20,000 profit for Smithb. If Jones had 10 cows, Smith would want 20 cows. If Jones had 20 cows, Smith would be indifferent (get the same profit) if he had 10 or 20 cows. So Smith has a dominant strategy of having 20 cows.If Smith had 10 cows, Jones would want 20 cows. If Smith had 20 cows, Jones would be indifferent (get the same profit) if he had 10 or 20 cows. So Jones has a dominant strategy of having 20 cows.The Nash equilibrium is for each farmer to have 20 cows, since that is the dominant strategy for each. They each make profits of $20,000. But they would both be better off if they cooperated and each had only 10 cows。 then profit would be $30,000 each.c. The problem illustrates how a mon field may be overused, reducing the profits of producers. Since people tend to overuse mon fields, it is more efficient for people to own their own portion of the field. Thus, over time, mon fields have been divided up and owned privately.10. Little Kona should not believe this threat from Big Brew because it is not in Big Brew’s interest to carry out the threat. If Little Kona enters, Big Brew can set a high price, in which case it makes $3 million, or Big Brew can set a low price, in which case it makes $1 million. Thus the threat is an empty one, which Little Kona should ignore。 Little Kona should enter the market.11. Neither player has a dominant strategy in this game. Jeff should hit left if Steve guesses right and Jeff should hit right if Steve guesses left. Steve should guess left if Jeff hits left and Steve should guess right if Jeff hits right. Thus, if Jeff stuck with a particular strategy (left or right), Steve would be able to guess it easily after a few points. A better strategy for Jeff is to randomly choose whether to hit the ball left or right, sometimes hitting left and other times hitting right.
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