【導(dǎo)讀】安全管理系統(tǒng)最重要的目的是維護(hù)和促進(jìn)工人們?cè)诠ぷ鲿r(shí)的健康和安全。性計(jì)劃時(shí)，了解為什么、怎樣做和其他意外事故的發(fā)展是十分重要的。事故致因理論旨在。闡明事故現(xiàn)象，和解釋事故的機(jī)理。所有現(xiàn)代理論都是基于試圖解釋事件發(fā)生、發(fā)展過(guò)程。在古老的時(shí)期，事故被看做是上帝的行為并且?guī)缀鯖](méi)有。預(yù)防的方法去阻止他們。在20世紀(jì)開(kāi)始的時(shí)候，人們開(kāi)始相信差的物理?xiàng)l件是事故發(fā)生的。安全從業(yè)人員集中注意力在提高機(jī)器監(jiān)護(hù)、維護(hù)和清理上。在大多數(shù)情況下，一件。事故的發(fā)生主要有兩個(gè)原因：人類(lèi)的行為和物理或者社會(huì)環(huán)境。高層管理人員負(fù)責(zé)建立一個(gè)能夠有效控制危險(xiǎn)源有關(guān)組織。一個(gè)人出現(xiàn)的錯(cuò)誤可能是有意。的或者是無(wú)意的。拉斯姆森和杰森已經(jīng)提出了三個(gè)層次的技能規(guī)則知識(shí)模型來(lái)描述不同種。類(lèi)的人錯(cuò)誤的起源。如今，這種模式已經(jīng)成為在工作中檢驗(yàn)人的錯(cuò)誤的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)之一。

　　

【正文】 fety problems. All system ponents and interactions are studied to predict the risks that will be involved in system operation. Design changes are then made to minimize these risks. Knowledge of similar systems is also helpful in this phase. Of particular interest are measures taken to correct design features that resulted in accidents. Similar accidents may be avoided by including the same corrective measures in the specifications that emerge from the design phase. 設(shè)計(jì)階段。設(shè)備規(guī)格、維護(hù)計(jì)劃、培訓(xùn)計(jì)劃、提出系統(tǒng)程序、和其他設(shè)計(jì)原材料的檢查評(píng)估也是在設(shè)計(jì)階段進(jìn)行的。廣泛的危險(xiǎn)源分析也有助于識(shí)別和解決潛在的安全問(wèn)題。研究所有系統(tǒng)組成部分和相互作用預(yù)測(cè)系統(tǒng)運(yùn)行中將會(huì)涉及到的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。通 過(guò)更改設(shè)計(jì)將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)最小化。在這一階段類(lèi)似的系統(tǒng)知識(shí)也很有幫助。我們采取一些措施為了糾正可能會(huì)造成事故的設(shè)計(jì)上的特點(diǎn)是尤其有意義的。在設(shè)計(jì)階段發(fā)現(xiàn)的問(wèn)題說(shuō)明書(shū)中如果相關(guān)的補(bǔ)救措施也寫(xiě)進(jìn)去的話(huà)類(lèi)似的一些事故也可以避免。 Development Phase. During the development phase, system safety programs assure that 10 the design requirements are incorporated as the system is generated. Hazard analyses are performed or updated. Additional studies or tests are conducted to verify the adequacy of safety design features. Training courses for operating personnel are reviewed to confirm that there is satisfactory coverage of safety aspects. Refinements of system design often result from these evaluations to improve system safety prior to the operation phase. 發(fā)展階段。在發(fā)展階段，系統(tǒng)安全規(guī)劃保證了系統(tǒng)形成時(shí)設(shè)計(jì)要求已經(jīng)整合。開(kāi)展或更新危險(xiǎn)源分析。進(jìn)一步的研究或試驗(yàn)進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證安全設(shè)計(jì)是否足夠。對(duì)操作人員的培訓(xùn)課程進(jìn)行審查，以確認(rèn)在安全方面是否有令人滿(mǎn)意的覆蓋面。系統(tǒng)設(shè)計(jì)的改進(jìn)往往是通過(guò)這些評(píng)估結(jié)果在運(yùn)行階段之前改善系統(tǒng)的安全性。 Operation Phase. Periodic safety inspections, maintenance, training, and performance reviews are conducted in the operation phase to maintain or improve the safety achieved previously. Hazard analyses are updated to determine the impact of any system changes, and action is taken to control any hazards that result from such changes. Similar action is taken following any accident or malfunction to correct deficiencies that have been overlooked. 運(yùn)作階段。在運(yùn)行階段進(jìn)行定期安全檢查，維修，培訓(xùn)和績(jī)效評(píng)估，以維持或改善先前達(dá)到的安全。危險(xiǎn)源分析的更新，是為了確定任何系統(tǒng)變化的影響，并采取行動(dòng)以控制導(dǎo)致這些變化的任何危害。在任何事故或故障中采取類(lèi)似的行動(dòng)，以糾正那些被忽略的缺陷 Disposal Phase. Program efforts are continued through the final phase of the life cycle. System disposal procedures are reviewed and monitored. Special precautions are taken in disposing of hazardous materials, equipment, etc. 處置階段。 方案在生命周期的最后階段中仍能繼續(xù)進(jìn)行。系統(tǒng)處理程序進(jìn)行審查和監(jiān)督。采取特別措施處理危險(xiǎn)品、設(shè)備等。 Analysis 危險(xiǎn)源分析 The heart of a system safety program is in the performance of hazard analyses. These efforts also involve most of the detail work of system safety engineering. Analyses are conducted to identify and evaluate hazards within a system. With this information, responsible officials may determine the safest, most efficient means of controlling th e hazards identified. With its accident sources eliminated, the entire system also bees more effective in performing its task. In general, hazard analyses are conducted as follows ： 系統(tǒng)安全計(jì)劃的核心是危險(xiǎn)源分析。這些 工作 還涉及到大多數(shù)系統(tǒng)安全工程的細(xì)節(jié)。進(jìn)行分析，以在系統(tǒng)中識(shí)別和評(píng)估危險(xiǎn)。有了這些信息，負(fù)責(zé)的管理人員可以決定控制 危險(xiǎn)源 的最安全，最有效的手段。憑借對(duì)其事故源的消除，整個(gè)系統(tǒng)也變得可以更加有效地執(zhí)行其任務(wù)。在一般情況下，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的分析是如下這樣進(jìn)行的： Gain an understanding of the system. Define the scope and purpose of the analysis. Select and apply an analysis technique. Evaluate the results. 獲取對(duì)系統(tǒng)的理解。 定義分析的范圍和目的。 選擇并應(yīng)用分析技術(shù)。 評(píng)估結(jié)果。 Hazard analysis is not an intuitive process. For an analysis to be meaningful, it must be 11 logical， accurate， descriptive of the system, and based on valid assumptions. Its success largely depends on the skill and knowledge of those conducting the analysis. Anyone who has a thorough， working knowledge of both the system under consideration and the analysis technique to be used may perform a hazard analysis. In practice, the efforts of several persons with varying backgrounds are usually required to assure that meaningful and prehensive hazard information is obtained. 危險(xiǎn)源分析并不是一個(gè)直觀的過(guò)程。要使一個(gè)分析有意義，它必須是符合邏輯的，精確的，描述性的系統(tǒng)，并且基于有效的假設(shè)。它的成功在很大程度上取決于那些進(jìn)行分析的技能和知識(shí)。任何對(duì)于系統(tǒng)有充分的工作知識(shí)和分析技術(shù)的人都可以進(jìn)行 危險(xiǎn)源分析。在實(shí)踐中，通常需要不同背景的人的努力，來(lái)確保獲得有意義的和全面的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)信息。 A system safety program usually requires the performance of several hazard analyses throughout the life cycle. The scope and purpose of each required analysis may be different. For example， a preliminary hazard analysis may be required in the concept phase to provide an initial assessment of hazards that may he encountered in subsequent life cycle phases. Special analyses may also be specified to determine the hazards volved in system development，assembly， operation， maintenance， or disposal. In addition ， the entire system or only part of the system may be analyzed at one time. Where subsystem hazard analyses are performed, a total system analysis should also be conducted to identify potential hazards at the interfaces of the subsystems. 一個(gè)系統(tǒng)安全項(xiàng)目通常要求在壽命周期內(nèi)進(jìn)行一些危險(xiǎn)源分析。每個(gè)要求分析的范圍和目的可能不盡相同。例如，一個(gè)初步危險(xiǎn)源分析可能要求在項(xiàng)目概念形成階段提供一次可能在后續(xù)壽命周期性階段出現(xiàn)危險(xiǎn)源的初始評(píng)估。還可以針對(duì)特殊問(wèn)題進(jìn)行特別分析，以確定系統(tǒng)開(kāi)發(fā)、裝配、操作、維護(hù)或處理中所涉及的危害。此外，該系統(tǒng)的整個(gè)系統(tǒng) 或者 部分可以 同時(shí) 進(jìn)行分析。其中，子系統(tǒng)危險(xiǎn)分析被執(zhí)行，一個(gè)總的系統(tǒng)的分析也應(yīng)進(jìn)行，以確定潛在的危險(xiǎn)在子系統(tǒng)的接口。 Regardless of the scope， purpose， or technique used， a hazard analysis is only a tool. It does not make decisions. Analysis was never intended to provide the final answer to system safety problems, but rather to aid in making decisions for improving the system. 無(wú)論范圍，目的，或使用的技術(shù)的手段， 危險(xiǎn)源 分 析只是一種工具。它不會(huì)作出決定。分析絕不是為了解決系統(tǒng)安全的問(wèn)題 而 提供 的 最終答案，而是幫助決策用于改進(jìn)該系統(tǒng)。 4． Hazard Control 危險(xiǎn)源 控制 To control the hazards identified by analysis, the system or its environment must be altered. Hazard control typically is acplished through either engineering, educational, or administrative solutions. Where these types of hazard controls are insufficient, protective apparol is often used. 要通過(guò)分析來(lái) 控制辨別出的危險(xiǎn)源，必須改變系統(tǒng)或環(huán)境。 危險(xiǎn)源 控制通常是通過(guò)工程、教育或行政解決方案來(lái)完成的。當(dāng)無(wú)法能夠控制這類(lèi) 危險(xiǎn)源 的時(shí)候，通常使用防護(hù)服。 5． Egineering Solutions 工程解決辦法 Because engineering solutions are relatively permanent， they are the most desirable type of hazard control. They normally involve altering the system’s machines, materials, or environment. The approach used in engineering soluti