【正文】 order to demonstrate how to acquire objective knowledge, Popper rejects the viewpoint of knowledge of the socalled essentialism and instrumentalism, in other words, he opposes both the doctrine about culminating reality and the theory just considering principle as instrument and insisting that a principle is true only because of its applicability. We might as well consider the viewpoint of knowledge Popper agree on as an evolutionary viewpoint of knowledge. He has ever indicated that knowledge is the result of an evolutionary accumulation after being falsified. If there is no doctrine about culminating reality, indeed, this doctrine is too arbitrary and too madcap, and foolish, I think the principle indicated by Popper could be regarded as a theory about a kind of relative reality. But we may doubt if the ‘relative reality’ is just the offspring of promise. ‘Of course not!’ Popper says, he thinks his principle could justify itself. In order to explain why, Popper brings in the abstract words and intentative words which have describing function. In his mind, all of the universal names are intentative and the degree of their intents ranks from low to high, for instance, the intentative degree of ‘it is electric’ is higher than the intentative degree of ‘now it is electric’, nay, the degree is relevant to the principle when it is conjectural or assumptive. While the degree of the intent is higher, a principle concludes more about reality, consequently, if a principle is more assumptive and the degree of its intent is higher, its testability will be higher. Universal names are so important that one language can not work without them. Long time ago, Popper asserted ‘Every description uses universal names (or symbols, or ideas)。 every statement has the character of a theory, of a hypothesis. The statement, ‘Here is a glass of water’ cannot be verified by any observational experience. The reason is that the universals which appear in it cannot be correlated with any specific senseexperience. (An ‘immediate experience’ is only once ‘immediately given’。 it is unique.) By the word ‘glass’, for example, we denote physical bodies which exhibit a certain lawlike behavior, and the same holds for the word ‘water’.’[16] The use of universal names always demands us to claim something and sequentially guess the substantiality of intents (here denoting relative substantiality but culminating or unconditional substantiality),thus, if we just research intentative words and concrete items separately, it will result in some falsehood, the reason is ‘a(chǎn)ll of the items are theoretical in a way, though some items are more theoretical 。 just like we have said, all of the principles are conjectural, though some principles are more conjectural than other principles.’[17]The basis of Popper’s argumentation is always the falsification of principles, though if we try to create a new principle, it will suffer from the danger of being falsified, in order to get preciser theories, we should still dare to use universal names to seek after all the mysteries in the world. Otherwise, language will be purportless. How logical calculus and arithmetical calculus can be applied to reality Generally, all of the logical calculuses are directed by the reasoning rules. Popper protests that to every proverbial reasoning rules, there is an assertive (could be proved) wellknown formula. Thus it can be seen that we regard logical calculus as a process, when we are in the process of using logical calculus, we will inevitably obey reasoning rules and make use of the formulas of logical calculuses in order to let the logical calculuses be applied to reality. Popper maintains that arithmetical calculus is a particular kind of logical calculuses, and its difference from other kinds of logical calculuses is that it could be used to describe some types of facts directly. If we want to prehend what the exact meaning of reasoning rules is when used as an instruction of logical calculuses, we must know that language denotes a kind of formal symbolic system which allows us to make true statements. A right reasoning rule will not meet counterexample in this kind of symbolic system, because none of counterexample exists at all. Popper thinks that we just need the formal character of reasoning rules. At the same time, we should realize that reasoning rules always concern with the statements of statements or concern with the statements of the generic statements, thereby they are mealanguages, and also conclude something about all of the generic statements unconditionally。 nevertheless calculus formula does not conclude anything unconditionally, but conclude a kind of all of its nexus and individuals conditionally. Thus Popper indicates that: ‘we should distinguish such as the traditional logical reasoning rules (called ‘Barbara’): ‘M a P’‘S a M’‘S a P’ from the generic calculus: ‘if M a P and S a M, then S a P ’ 。moreover, distinguish the reasoning rule or positive hypothetical reasoning called ‘the reasoning fundamental of propositional logic’: p if p, then q qfrom the formula of propositional calculus.’[18] Although to every wellknown reasoning rule, there is a wellknown calculus formula accordingly, we should respect Popper’s warning and edification, and not confuse mealanguage with objective language or else we may make mistakes and bring up against paradox. I think ‘the reasoning rule’ referred by Popper here is also denoting ‘logical rule’ and the actual meaning of ‘logical calculuses’ is regarded as a process of how to constitute practical logical calculuses in order to use calculus formula and consequently let logical calculuses be applied to reality. Herein, I maintain that we should make an effort to grasp the method of constituting practical logical calculuses and make sure that the reasoning rules can be applied t