【正文】 or markets helps to discipline managers. 前面簡(jiǎn)要的討論了下來(lái)自勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的壓力如何約束企業(yè)管理者。We now examine somewhat more specifically conditions under which the discipline imposed by managerial labor markets can resolve potential incentive problems associated with the separation of security ownership and control of the firm. 我們現(xiàn)在更為特殊的條件下，勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)施加的約束能夠很好地解決企業(yè)證券所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離帶來(lái)的潛在的激勵(lì)問(wèn)題。To focus on the problem we are trying to solve, let us first examine the situation where the manager is also the firm39。s sole security holder, so that there is clearly no incentive problem. 為了把重點(diǎn)集中在我們要分析的問(wèn)題上，我們首先分析管理者也是企業(yè)唯一的證券持有人的情況，這里顯然沒(méi)有激勵(lì)問(wèn)題。When he is sole security holder, a manager consumes on the job, through shirking, perquisites, or inpetence, to the point where these yield marginal expected utility equal to that provided by an additional dollar of wealth usable for consumption or investment outside of the ，管理者通過(guò)規(guī)避責(zé)任、取得額外收入、或者褻瀆職責(zé)來(lái)取得的職業(yè)消費(fèi)(非現(xiàn)金收益)會(huì)到達(dá)這樣一個(gè)點(diǎn),這樣的行為的邊際期望效用剛好等于可用于企業(yè)外部消費(fèi)或者投資的財(cái)富增量。The manager is induced to make this specific decision because he pays directly for consumption on the job。 that is, as manager he cannot avoid a full ex post settling up with himself as security ，因?yàn)樗苯映袚?dān)職業(yè)消費(fèi)的后果；也就是說(shuō)，作為管理者他不可以避免同時(shí)作為證券持有者所面臨的同自身事后進(jìn)行財(cái)務(wù)清算的所有后果。In contrast, when the manager is no longer sole security holder, and in the absence of some form of full ex post settling up for deviations from contract, a manager has an incentive to consume more on the job than is agreed in his ，如果管理者不是證券持有者，并且缺乏解決偏離契約的事后清算的手段時(shí)，管理者有激勵(lì)進(jìn)行比其答應(yīng)的更多的職業(yè)消費(fèi)。The manager perceives that, on an ex post basis, he can beat the game by shirking or consuming more perquisites than previously agreed. 管理者意識(shí)到，在事后偏差的基礎(chǔ)上，他可以通過(guò)偷懶和消費(fèi)比契約規(guī)定的更多的職業(yè)消費(fèi)以獲得博弈的成功。This does not necessarily mean that the manager profits at the expense of other 。Rational managerial labor markets understand any shortings of available mechanisms for enforcing ex post settling up. 理性的管理者勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)了解實(shí)施事后結(jié)算的可行機(jī)制的所有缺陷。Assessments of ex post deviations from contract will be incorporated into contracts on an ex ante basis。 for example, through an adjustment of the manager39。s wage. 事后偏離契約的評(píng)估會(huì)在事前達(dá)成的契約中體現(xiàn)；比如，通過(guò)管理者的工資調(diào)整。Nevertheless, a game which is fair on an ex ante basis does not induce the same behavior as a game in which there is also ex post settling up. 然而，一種從事前角度來(lái)看的公平博弈，并不能引出與一種也能事后了解的博弈的同樣的行為。Herein lie the potential losses from separation of security ownership and control of a firm. 這里存在著由證券所有權(quán)和企業(yè)控制權(quán)分離帶來(lái)的潛在損失。There are situations where, with less than plete ex post settling up, the manager is induced to consume more on the job than he would like, given that on average he pays for his consumption ex ante. 有這樣一種場(chǎng)合，管理者在事前支付其消費(fèi)的平均水平，如果事后結(jié)算不完備，管理者會(huì)引致比他想要的更多的職業(yè)消費(fèi)。Three general conditions suffice to make the wage revaluation imposed by the managerial labor market a form of full ex post settling up which resolves the managerial incentive problem described above. 有三個(gè)條件足以使管理者勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的工資重新估計(jì)成為一種完全的事后結(jié)算形式，這就解決了前述管理的激勵(lì)問(wèn)題。The first condition is that a manager39。s talents and his tastes for consumption on the job are not known with certainty, are likely to change through time, and must be imputed by managerial labor markets at least in part from information about the manager39。s current and past performance. 第一個(gè)條件是，管理者的才能和職業(yè)消費(fèi)偏好是不可以確切了解的，可能隨著時(shí)間而變動(dòng)，因此必須訴諸于管理者勞動(dòng)市場(chǎng)，至少是部分的求助于管理者現(xiàn)在和過(guò)去的業(yè)績(jī)信息。Since it seems to capture the essence of the task of managerial labor markets in a world of uncertainty, this assumption is no real restriction. 這一假定看起來(lái)抓住了不確定環(huán)境中管理者勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的實(shí)質(zhì)，因此，他是現(xiàn)實(shí)的。 The second assumption is that managerial labor markets appropriately use current and past information to revise future wages and understand any enforcement power inherent in the wage revision process. 第二個(gè)假設(shè)是，管理者勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)能夠適當(dāng)使用現(xiàn)在和過(guò)去的信息去修訂未來(lái)工資和了解修訂工資過(guò)程中的發(fā)生實(shí)施的力量。In short, contrary to much of the literature on separation of security ownership and control, we impute efficiency or rationality in information processing to managerial labor ，與許多證券所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離的文獻(xiàn)相反，我們把信息處理過(guò)程中的效率和理性歸因與管理者勞動(dòng)市場(chǎng)。In defense of this assumption, we note that the problem faced by managerial labor markets in revaluing the managers of a firm is much entwined with the problem faced by the capital market in revaluing the firm itself. 為了維護(hù)這一假定，我們指出，在重估企業(yè)管理者的價(jià)值時(shí)管理市場(chǎng)面臨的問(wèn)題與資本市場(chǎng)重估企業(yè)價(jià)值所面臨的問(wèn)題高度相關(guān)。Although we do not understand all the details of the process, available empirical evidence (., Fama 1976, chaps. 5 and 6) suggests that the capital market generally makes rational assessments of the value of the firm in the face of imprecise and uncertain information. 盡管我們不知道這一過(guò)程的細(xì)節(jié)，可利用的經(jīng)驗(yàn)型證據(jù)（例如：法碼1976，5和6章）說(shuō)明了資本市場(chǎng)通?？梢栽诓痪_和非完全信息下理性得評(píng)估企業(yè)的價(jià)值。This does not necessarily mean that information processing in managerial labor markets is equally efficient or rational, but it is a warning against strong presumptions to the contrary. 這并不必然意味著管理者勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的信息過(guò)程是完全一樣有效與理性的，但是卻對(duì)任何相反假定進(jìn)行有力的告誡。The final and key condition for full control of managerial behavior through wage changes is that the weight of the wage revision process is sufficient to resolve any potential problems with managerial ，工資調(diào)整過(guò)程的力度足以解決管理者激勵(lì)的所有潛在問(wèn)題。In this general form, the condition amounts to assuming the desired result. 一般來(lái)說(shuō)，這一條件無(wú)異于將期望結(jié)果作為假定。More substance is provided by specific examples. 更多實(shí)質(zhì)性含義將通過(guò)特殊例子來(lái)說(shuō)明。Example 1: Marketable Human Capital 例1：市場(chǎng)化的人力資本Suppose a manager39。s human capital, his stream of future wages, is a marketable ，即他未來(lái)的流動(dòng)工資，是市場(chǎng)化資產(chǎn)。Suppose the manager perceives that, because of the consequent revaluations of future wages, the current value of his human capital changes by at least the amount of an unbiased assessment of the wealth changes experienced by other factors, primarily the security holders, because of his current deviations from ，由于未來(lái)工資的重新估價(jià)，他的人力資本的現(xiàn)值是隨著對(duì)財(cái)富的最小無(wú)偏估計(jì)量變化而變化，其財(cái)富的變化受著其他要素、特別是證券持有者的影響，由于管理者的契約偏差。Then, as long as the manager is not a risk preferrer, these revaluations of his human capital are a form of full ex post settling ，只要管理者不是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好，人力資本的重估完全是事后結(jié)算的形式。The manager need not be charged ex ante for presumed ex post deviations from 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