會計(jì)專業(yè)外文翻譯---股權(quán)集中度在私營企業(yè)的職責(zé)-會計(jì)審計(jì)-資料下載頁
2025-05-12 16:45本頁面
【導(dǎo)讀】公司的披露標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和審計(jì)相關(guān)特性的影響。會計(jì)透明度，有助紓緩該機(jī)構(gòu)之間少數(shù)投資。者和有控制權(quán)的股東的沖突。公司的資源，取決于這些私人利益被隱藏起來。在控制了其他國家一級和公司一級。的影響因素，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)弱的證據(jù)表明，廣泛披露標(biāo)準(zhǔn)減少股權(quán)集中度。責(zé)任中，股權(quán)集中度低，在民事和刑事訴訟中反對審計(jì)員關(guān)于Ball[2020]預(yù)言。究通過檢查審計(jì)紀(jì)律對股權(quán)集中度對于法定機(jī)構(gòu)的重要性。尤其是披露壞的決定和報(bào)告損失。人員和財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的質(zhì)量和披露實(shí)際取決于內(nèi)在刺激經(jīng)理和審計(jì)師的遭遇。最近的研究表明，雖然所有權(quán)集中減輕管理征用，但由此產(chǎn)生了另一個(gè)代理問題，這些顯性股東通常充分發(fā)。費(fèi)，顯示私營企業(yè)福利的管制措施。我們調(diào)查是否供選擇統(tǒng)治機(jī)制，即披露標(biāo)準(zhǔn)及審計(jì)員有關(guān)的特點(diǎn),改善縮。形下，如果發(fā)生財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告關(guān)于審計(jì)員選擇和較好揭發(fā)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)失敗審計(jì)員的。據(jù)補(bǔ)充最近國際研究,其發(fā)現(xiàn)影響主管刺激的機(jī)構(gòu)比正式揭發(fā)標(biāo)對品質(zhì)的要求更高,
【正文】 surrounding enforcement infrastructure is more important to good corporate governance than extensive investor protection laws. In contrast to Dyck and Zingales[2020]and Haw et al.[2020],we find that the severity of tax enforcement does not influence ownership concentration,our proxy for the amount of insiders’private control ,our research suggests that governance reforms meant to alleviate the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and outside investors should focus on lowering the burden of proof in both civil and criminal cases against firms’auditors and,to a lesser extent,requiring more ,these policy prescriptions are relatively straightforward for governments to implement in order to improve their securities fact,such feasible reforms should enhance the quality of financial reporting,leading to the positive externality of higher tax pliance since preventing diversion of corporate resources benefits tax authorities as well as outside investors. The remainder of the paper proceeds as 2 develops our testable 3 describes the sample and reports summary descriptive statistics on the regression 4 discusses the empirical 5 concludes. However,we mainly contribute to our understanding of international corporate governance by responding to Ball’s[2020]and Leuz’s[2020]calls for research that sheds light on whether legal institutions that discipline auditors lead to firms being better known in the capital particular,we estimate the influence of differences across countries in the burden of proof required in civil and criminal cases against auditors on ownership evidence implies that governments that genuinely expose auditors to civil and criminal penalties benefit from firms having more dispersed ownership,suggesting that minority investors perceive that firms’financial statements are more credible in these ,in multivariate tests,we find that securities laws that facilitate civil and criminal litigation against auditors subsume the influence of other legal,including disclosure standards,and extralegal our regressions on a broad sample of western European public firms provides similar evidence on all of our predictions. In contrast to Dyck and Zingales[2020]and Haw et al.[2020],we find that imposing more severe private and public enforcement on auditors dominates tax pliance in explaining ownership concentration in our ,consistent with Ball’s[2020]predictions,our strong,robust evidence suggests that liberalizing the legal infrastructure that governs auditors improves contracting by supporting highquality financial ,among the set of feasible public policy reforms,our research implies that countries should pursue enacting securities laws that discipline fact,countries could tailor these reforms to suit their legal traditions with mon(civil)law countries lowering the burden of proof in civil(criminal)cases against auditors. 外文翻譯考核表 指導(dǎo)教師對外文翻譯的評語： 指導(dǎo)教師 （簽名） 年 月 日 建議成績 評閱小組或評閱人對外文翻譯的評語： 評閱小組負(fù)責(zé)人或評閱人 （簽名） 年 月 日 建議成績
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