畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)外文翻譯---股票期權(quán)、當(dāng)前的公司業(yè)績(jī)和遞延收益-資料下載頁(yè)
【導(dǎo)讀】我們研究CEO股票期權(quán)的潛在不利影響。酬總額的比例將觀察值分為三組。我們根據(jù)實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)認(rèn)為股票期。權(quán)的比例和公司當(dāng)前經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)負(fù)相關(guān)。我們有證據(jù)顯示，股權(quán)比。我們研究1992-2020年期間上市公司CEO的股票期權(quán)。管其他管理者也有股權(quán)激勵(lì)，但是本文主要研究CEO的股權(quán)激勵(lì)。在我們的樣本中，股票期權(quán)占了CEO報(bào)酬總額的大部分。CEO總收入的份額。第一組包括SOPROP值最低的三分之一的。等），第三組包括SOPROPt值最高的三分之一公司（高）。期權(quán)的比例和公司特定的業(yè)績(jī)進(jìn)行回歸分析的同時(shí)控制變量。除了報(bào)酬總額，該數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)提供了CEO收入的詳細(xì)組成部分，CEO的平均報(bào)酬高于500萬(wàn)，其中47%為股票期權(quán)，40%. 是22%，現(xiàn)金的比例是53%。根據(jù)SOPROP按行業(yè)按年進(jìn)行排序。用托賓Q測(cè)試表明SOPROPt值最高。的那組和SOPROPt值最低的那組呈在顯著的差異，巨大收益，有動(dòng)機(jī)將當(dāng)前的收入和收益推遲到未來(lái)期間確認(rèn)?？偟脕?lái)說(shuō)，本研究認(rèn)為對(duì)CEO授予過(guò)度的股權(quán)激勵(lì)具有負(fù)面影響。這種行為會(huì)對(duì)現(xiàn)任股東的財(cái)富產(chǎn)生不利影響。
【正文】 k options, account on average, for 22% of the total pensation, while the cash ponent represents 53%. Conversely, stock options represent almost three quarter of total pensation of the group of firms with a high proportions of stock options, while the cash ponent is 23% of total pensation. For each group of firms, the average return on assets is positive but it is lower for the group of firms with a high proportion of stock options. All three groups experience positive growth, on average, and the leverage ratio seems to be negatively correlated to the proportion of stock options. On average, firms with a high proportion of stock options have experienced a higher return on their stock over the last year and the last three years. The volatility of stock return is also higher for firms with a high proportion of stock options. 4. Conclusion In this paper, we employ a sample of public firms spanning the period 19922020, and classify firmyear observations based on the proportion of stock options. For firms with a high proportion of stock options, we document a negative association between proportion of stock options and contemporaneous operating performance, even after controlling for other known variables associated with stock option grants. For firms with a low proportion of stock options, we observe a positive association between contemporaneous operating performance and proportion of stock options. When stock options grants constitute a large proportion of total pensation, manager payoffs increase steeply at higher levels of future performance (., the pensation is convex). Managers of such firms, recognizing the potential for large payoffs, have incentives to postpone revenues and earnings from the current to future periods. Our results are consistent with this conjecture. Overall, this study identifies a potential negative consequence of granting excessive levels of stock options to CEOs. Such behavior can negatively affect the wealth of incumbent shareholders. Author:K. Kiridaran Nationality: Canada/ Canada Originate from: International Journal of Management， ,April 2020， P263
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