【導讀】本權利屬于全人類。當中指出這些權利的一節(jié)載有“程序上保障民事和刑事審。如第14條第1款確切指出：“所有的人在法院和法庭面前一律平等。在。這個規(guī)定源于先前的普遍原則，并借鑒了許多國家的歷史經(jīng)驗。獨立的法院和法庭的情況下來解決雙方的爭端是不可能的。為確保法治社會的進。程，必須建立一個稱職、獨立和公正性質的法院。很顯然，沒有法治的保證和獨。立的決策者，“法律面前人人平等”將不存在。國家尋求符合上述規(guī)定的權利所載的原則的主要途徑。憲法聲明，保證司法機構的獨立。在許多國家，執(zhí)行政府任命法。官，立法規(guī)定他們的工資和退休金。任期成立辦公室，并支付他們的工資。減少養(yǎng)老金、工資和其他福利以恐嚇法官。真正的考驗是，當法官根據(jù)法律調查的事實作出的決定違反。最近在美國，最高法院曾兩次并一致拒絕主席，這具有重大政治意義。年美國訴尼克松案中，最后尼克松服從法院裁決，辭去主席職務。林頓訴瓊斯案中，最高法院駁回了他的豁免請求。

　　

【正文】 and weaknesses. The book reads as a manual rather than an academic text, even though case law and secondary literature are given some play. The book is divided into sections each of which usefully canvases a variety of different questions, including what is referred to as the five ponents of truth missions’ work that bear directly on procedural fairness: the hearings themselves。 the taking of statements。 the use of subpoena powers。 powers of search and seizure, and finally, with the very serious issue of the publication of alleged perpetrators’ names. Each of these dimensions of a truth mission is given its own dedicated chapter. 11 Beyond the singling out of these dimensions, Freeman proposes a guiding conception of procedural fairness, offering a set of general principles for dealing with the problems. These principles include independence and impartiality, accountability, petence, nondiscrimination, transparency, proportionality, dignity, accessibility and good faith. He then introduces peting procedural objectives such as efficiency, flexibility, victimcenteredness, accuracy and prehensiveness (p. 132), and raises the practical constraints confronted by truth missions such as limited time, scarce resources and large caseloads. This conception of procedural fairness, however, plays itself out in curious abstraction from the politics of transition。 it could apply to virtually any quasijudicial or public legal body and does not seem related to systematic reflection on the aims and purposes of truth missions. In this sense Freeman39。s work raises but does not answer the fundamental question: what is the ultimate goal of these bodies – which of course would inevitably affect how we think about the attendant processes? Further, by considering truth missions in relative isolation from other institutions and modalities of transitional justice, such as criminal trials, Freeman avoids some of the most plex procedural questions that have a bearing on the meaning of fairness: for instance, to what extent is it appropriate that testimony or evidence given under the noncriminal standards of truth missions be available for use in criminal trials. And by abstracting from politics, the book also manages to avoid wrestling with the fundamental problem here of ‘the exception’: to what extent do departures from ideal procedures get justified by the exceptional character and demands of the transitional situation? And how can one make such promises without eroding the guiding normative force of the standards and principles that are identified here as conceptually justified? The clear risks of allowing ‘the exception’ to do just that are very much around us – witness the war on terror. Arguably in the absence of a procedural minimum with universal applicability, the very idea of a global rule of law bees unsustainable. Although several core questions remain unaddressed, the book is a wele contribution to the available work on evaluating truth missions and their processes 12 and is delivered in an accessible format with useful inclusions such as appendices that catalog previous missions in chronological order and according to a variety of criteria. 13 指 導 老 師 評 語 簽名： 年 月 日