【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn) ? 系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是指由某一家金融機(jī)構(gòu)違約而促成的連鎖反應(yīng)，一家銀行的違約會觸發(fā)其他銀行違約，從而對整個金融系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定造成威脅。這是因?yàn)樵阢y行之間存在大量的場外交易，當(dāng)銀行 A破產(chǎn)時(shí)，銀行 B因?yàn)榕c銀行 A之間的交易而蒙受巨大損失，從而可能會造成銀行 B破產(chǎn)，銀行 C可能同銀行 A及銀行 B之間都有交易，因此銀行 C也可能遭遇巨大損失，從而也會給 C的運(yùn)作帶來巨大的困難，依次類推。 ? 金融系統(tǒng)在 1990年的德崇證券 (Drexel)危機(jī)及2023年雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)危機(jī)中幸免，但監(jiān)管人員仍然憂心忡忡。在 2023~2023年的金融動蕩中，政府拯救了許多大型金融機(jī)構(gòu)使其免于破產(chǎn)，其原因是政府對系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的顧慮。 德崇證券 (Drexel Burnham Lambert )的破產(chǎn)過程 ? According to Dan Stone, a former Drexel executive, the firm39。s aggressive culture led many Drexel employees to stray into uhical, and sometimes illegal, conduct. Milken himself viewed the securities laws, rules and regulations with some degree of contempt, and often condoned uhical and illegal behavior by his colleagues at Drexel39。s operation in Beverly Hills.[5] However, he personally called Joseph, who believed in following the rules to the letter, on several occasions with ethical questions.[7] The firm was first rocked on May 12, 1986, when Dennis Levine, a Drexel managing director and investment banker, was charged with insider trading. Levine had spent virtually his entire career on Wall Street trading on inside information, unknown to Drexel management when he was hired in 1985. Levine pleaded guilty to four felonies, and implicated one of his recent partners, superarbitrageur Ivan Boesky. Largely based on information Boesky promised to provide about his dealings with Milken, the Securities and Exchange Commission initiated an investigation of Drexel on November 17. Two days later, Rudy Giuliani, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, launched his own investigation. Ominously, Milken refused to cooperate with Drexel39。s own internal investigation, only speaking through his attorneys. [5] For two years, Drexel steadfastly denied any wrongdoing, claiming that the criminal and SEC cases were based almost entirely on the statements of an admitted felon looking to reduce his sentence. However, it was not enough to keep the SEC from suing Drexel in September 1988 for insider trading, stock manipulation, defrauding its clients and stock parking (buying stocks for the benefit of another). All of the transactions involved Milken and his department. The most intriguing charge was that Boesky paid Drexel $ million in 1986 for Milken39。s share of profits from illegal trading. Earlier in the year, Boesky characterized the payment as a consulting fee to Drexel. ? Around the same year, Giuliani began seriously considering indicting Drexel under the powerful Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, under the doctrine that panies are responsible for an employee39。s crimes.[5] The threat of a RICO indictment unnerved many at Drexel. A RICO indictment would have required the firm to put up a performance bond of as much as $1 billion in lieu of having its assets frozen. This provision was put in the law because anized crime had a habit of absconding with the funds of indicted panies, and the writers of RICO wanted to make sure there was something to seize or forfeit in the event of a guilty verdict. Unfortunately, most of Drexel39。s capital was borrowed money, as is mon with most Wall Street firms (in Drexel39。s case, 96 percent—by far the most of any firm). This debt would have to take second place to this performance bond. Additionally, if the bond ever had to be paid, Drexel39。s stockholders would have been all but wiped out. Due to this, banks will not extend credit to a firm under a RICO indictment.[5] ? By this time, several Drexel executives—including Joseph—concluded that Drexel could not survive a RICO indictment, especially after Princeton Newport Partners, a small investment partnership, was forced to close its doors in the summer of 1988. Princeton Newport had been indicted under RICO, and the prospect of a huge performance bond forced its shutdown well before the trial. Joseph said years later that he39。d been told that if Drexel were indicted under RICO, it would only survive a month at most.[6] Noheless, negotiations for a possible plea agreement collapsed on December 19 when Giuliani demanded that Drexel waive its attorneyclient privilege. He also demanded that Milken leave the firm if the government ever indicted him. These terms were far too much even for those who had advocated a settlement from the beginning, and Drexel39。s board unanimously rejected the terms. For a time, it looked like Drexel was going to fight.[5] ? Only two days later, however, Drexel lawyers found out about a limited partnership, MacPherson Partners, they previously hadn39。t known about.