【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 企業(yè)都可以實現(xiàn)信息傳遞、共享。 58 ? 施耐德電氣的體會是首先系統(tǒng)中加入了信息平臺，實現(xiàn)了信息共享和信息交流，各單項實體以信息為指導(dǎo)制定運營計劃，在聯(lián)盟內(nèi)部優(yōu)化資源。同時信息平臺可作為交易系統(tǒng)，完成產(chǎn)銷雙方的定單和對第三方物流服務(wù)的預(yù)定購買。其次，聯(lián)盟內(nèi)部各實體實行協(xié)作，某些票據(jù)聯(lián)盟內(nèi)部通用，可減少中間手續(xù)，提高效率，使得供應(yīng)鏈銜接更順暢。 ? 第三方物流好處多從施耐德電氣的經(jīng)驗來看，第三方物流有以下的優(yōu)點。 ? 首先，可以使企業(yè)專心致志地從事自己所熟悉的業(yè)務(wù)，將資源配置在核心事業(yè)上。由于任何企業(yè)的資源都是有限的，很難成為業(yè)務(wù)上面面俱到的專家。為此，企業(yè)應(yīng)把自己的主要資源集中于自己擅長的主業(yè)，而把物流等輔助功能留給物流公司。如施耐德中壓廠通過與 CAAC物流公司的合作，取得良好的效益。施耐德集中于產(chǎn)品制造，而 CAAC管理施耐德的物流事務(wù)。產(chǎn)品下線后，由 CAAC公司負責(zé)發(fā)運到距工廠 20分鐘的成品倉庫，然后根據(jù)發(fā)運單的要求，組織產(chǎn)品的配送。 59 ? 其次，靈活運用新技術(shù)，實現(xiàn)以信息換庫存，降低成本。當(dāng)科學(xué)技術(shù)日益進步時，專業(yè)的第三方物流能不斷地更新信息技術(shù)和設(shè)備，而普通的單個制造公司通常一時間難以更新自己的資源或技能；不同的零售商可能有不同的、不斷變化的配送和信息技術(shù)需求，此時，第三方物流能以一種快速、更具成本優(yōu)勢的方式滿足這些需求，而這些服務(wù)通常都是制造商一家難以做到的。同樣，第三方物流還可以滿足一家企業(yè)的潛在顧客需求的能力，從而使企業(yè)能夠接洽到零售商。 ? 第三，減少固定資產(chǎn)投資，加速資本周轉(zhuǎn)。企業(yè)自建物流需要投入大量的資金購買物流設(shè)備，建設(shè)倉庫和信息網(wǎng)絡(luò)等專業(yè)物流設(shè)備。這些資源對于缺乏資金的企業(yè)特別是中小企業(yè)是個沉重的負擔(dān)。而如果使用第三方物流不僅減少設(shè)施的投資，還解放了倉庫和車隊方面的資金占用，加速了資金周轉(zhuǎn)。 60 ? 第四，提供靈活多樣的顧客服務(wù)，為顧客創(chuàng)造更多的價值。通過第三方物流的倉儲服務(wù)，可以滿足客戶需求，而不必因為建造新設(shè)施或長期租賃而調(diào)撥資金，并在經(jīng)營靈活性上受到限制，提供更多樣的服務(wù)品種，為顧客帶來更多的附加價值，使顧客滿意度提高。 ? 好壞對半分 ? 細數(shù)第三方物流缺陷施耐德電氣也認為，在和第三方物流的合作過程中，也發(fā)現(xiàn)了不少問題，普遍表現(xiàn)為服務(wù)能力不足的問題，主要表現(xiàn)在： 物流服務(wù)機能比較原始和單一；物流運作的效率不高；有效服務(wù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)不足；社會化程度較低等。 因此，第三方物流在為企業(yè)提供便利的同時，也存在著一些弊端。 61 ? 首先，企業(yè)不能直接控制物流職能，不能保證供貨的及時性和準確性，不能保證顧客服務(wù)的質(zhì)量。 ? 其次，第三方物流設(shè)計的方案通常都是針對不同的客戶量身定制的，不具有廣泛適用性。因此第三方物流公司不具有規(guī)模經(jīng)濟性，第三方物流公司在為客戶減少了配送成本的同時，隨之而來管理成本卻會上升，因此為貨主節(jié)約的最終成本非常有限。 ? 第三，傳統(tǒng)上，企業(yè)可以通過優(yōu)化庫存、利用地區(qū)服務(wù)代理商和第三方物流公司來滿足客戶不斷增長的需要。但是到現(xiàn)在，客戶需要包括電子采購、訂單處理能力、虛擬庫存管理等。企業(yè)發(fā)現(xiàn)第三方物流提供商缺乏當(dāng)前所需要的綜合技能、集成技術(shù)、戰(zhàn)略和全球擴張能力。 ? 施耐德電氣認為雖然目前第三方物流仍如火如荼，但是企業(yè)在做決策時還應(yīng)保持清醒的頭腦，不要盲目跟風(fēng)，在不分析自身特性的情況下，一廂情愿地認為第三方物流可以解決所有的物流問題。由于物流在不同企業(yè)里發(fā)揮的作用不盡相同，所采取的物流方式也應(yīng)有所區(qū)別。企業(yè)要在自身發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的前提下，分析自己的核心競爭力所在，然后確定物流在企業(yè)實現(xiàn)中的方式，究竟采取第三方物流還是自營物流，以及制定怎樣的具體物流決策，都要從保持企業(yè)核心競爭力和長遠利益角度出發(fā)。 62 問題 ? 物流網(wǎng)絡(luò)設(shè)計與物流績效關(guān)系？ ? 制造業(yè)物流剝離與第三方物流協(xié)調(diào)關(guān)系？ ? 國際供應(yīng)鏈物流設(shè)施與網(wǎng)絡(luò)的布局策略？ ? 集群供應(yīng)鏈物流設(shè)施與網(wǎng)絡(luò)的布局策略？ ? 集群供應(yīng)鏈與第三方物流協(xié)調(diào)關(guān)系？ ? 生態(tài)供應(yīng)鏈物流設(shè)施與網(wǎng)絡(luò)的布局策略？ 63 Chrysler Corporation ? Walter P. Chrysler founded the Chrysler Corporation in 1925. Always short of capital in this capitalintensive business, Chrysler was forced to build its cars largely of purchased parts. Despite this, the Chrysler Corporation became known for producing solid, well engineered, but conservative cars. Chrysler survived both the depression and war years, emerging as one of the three major auto producers in the United States. ? Although Chrysler set sales records in 1972 and 1973, a bination of high gasoline prices, high interest rates, severe inflation, political uncertainty, and weakening of consumer confidence drove Chrysler into a financial crisis in the mid1970s. American consumer demand soared for smaller, more fuelefficient cars, and the Japanese manufacturers were the first to respond, making great inroads into the . market. 64 ? Chrysler reduced costs, restructured its management and recruited new executives to deal with its serious financial problems. Despite these measures, external factors continued to limit Chrysler39。s ability to finance its programs fully. Chrysler was forced to seek assistance from the federal government in the form of loan guarantees. In late December 1979, the . Congress passed the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act, which President Carter signed into law on January 7, 1980. The act provided Chrysler with $ billion in federal loan guarantees. 65 ? Despite its remarkable turnaround earlier in the decade, by the end of the 1980s Chrysler once again faced financial problems. The pany had a $ billion unfunded pension fund and had recorded a loss of $664 million for the fourth quarter of 1989。 it had also closed three assembly plants within 18 months during 1988 and 1989. With the exception of its minivans, its boxy cars appealed only to older buyers. Chrysler39。s executives knew they had to do something different, and fast. 66 New Supply Chain Management at Chrysler ? Identifying problem in new product development ? Chief among the concerns facing Chrysler management was a realization that the pany39。s new product development process was inadequate. Developing a new platform, upon which a series of car models could be based, typically required more than five years and fixed costs well over $1 billion. In early 1989, the recently launched L/H family sedan program (which later became the Chrysler Concord, Eagle Vision, and Dodge Intrepid) was already running a projected $1 billion over budget at a time when the firm was in dire financial straits 67 ? Through benchmarking of petitors, listening to suppliers, and experimenting with new ideas and programs, Chrysler39。s management gradually developed a vision of the changes they needed to make. It was apparent that most delays and cost overruns were ultimately attributable to the traditional sequential design approach that Chrysler followed, with different functional groups responsible for different steps in the product development process. This resulted in poor coordination and conflicts between the functional groups, often requiring redesign and retooling. What was needed was a new approach that bined individuals from the different functional groups into an integrated product development team. What was needed was a new approach that bined individuals from the different functional groups into an integrated product development team. 68 ? Another critical element of this process was the relationship between Chrysler and its suppliers. Suppliers were at the same time both essential to and largely uninvolved in the product development process. About twothirds of the ponents Chrysler uses in manufacturing e from outside sources. In 1996, after greatly reducing its number of suppliers in preceding years, Chrysler was still purchasing 60,000 different items from 1,140 different suppliers and spending about $34 billion in the process. If Chrysler could involve the suppliers earlier in the process, it might realize time and cost savings by avoiding design