【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 by the authorities and the banks proved wholly inadequate.　　　　Profitability Can Rise in Deflation　　　　　One of the most surprising lessons from Japan is that corporate profits do not necessarily suffer in an era of deflation, even if acpanied by weak growth. For example, the profit margin (recurring profits/sales) for the nonfinancial sector in Japan has actually improved since the country went into sustained deflation in the late1990s. Moreover, even nominal profits have been on an uptrend, despite fluctuations, since the late1990s.　　　　Changed Consumption Patterns Create New Opportunities　　　　Yet another conclusion from the last decade is that deflation creates business opportunities. The shifts of consumption create huge openings for investors. Deflation pressures in Japan began in the early 1990s with the major opening of the economy to manufactured imports from Asia. Imports from China became a major factor at the middle of the 1990s, and have accelerated since. As Japanese manufacturing moved abroad, domestic resources had to be shifted into new activities. Some resources failed to find new activity, and became unemployed. However, the cost savings to consumers and business from lowcost imports were large enough to generate whole new industries. For example, Japanese consumers have saved 2% points of total consumption in food, and another 2% points in clothing over the last 13 years. These savings have been used to fuel the boom in mobile phones, electronic gadgets and services, health, and housing. Some firms that did not exist 10 years ago are now among the largest in the country, particularly in the telemunications sector. Moreover, there can be business opportunities in niches for all ponents of the ine scale, not just the high end.　　　　Investment Styles: It’s Not Just Value and Growth Any More　　　　　As my colleague Naoki Kamiyama has written, the final, and perhaps most important, lesson for investors concerns styles of investment. Prior to Japan’s fall into deflation, most investors accepted the basic distinction between growth investing and value investing. For a given target return on equity, growthoriented investors would invest in panies with high priceearnings ratios (PER), as a symbol of growth prospects. This required, mathematically, that the firms also have a high ratio of price to book (PBR). (Note that [P/B] / [P/E] = E/B = RoE.) For the same targeted return on equity, valueoriented investors did not want to take the growth risk, and thus would not invest in high PER firms. As a result, they were able to invest in firms with low PBRs as well. While useful in a growing economy, this distinction between growth and value is inadequate for a deflation economy. In particular, the old assumption that PBR and PER are necessarily correlated positively turns out to be incorrect. Japan has taught us to make more subtle distinctions. In particular, some firms have high PBR, but low PER I label these quality panies. Some others have low PBR and high PER I label these distressed panies. These distinctions turn out to be crucial in understanding how Japanese valuations changed during the decade.　　　　Performance among the different styles of investing changed sharply over the last 12 years. The first major period is late1991 to early1997. In this period value panies outperformed very clearly. It is also interesting to note that the distressed category (high PER, low PBR) also performed well. Perhaps this can be attributed to investors dismissing the importance of PERs in Japan, because of accounting differences with other countries. It may also be attributable to crossholdings, whereby business relationships within corporate groups at times overshadowed investment quality as a criterion for asset selection. From early 1997 on, things began to change. Quality stocks (low PER, high PBR) began to outperform, while distressed stocks began to underperform significantly. In the TMT era, growth panies outperformed although quality panies continued to do well also. In this period, distressed panies suffered more, and value stocks suffered the most. With the bursting of the TMT bubble, growth stocks collapsed, but interestingly, quality stocks did not. In recent months, value stocks have done poorly as well, leaving quality stocks as the only category that has maintained its relative performance.　　　　In short, developments in econometric models of both the economy and the equity market generated new insights for investors. These insights can be applied elsewhere. Moreover, there are many other insights from the remaining two quadrants, the journalism quadrant and the theory quadrant. The third part of this series will turn to the journalism quadrant, and the fourth to the theory quadrant.　　摩根斯坦利：失去的十年20世紀(jì)90年代日本經(jīng)濟(jì)反思之三（新聞報(bào)導(dǎo)篇）　　[摘要]日本在過去13年間的經(jīng)歷是至關(guān)重要的，無論分析日本金融市場的走勢，還是其他國家的市場走勢，都能從中吸取有益的教訓(xùn)。無論怎樣分析，人們都必須承認(rèn)，任何成功的全球性投資方案都不應(yīng)回避日本的資產(chǎn)。事實(shí)上，日本問題專家不僅不會(huì)受到冷落，甚至?xí)媾R供不應(yīng)求的局面。他們將像過去一樣，為世界其他地區(qū)的投資者解釋日本經(jīng)濟(jì)的特點(diǎn)。目前，從某些方面來看，在日投資的業(yè)績正在與其他國家趨同，但人們?nèi)匀恍枰私馊毡镜奶攸c(diǎn)。不僅如此，我們還必須了解其他國家經(jīng)濟(jì)的缺陷，從而有效地借鑒日本經(jīng)濟(jì)的教訓(xùn)。本文首先介紹了研究日本經(jīng)濟(jì)問題的四象限分析框架，即把分析角度分為技術(shù)分析、計(jì)量模型、新聞報(bào)導(dǎo)和經(jīng)濟(jì)理論四個(gè)象限，而后從這四個(gè)角度進(jìn)行了分析。　?。ㄊ澜?jīng)評論北京）本文為90年代日本經(jīng)濟(jì)反思四部曲的第三篇。本系列的前兩篇介紹了研究日本經(jīng)濟(jì)問題的四象限分析框架，即把分析角度分為技術(shù)分析、計(jì)量模型、新聞報(bào)導(dǎo)和經(jīng)濟(jì)理論四個(gè)象限。而后討論了技術(shù)分析象限和計(jì)量模型象限的教訓(xùn)。本篇討論新聞報(bào)導(dǎo)象限的教訓(xùn)，側(cè)重點(diǎn)是事實(shí)與事件。下一篇將討論經(jīng)濟(jì)理論象限的教訓(xùn)?！　　　∥艺J(rèn)為，新聞報(bào)導(dǎo)象限的教訓(xùn)可以歸結(jié)為新技術(shù)、丑聞和政治分裂三個(gè)方面?！　　　　⌒录夹g(shù)引領(lǐng)新聞焦點(diǎn)　　　　過去十幾年間，新技術(shù)一再成為日本經(jīng)濟(jì)的主題，然而，對這些新問題進(jìn)行量化幾乎是不可能的。新技術(shù)行業(yè)的先行指標(biāo)和滯后指標(biāo)固然難以捉摸，但麻煩不止于此；事實(shí)上，由于嶄新的技術(shù)類型不斷涌現(xiàn)，因而我們找不到現(xiàn)成的分析框架對其進(jìn)行研究。正因?yàn)槿绱?，高技術(shù)問題只能表現(xiàn)為事實(shí)和事件，因而屬于新聞報(bào)導(dǎo)象限。　　　　這里很難討論諸如哪些新技術(shù)最為重要之類的細(xì)節(jié)，因此我們不妨把有關(guān)問題歸納為幾個(gè)不同的部分，分別予以討論。首先應(yīng)該指出，企業(yè)要維持競爭優(yōu)勢，那么新產(chǎn)品、新服務(wù)的開發(fā)技術(shù)就是極為重要的。不過，僅有高技術(shù)產(chǎn)品是不夠的。更重要的是必須選擇能夠?yàn)楣緞?chuàng)造收入和利潤的產(chǎn)品。這就是說，包括一些大型電器工業(yè)公司在內(nèi)，日本的高科技企業(yè)集團(tuán)之所以業(yè)績不佳，是因?yàn)樗鼈兾茨芗屑夹g(shù)資源，以獲得良好的投資回報(bào)。市場的新進(jìn)入者問題是有關(guān)新技術(shù)的又一類重要問題。上文曾提到，一些電信公司90年代初還不存在，現(xiàn)在卻已經(jīng)位居日本最大的公司之列。隨著企業(yè)家不斷發(fā)現(xiàn)新商機(jī)，許多新公司也就應(yīng)運(yùn)而生了。其中一些是外國公司的日本分公司，其他則是國內(nèi)的企業(yè)。并購活動(dòng)與新技術(shù)的發(fā)展息息相關(guān)，這些活動(dòng)的主角有些是外國公司，有些則是日本本國公司。新技術(shù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的物流革命是新聞報(bào)導(dǎo)關(guān)注的另一個(gè)重要內(nèi)容，在這種情況下，便利店的重要性日漸突出，而全球采購網(wǎng)絡(luò)的夢想也由此成為現(xiàn)實(shí)。關(guān)于新技術(shù)的另一項(xiàng)內(nèi)容是高技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的建設(shè)，在這個(gè)建