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人的敵視。美國管理層傲慢的管理作風(fēng)與方式使員工士氣低落,也是造成了游客減少的原因之一。報告還進(jìn)一步指出,美國管理的傲慢甚至造成了管理隊伍中美、法人士敵對情緒的滋生。美國管理人員羅伯特菲茨帕里特(RobertFitzpatrick)由于與一名法國姑娘結(jié)婚,最后竟然因此而喪失了美、法雙方的信任。(二)文化差異和營銷問題顧問團(tuán)隊中的營銷戰(zhàn)略專家提出了歐洲迪斯尼與美國迪斯尼在文化及營銷方面存在的差異:1.平均逗留時間的差異歐洲人在歐洲迪斯尼的平均逗留時間為兩個白天加一個晚上。他們往往第一天早上到,第二天早上結(jié)帳。而美國游客的平均逗留時間為四天。這一差異主要是由于停車場的數(shù)量造成的。與美國的多個停車場相比,歐洲迪斯尼只有一個停車場,再加上高昂的停車費,使得歐洲游客來也匆匆,去出匆匆。2.高度季節(jié)性的游客歐洲迪斯尼的游客呈現(xiàn)典型的季節(jié)性,夏天小孩子放假時是高峰期,沒有假日時則是低谷。與美國人不同,他們喜歡較長的假期,不愿意總是帶孩子出去度假,而美國人外出度假的頻率要比歐洲人高得多。3.國內(nèi)食品飲食不盡人意歐洲迪斯尼的食品收入與其它公園相比水平很低。這主要是由于兩個錯誤假設(shè)造成的:①認(rèn)為歐洲人一般不吃早餐②完全效仿美國迪斯尼,樂園內(nèi)不提供酒類及酒精類飲料事實上,大部分歐洲人尋求合理豐盛的早餐,較少的餐廳及昂貴的快餐食品限制了這部分需求。此外,與美國不同的是,酒在歐洲被認(rèn)為是日常生活進(jìn)餐的必須部分,園內(nèi)餐館不提供酒類飲料,無疑不符歐洲人的生活習(xí)慣。 4.紀(jì)念品價格低歐洲迪斯尼樂園的紀(jì)念品銷售收入大大低于美國的兩個和東京迪斯尼樂園,尤其是樂京迪斯尼樂園。最主要的原因是歐洲人對購買紀(jì)念的毫無興趣,而不象日本人熱衷于購買紀(jì)念品作為禮物贈給親朋好友。5.交通運輸設(shè)施不足。歐洲迪斯尼的交通設(shè)施由于初期大大低估了學(xué)校、團(tuán)體的集體旅游而明顯不足。(三)環(huán)境及定位環(huán)境方面的專家就歐洲迪斯尼存在的問題提出兩點看法:①迪斯尼選擇設(shè)在北歐中部,這一地區(qū)一年中僅有六個月適合戶外活動。歐洲迪斯尼為此建設(shè)了大量房間,并為了吸引游客在淡季大打折扣,然而這從另一個側(cè)面反映出定位的錯誤。而且,在淡季為增加游客量,究竟是采取價格變動,還是運用其它的營銷促銷工具還有待研究。②錯誤的地理位置選擇。歐洲迪斯尼建在巴黎西郊,雖然現(xiàn)在大部分的巴黎游客居住在城西,但長期來看,人口增長將集中在巴黎東部。雖然最初研究項目時,法國一方曾提出這一問題,但美方人員的盲目自信,視為耳旁風(fēng),造成了今天難以改變的局面。(四)法國勞動力問題法國勞動力經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家指出,對法國有關(guān)勞動力法律的無知是造成歐洲迪斯尼勞動力成本大大高于美國迪斯尼的主要原因。在美國,針對迪斯尼的季節(jié)性,管理人員采用星期工作制及年度工作制來安排員工。這樣即保證人員配套的高度靈活性,以滿足高峰時期游客的需求,又具有相當(dāng)?shù)慕?jīng)濟(jì)性。然而,法國有關(guān)的法律對此卻缺乏靈活性的規(guī)定。對這一法律方面差異的忽視造成了歐洲迪斯尼過高的勞動力成本。(五)財務(wù)和最初業(yè)務(wù)計劃財務(wù)專家提出的報告主要包括以下幾個問題:①最初的財務(wù)計劃方案過于樂觀和復(fù)雜。這一計劃主要依賴于迪斯尼周圍的寫字樓和旅館而不是樂園自身來獲利,因而整個財務(wù)計劃不容許有任何失誤。此外,園內(nèi)建筑方面的超額支出進(jìn)一步加大了成本,愈加難以取得預(yù)期的回報。②最初計劃認(rèn)為財務(wù)風(fēng)險低,并計劃于二十世紀(jì)八十年代中期進(jìn)行實施??紤]到那時的美國市場融資形勢很是樂觀。于是迪斯尼決定將大量的股份賣給個人投資者。③嚴(yán)重的歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退,法國房地產(chǎn)市場滑坡及歐洲貨幣對法朗的重估價,使得最初計劃得以實施的基本條件全部喪失。④嚴(yán)重的定價錯誤。隨著各項成本的增加,為了完成預(yù)期的目標(biāo),歐洲迪斯尼盲目提價。,而美國、日本的迪斯尼日常費僅30美元;旅店定價很高,平均一間房間約需340美元,相當(dāng)于巴黎高級旅店的消費水平;樂園內(nèi)部,食品定價高居不下。(六)來自美國迪斯尼樂園的競爭法朗的堅挺,美元的虛弱,使得去美國,尤其是去佛羅里達(dá)旅行的費用對歐洲游客來說并不十分昂貴。奧蘭多溫暖的天氣,明媚的陽光,正宗的美國迪斯尼無一不在吸引著歐洲的游客。結(jié)果美國迪斯尼樂園反倒成為歐洲迪斯尼樂園強(qiáng)有力的競爭對手。THE RESOLUTIONSMuch has happened with Euro Disneyland since its opening. Although there have been successes at Euro Disneyland the high debt incurred along the way has caused the financial problems to bee the number one priority. In order for the park to remain operational the debt must be lowered. Disney39。s Rescue PackageOn March 14, 1994, Walt Disney Company proposed a restructuring rescue plan which would decrease the amount of Euro Disneyland39。s debt. The centerpiece of the plan is a 6 billion francs rights issue where 51% would be underwritten by 61 banks and the rest taken up by Walt Disney, which has a 49% stake in Euro Disneyland (Euro Disney39。s wish, 1994。 Euro Disney creditors, 1994). A rights issue is an offering which allows rights to purchase shares, usually at below market prices, to existing shareholders in the same proportion as their present ownership. Thus, the banks would spend about $500 million and make other concessions for their 51% shares, where as, the Walt Disney Company agreed to spend about $508 million to bail out its 49% shares as well as buy certain Euro Disneyland park assets for billion francs (about $240 million) and lease them back at terms favorable to Euro Disneyland (Coleman amp。 King, 1994). In return, the Walt Disney Company agreed to waive royalty and management fees for five years, saving Euro Disneyland about 450 million francs a year. Following the five years, the original royalty fee will be cut in half (Euro Disney39。s wish, 1994). The plan would lower Euro Disneyland39。s debt to about 10 billion francs (about $ billion), from the current 20 billion francs. In addition, the bank agreed to forgive 18 months of interest payments on the debt and would defer payments for three years saving Euro Disneyland about billion francs. This plan increases Walt Disney Company39。s tie to the theme park since its initial investment in Euro Disneyland was just $160 million (Coleman amp。 King, 1994). It should be noted that at the time the rescue plan was instituted, the Walt Disney Company continued to own 49% of the shares. At that same time the Walt Disney Company was discussing with Prince AlWalid bin Talal bin AbdulAziz AlSaud, from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the option of investing about $500 million in Euro Disneyland and buying as much as 24% of Euro Disneyland shares of stock (Rossant, Harbrecht, amp。 Grover, 1994). In January 1995, Brian Coleman wrote that the Walt Disney Company now owned 40% of Euro Disneyland shares, indicating that the parties had pleted the deal (Coleman, 1995, January). As of January 25, 1995, Coleman (1995, January) reported Euro Disneyland39。s rescue plan had sharply narrowed its losses for the fiscal first quarter due to financial restructuring and higher revenues which gave a large boost the theme park. During that same time period, the theme park had a 3% rise in its revenue from 828 million francs to 854 million francs. For the fiscal year ended in 1994, Euro Disneyland reported a net loss of billion francs (Coleman, 1995, January). Furthermore, on July 26, 1995, Coleman (1995, July) reported that Euro Disney posted its first profit. During Euro Disneyland39。s third quarter its profit was $ million. Disneyland ParisEuro Disneyland unofficially changed its name in September 1994 to Disneyland Paris in order to adapt to ...European tastes and turn around continued losses and reported slumping attendance (Crumley, 1994, October, p. 2). Through the emphasis on the name recognization of Paris, Disney executives hoped to capitalize on its proximity to the French capital (Euro Disney mulls renaming park, 1994). It was hoped that this would result in increased attendance and revenues. DownsizingIn order for Euro Disneyland to hold down costs and increase revenues it has cut 950 administrative posts, or % of its overall work force (Euro Disney plans to slash, 1993). In addition, responding to plaints regarding high entrance fees and hotel prices, Euro Disneyland has broke