金融專(zhuān)業(yè)外文翻譯-----資本結(jié)構(gòu)決定因素以中國(guó)企業(yè)為案例-金融財(cái)政(編輯修改稿)
2025-06-25 15:05 本頁(yè)面
【文章內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介】 es equityholders an incentive to invest suboptimally. More speci?cally the debt contract provides that, if an investment yields large returns well above the face value of the debt, equityholders will capture most of the gain. If, however, the investment fails, debtholders bear the consequences because of limited liability. As a result, equityholders may bene?t from ?going for broke?。 . investing in very risky projects, even if they are valuedecreasing. Such investments result in a decrease in the value of the debt. The loss in value of the equity from the poor investment can be more than o?set by the gain in equity value captured at the expense of debtholders. Equityholders correctly anticipate equityholders? future behavior. In this case, the debtholders receive less for the debt than they otherwise would. Thus, the cost of the incentive to invest in valuedecreasing projects created by debt is borne by the equityholders who issue the debt. This e?ect, generally called the asset substitution e?ect, is the agency cost of debt ?nancing. On the other hand, con?icts between shareholders and managers arise because managers hold less than 100% of the residual claim. Consequently, they do not bear the entire cost of these activities. Managers may thus invest less effort in managing the ?rm?s resources, and may be able to transfer ?rm resources to their own personal bene?t, for example through ?empirebuilding? or by consuming ?perquisites? such as corporate jets, luxurious offices etc. The manager bears the entire cost of refraining from these activities, but captures only a fraction of the gain. As a result, managers overindulge in these pursuits relative to the level that would maximize ?rm value. This ineffciency is reduced the larger is the fraction of the ?rm?s equity owned by the manager. Holding constant the manager?s absolute investment in the ?rm, an increase in the debt ratio of the ?rm increases the manager?s share of the equity and mitigates the loss from the con?ict between the manager and shareholders. Moreover, as pointed out by Jensen (1986), since debt mits the ?rm to pay out cash, it reduces the amount of ?free? cash available to managers to engage in the types of pursuits mentioned above. This mitigation of the con?icts between managers and equityholders constitutes a bene?t of debt ?nancing. A number of implications follow from this analysis. First, one wouldexpect bond contracts to include features that attempt to prevent asset substitution, such as interest coverage requirements, prohibitions against investments in new unrelated lines of business, etc. Second, industries in which the opportunities for asset substitution are more limited will have higher debt levels ceteris paribus. Thus, for example, the theory predicts that regulated public utilities, banks, and ?rms in mature industries with few growth opportunities will be more highly leveraged. Third, it is optimal for ?rms with slow or even negative growth, and that have large free cash in ?ows from operations, to have more debt. Large free cash ?ows without good investment prospects create the resources to consume perquisites, build empires, overpay subordinates etc. Increasing debt reduces the amount of ?free cash? and increases the manager?s fractional ownership of the residual claim. According to Jensen (1
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