外文翻譯--公司治理對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)價(jià)值關(guān)系的影響-其他專業(yè)(編輯修改稿)
2025-02-24 09:56 本頁面
【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 d moderate economical transactions within the firm and, consequently, between entrepreneurs and other stakeholders (corporate governance relations). As explicitly pointed out by Bhagat and Jefferis (2021), when they pay particular attention to the relations between cause and effect and to their interactions recently described on a theoretical level (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Heinrich, 2021, Brailsford et al., 2021,MahrtSmith, 2021), a ??research proposal?? that future empirical studies should evaluate should be, how corporate governance can potentially have a relevant influence on the relation between capital structure and value, with an effect of mediation and/or moderation. The five relations identified in Figure 2 describe:the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through a role of corporate governance ??mediation?? 。 the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through the role of capital governance ??moderation?? (relation D)。the role of corporate governance as a determining factor in choices regarding capital structure (relation E). All five relations shown in Figure 2 are particularly interesting and show two threads of research that focus on the relations between:corporate governance and capital structure, where the dimensions of the corporate governance determine firmfinancing choices, causing a possible relation of cocausation Whether management voluntarily chooses to use debt as a source of financing to reduce problems of information asymmetry and transaction, maximizing the efficiency of its firm governance decisions, or the increase in the debt level is forced by the stockholders as an instrument to discipline behavior and assure good corporate governance, capital structure is influenced by corporate governance (relation E) and vice versa (relation B). On one hand, a change in how debt and equity are dealt with influences firm governance activities by modifying the structure of incentives and managerial control. If, through the mix debt and equity, different categories of investors all converge within the firm, where they have different types of influence on governance decisions, then managers will tend to have preferences when determining how one of these categories will prevail when defining the firm?s capital structure. Even more importantly, through a specific design of debt contracts and equity it is possible to considerably increase firm governance efficiency. On the other hand, even corporate governance influences choices regarding capital structure (relation E). Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how firmfinancing choices are made by management following an order of preference。 in this case, if the manager chooses the financing resources it can be presumed that she is avoiding a reduction of her decision making power by accepting the discipline represented by resource financing allows management to prevent other subjects from intervening in their decision making processes. De Jong (2021) reveals how in the Netherlands managers try to avoid using debt so that their decision making power remains unchecked. Zwiebel(1996) has observed that managers don?t voluntarily accept the ??discipline?? of debt。 other governance mechanisms impose that debt is issued. Jensen (1986) noted that decisions to increase firm debt are voluntarily made by management when it intends to ??reassure??stakeholders that its governance decisions are ??proper??. In this light, firm financing decisions can be strictly deliberated by managersentrepreneurs or else can be induced by specific situations that go beyond the will of the management. Conclusion This paper define a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, cor
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