【正文】 此外 ,在這些關(guān)系的研究分析中也要考慮國(guó)家宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的作用。 從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的觀點(diǎn)來(lái)看，進(jìn)一步探討實(shí)證研究是非常重要的，在圖 2 的模型中建議處理元素關(guān)系的復(fù)雜研究可以采用適當(dāng)?shù)慕?jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量技術(shù)。 換句話說(shuō) ,許多作者 (BorschSupan和 Koke， 2021， Bhagat和 Jefferis， 2021，柏格與帕蒂， 2021)指出了分析資本結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值關(guān)系的必要性，以及分析了公司通過(guò)公司價(jià)值與治理的交互作用的考慮變量，如股權(quán)集中度、管理參與股權(quán)資本、組成董事會(huì)等。 有鑒于此，公司融資決策可以嚴(yán)格審議管理人員，企業(yè)家或其他可以被超越的管理將有具體情況引起。 內(nèi)部資源融資允許管理者防止其他部門介入他們的決策過(guò)程。如果，通過(guò)債務(wù)和股權(quán)的組合，各種不同種類的投資者都在收斂公司，在那里他們對(duì)不同類型的治理決定上產(chǎn)生影響，然后經(jīng)理往往會(huì)用自己的偏好決定這些類別的公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)。 圖二中清晰的描述了五種關(guān)系：資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)價(jià)值之間的關(guān)系 通過(guò)公司治理來(lái)“調(diào)解”（關(guān)系 A）；資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)價(jià)值之間的關(guān)系通過(guò)角色的資本治理關(guān)系穩(wěn)定（關(guān)系 D），選擇一個(gè)確定的因素對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)公司治理的作用進(jìn)行分析（關(guān)系 E）。例如 ,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家們對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)和金融合同是怎樣布局特別敏感 ,這樣，最佳企業(yè)管理將得到保證，而管理激勵(lì)機(jī)制和約束機(jī)制也可同時(shí)建立。這方面的考慮可以幫助克服在理論和經(jīng)驗(yàn)層面之間的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)資本結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值的爭(zhēng)議?！笔聦?shí)上 , 相關(guān)生命周期階段的公司應(yīng)該有一個(gè)最優(yōu)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。信息不對(duì)稱結(jié)合交易成本 ,將提供一個(gè)合理的解釋，財(cái)務(wù)管理行為做出選擇是分等級(jí)的。 這也因此清楚地表明，資本結(jié)構(gòu)除了定義呀還有好多值得研究的話題。研究表明，公司之間的相似在相同的部門，換句話說(shuō)，資本結(jié)構(gòu)是趨于特定行業(yè)的。最后 ,還有研究 (麥爾斯 ,梅爾斯1984 年 )指出管理偏好在于融資資源的選擇。 莫迪里亞尼和米勒 (1958 年 ),宣稱原本資本結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值沒(méi)有關(guān)系的理論者，在 1963 年得出了與此前自相矛盾的結(jié)論 ,最大程度的債務(wù)由于可以申請(qǐng)扣減稅項(xiàng)將意味著公司的價(jià)值的最大化。 other governance mechanisms impose that debt is issued. Jensen (1986) noted that decisions to increase firm debt are voluntarily made by management when it intends to ??reassure??stakeholders that its governance decisions are ??proper??. In this light, firm financing decisions can be strictly deliberated by managersentrepreneurs or else can be induced by specific situations that go beyond the will of the management. Conclusion This paper define a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance and value, while they also promote a more precise design for empirical research. Capital structure represents one of many instruments that can preserve corporate governance efficiency and protect its ability to create , this thread of research affirms that if investment policies allow for value creation,financing policies, together with other governance instruments, can assure that investment policies are carried out efficiently while firm value is protected from opportunistic behavior. In other words, various authors (BorschSupan and Koke, 2021, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2021 and Berger and Patti, 2021) point out the necessity to analyze the relation between capital structure and value by always taking into consideration the interaction between corporate governance variables such as ownership concentration, management participation in the equity capital, the position of the Board of Directors, etc. Furthermore, there is a problem in the way to operationalize these constructs, due to multidimensional nature of these. It is quite difficult to identify indicators that perfectly correspond to theoretical constructs。 ShyamSunder and Myers,1999). Stewart Myers is the founder of the pecking order theory[7]. Problems of information asymmetry, together with transaction costs, would be able to offer a rational explanation to managerial behaviour when financial choices are made following a hierarchical order (Fama and French, 2021). In other words, according to Myers and Fama, there should be a??rational?? explanation to the phenomenon observed by Stein, Baker, Wrugler, Barberis and Thaler. Moreover, studies on capital structure have also been done looking at small and medium size firms (Berger and Udell, 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999, Romano et al., 2021, Fluck, 2021),due to the relevant economic role of these firms (in Europe they are 95 percent of the total firms operating). Zingales (2021) as well has emphasized the fact that today ?? . . . the attention shown towards large firms tends to partially obscure firms that do not have access to the financial markets . . . ??. In one of the most interesting studies done on this topic, Berger and Udell (1998) asserted that firm financial behaviour depends on what phase of their life cycle they are in. In fact, there should be a