【文章內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介】 沒(méi)有提供任何證據(jù)說(shuō)明降低一個(gè)公司的稅務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)與稅后報(bào)酬的關(guān)系。這項(xiàng)調(diào)查擴(kuò)展到了事業(yè)部層次，這些部門(mén)的報(bào)酬激勵(lì)動(dòng)機(jī)與減少稅收的目的目的之間存在明顯的沖突 (., McLemore 1997)以及 觀察的經(jīng)驗(yàn)是，大多數(shù)企業(yè)沒(méi)有這樣做 (., Douglas et al. 1996)。目前的研究提供的證據(jù) 關(guān)于明確激勵(lì)首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部管理人員納入其經(jīng)營(yíng)和投資決策的稅務(wù)結(jié)果的增量效益。 以某個(gè)側(cè)面來(lái)研究出口退稅與管理層薪酬的共同課題，衡量的結(jié)果是所有樣本公司可優(yōu)化關(guān)于被調(diào)查的選擇 (Ittner and Larcker 2021)。如果 不解決公司選擇的內(nèi)生性，很難提供一致的證據(jù)關(guān)于這選擇導(dǎo)致改善的結(jié)果。為了解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理關(guān)于稅后績(jī)效與出口退稅的聯(lián)系依舊采用兩步方式估計(jì)，可以幫助對(duì)潛在的內(nèi)生性與相關(guān)偏見(jiàn)這兩個(gè)變量做出正確的選擇。作為實(shí)施這一方法的第一步， the Antle and Demski (1988) 可控性原則是用來(lái)模擬 一個(gè)公司的決定 ,通過(guò)對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理稅后績(jī)效指標(biāo)的衡量。要包括一個(gè)特別措施在經(jīng)理人的薪酬合同中，這一原則要求持有一個(gè)衡量預(yù)期收益和負(fù)責(zé)任的經(jīng)理 7 更加努力工作來(lái)規(guī)避所支付的附加工資之間的額外風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此， 稅后績(jī)效指標(biāo)應(yīng)作為一個(gè)激勵(lì)經(jīng)理人的獲取額外報(bào)酬的方法，只有當(dāng)經(jīng)理的稅務(wù)規(guī)劃工作的參與導(dǎo)致了稅前和稅后核算結(jié)果之間的差異，這通常反映在出口退稅上面。與以前的研究相一致，包括與首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理選擇稅后模型的變量，對(duì)于一個(gè)企業(yè)的稅務(wù)籌劃的機(jī)會(huì)控制，因?yàn)檫@種機(jī)會(huì)的存在會(huì)在某種程度上反映了經(jīng)理人的行動(dòng)，可以預(yù) 期，將會(huì)降低出口退稅。 即使通過(guò)經(jīng)理人的努力，預(yù)計(jì)將導(dǎo)致較低的出口退稅，公司將使用稅后績(jī)效指標(biāo)只有當(dāng)預(yù)期收益超過(guò)預(yù)期成本才這樣做，稅后業(yè)績(jī)措施預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)導(dǎo)致較低的出口退稅，因?yàn)樗偈构芾砣藛T和稅務(wù)專(zhuān)業(yè)人員加強(qiáng)合作以達(dá)成一致的，發(fā)展的，執(zhí)行稅收籌劃策略， McLemore (1997, 1)引用 惠普公司的稅務(wù)主任支持稅務(wù)規(guī)劃工作需要事業(yè)部經(jīng)理參與的必要性： 稅收籌劃這種事情也只有在被作為業(yè)務(wù)規(guī)劃的早期階段，戰(zhàn)略上的規(guī)劃，兼并和收購(gòu)工作??你的稅務(wù)部門(mén)要在會(huì)議上，代表這些部門(mén)做出決定。對(duì)未來(lái)的發(fā)展模式是稅務(wù)策劃人與業(yè) 務(wù)部門(mén)緊密合作完成的。 與使用稅后業(yè)績(jī)的措施有關(guān)的費(fèi)用包括附加工資必須支付給經(jīng)理以彌補(bǔ)由于潛在的稅法變化增加的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，使經(jīng)理加倍的努力，包括，從合同中補(bǔ)償個(gè)人所得稅方面費(fèi)用的增加的結(jié)果。與稅后報(bào)酬有關(guān)的其他潛在費(fèi)用包括向一個(gè)公司的事業(yè)部分配行政費(fèi)用開(kāi)支，稅務(wù)檢查成本增加，并增加稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)審查頻率。相反，通過(guò) 觀察出口退稅的好處 來(lái) 衡量稅后報(bào)酬， 有沒(méi)有稅后業(yè)績(jī)計(jì)量的成本效益明顯的有經(jīng)驗(yàn)代理人。因此，本研究著重于在管理者的基礎(chǔ)上實(shí)現(xiàn)的稅后補(bǔ)償效益，但不提供相關(guān)的成本，規(guī)模的證據(jù)。 在企業(yè)主管的調(diào)查中所獲得的專(zhuān)有數(shù)據(jù)用于 構(gòu)造并測(cè)試某些變量，說(shuō)明是否包括那些首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部的經(jīng)理們使用稅后會(huì)計(jì)基礎(chǔ)的績(jī)效指標(biāo)。公開(kāi)數(shù)據(jù)用于構(gòu)造出口退稅和其他變量來(lái)測(cè)試，結(jié)果與假設(shè)一致，即事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的報(bào)酬，但不包括公司首席執(zhí)行官的，與稅后導(dǎo)致較低的出口退稅有關(guān)，估計(jì)使每年平均節(jié)省 1330 萬(wàn)美元的稅款。模擬公司進(jìn)行敏感性測(cè)試的子樣本中，邊際稅率 (Graham 1996)提供進(jìn)一步的證據(jù)表明，低 邊際稅率的公司將會(huì)有降低潛在出口退稅的行動(dòng)，可 能對(duì)現(xiàn)金流量和稅后利潤(rùn)不吻合這一結(jié)果產(chǎn)生模棱兩可的影響。 敏感性測(cè)試有助于進(jìn)一步排除了稅收職能外包的比例，作為另 一種解釋?zhuān)?統(tǒng)計(jì)上和經(jīng)濟(jì)上顯示事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的稅后報(bào)酬和出口退稅呈負(fù)相關(guān)。 研究結(jié)果有助于薪酬以會(huì)計(jì)為基礎(chǔ)的著作，通過(guò)實(shí)施事業(yè)部經(jīng)理參與的以稅后會(huì)計(jì)為基礎(chǔ)的績(jī)效措施，是逐步降低企業(yè)出口退稅的有效措施。符合 Guidry et al. (1999)表明了獎(jiǎng)金導(dǎo)致事業(yè)部盈余管理水平的不同， 這 一發(fā)現(xiàn)提供了更多的有洞 8 察力的影響，事業(yè)部經(jīng)理以會(huì)計(jì)績(jī)效為基礎(chǔ)對(duì)管理人員的行為進(jìn)行激勵(lì)。另外，明確的表明企業(yè)的決策者設(shè)計(jì) 降低所得稅費(fèi)用的公司稅后業(yè)績(jī)會(huì)使管理層人員獲得更多薪酬的措施來(lái)激勵(lì)事業(yè)部經(jīng)理。 該文章的過(guò)程如下： 下一節(jié)闡述了在這 項(xiàng)研究中測(cè)試的假設(shè)。 第三節(jié)概述了經(jīng)驗(yàn)?zāi)Ｐ秃凸烙?jì)程序在測(cè)試中使用的一些假說(shuō)。第四節(jié)提供了數(shù)據(jù)和樣本的討論，包括用于獲得所有的用于調(diào)查的報(bào)酬數(shù)據(jù)的簡(jiǎn)要概述。 結(jié)果列于第五章最后一節(jié)提供了一個(gè)結(jié)論，即關(guān)于該研究的局限性的討論。 II. 假說(shuō)發(fā)展 Newman (1989), Cares and Guffey (2021), and Atwood et al. (1998) 調(diào)查作為稅后盈利企業(yè)對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃包含變量的選擇。這些研究假設(shè)，企業(yè)有更大的稅收籌劃的機(jī)會(huì)，與 Antle and Demski (1988)的可控性原則一致， 更有可能使用稅后業(yè)績(jī)的措施。利用稅收籌劃的機(jī)會(huì)代理，這些研究都發(fā)現(xiàn)了跨國(guó)公司的地位，經(jīng)營(yíng)分部的數(shù)量，企業(yè)規(guī)模，首席執(zhí)行官的報(bào)酬 和資本密集度呈正相關(guān)，Atwood et al. (1998) 還提出證據(jù)，充分利用這一負(fù)相關(guān)的選擇。 Corporate TaxPlanning Effectiveness: The Role of CompensationBased 9 Incentives (Ⅱ ) John D. Phillips University of Connecticut Dhaliwal et al. (2021) also focuses on the relation between a firm39。s taxplanning opportunities and the decision whether to use aftertax earnings in CEO bonus plans, but measures planning opportunities using only realized tax credits and absolute values of firms39。 permanent booktax differences. They exclude temporary booktax differences such as those resulting from accelerated tax depreciation because these differences do not impact a firm39。s aftertax accounting earnings, the performance measure used in aftertax accountingbased bonus plans. Similarly, the ETR used in the current study is puted using total tax expense in the numerator, thereby excluding the effects of temporary booktax differences. Consistent with prior literature, Dhaliwal et al. (2021) find that firms with greater tax credits and absolute values of permanent booktax differences are more likely to pensate their CEOs on an aftertax basis. Because permanent differences can either increase or decrease taxable ine relative to book ine, they provide no direct evidence of an association between aftertax CEO pensation and lower ETR. The current study investigates this relation between aftertax CEO pensation and ETR. The first hypothesis, stated in alternative form is: H1: Using aftertax performance measures in CEO accountingbased bonus plans leads to lower ETR. This paper also extends the pre versus aftertax pensation analysis to SBUmanager incentive pensation plans. The need for SBUmanager involvement in taxplanning efforts is consistent with the coordination task that arises when specialists require input and cooperation from non specialists (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). The firm39。s tax professionals not only need help from the firm39。s SBU managers in the identification of taxplanning opportunities, but also their cooperation in developing and executing strategies to capitalize on such opportunities. In the context of lowering the ETR and increasing aftertax accounting ine, how do SBU managers participate in efforts that increase tax credits and lead to permanent differences that lower taxable ine? ColgatePalmolive39。s CFO states that Colgate man agers routinely watch for ways to time remittances from overseas [which 10 leads to higher foreign tax credits], maximize research and development tax credits.... (Mintz 1999, 2.) SBU managers can also help tax professionals formulate transfer prices (Ernst amp。 Young 1999), which helps lower the ETR by decreasing (increasing) ine reported in countries with tax rates in excess of (lower than) the . tax Other examples of SBUmanager involvement that helps lower the ETR include (1) determining whether a potential employee qualifies for a payrollbased tax credit before the hiring decision is made, (2) consulting with the firm39。s tax professionals prior to domestic location decisions to incorporate varying state and local tax rates as a factor in such decisions, and (3) helping tax professionals gather data necessary to document tax return reporting positions. The above discussion suggests that SBUmanage