【正文】 lowering firms39。 costs. This study thus focuses on the realized benefits of pensating managers on an aftertax basis but does not provide evidence of the associated costs39。s SBU, increased tax examination costs, and increased tax authority scrutiny. Contrary to measuring aftertax pensation39。s increased cooperation with tax professionals to help identify, develop, and execute taxplanning strategies. McLemore (1997, 1) cites Hewlett Packard39。s actions can be expected to lower the ETR. Even if a manager39。s involvement in taxplanning efforts leads to a difference between pretax and aftertax accounting results, which is generally reflected in the ETR. Consistent with prior research, the pre versus aftertax CEO and SBUmanager selection models include variables that control for a firm39。s pensation contract, this principle requires that the expected benefits from holding a manager responsible for a measure must be greater 3 than the additional wage that must be paid to pensate the manager for the resulting additional risk and effort. Accordingly, an after tax performance measure should be used as a contracting variable in a manager39。s choice, it is difficult to provide evidence consistent with this choice leading to an improved oute. To address this issue, the relation between ETR and CEO and SBUmanager aftertax performance measures is estimated using a twostep approach that helps correct for the potential endogeneity bias associated with these two choice variables. As a first step in implementing this approach, the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle is used to model a firm39。s effectiveness in lowering a firm39。 Atwood et al. 1998。 ETR and does so at both the chief executive officer (CEO) and businessunit (SBU) manager levels. Prior aftertax performance measure research has focused only on the determinants of pensation CEOs using pre versus aftertax earnings (., Newman 1989。 Healy 1985。 Swenson 1999). Accounting research has addressed the relation between accountingbased pensation and managers39。s expected discounted aftertax cash flows, requires managers to consider their decisions39。 performance measures。 外文文獻翻譯 2021 屆 譯文一： 企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對報酬的激勵作用（上） 譯文二： 企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對報酬的激勵作用（下） 學(xué)生姓名 周偉 學(xué) 號 07062136 院 系 經(jīng)濟與管理學(xué)院 專 業(yè) 會計 指導(dǎo)教師 許慶高 完成日期 2021年 12月 2日 Corporate TaxPlanning Effectiveness: The Role of CompensationBased Incentives (Ⅰ ) John D. Phillips University of Connecticut ABSTRACT This study investigates whether pensating chief executive officers and businessunit managers using aftertax accountingbased performance measures leads to lower effective tax rates, the empirical surrogate used for taxplanning effectiveness. Utilizing proprietary pensation data obtained in a survey of corporate executives, the relation between effective tax rates and aftertax performance measures is modeled and estimated using a twostep approach that corrects for the endogeneity bias associated with firms39。 decisions to pensate managers on a pre versus aftertax basis. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that pensating businessunit managers, but not chief executive officers, on an aftertax basis leads to lower effective tax rates. KEYWORDS tax planning。 endogenous treatment effects. I. INTRODUCTION Effective tax planning, defined by Scholes et al. (2021) as tax planning that maximizes the firm39。 aftertax consequences. In this paper, I investigate whether aftertax accountingbased performance measures lead to lower effective tax rates (ETR), my empirical surrogate for tax planning The ETR, an inestatementbased oute measure calculated as the ratio of total ine tax expense to pretax ine, generally measures the effectiveness of tax reduction strategies that lead to higher aftertax ine. A lower ETR, however, can only proxy 2 for tax savings and does not always imply that aftertax ine and/or cash flows have been Despite this limitation, the ETR has been used to measure the effectiveness of spending on the tax function (Mills et al. 1998) and corporate tax department performance (Douglas et al. 1996). Also, lowering the ETR is frequently cited as a way to increase earnings (., Ziegler 1997) and increase share price (., Mintz 1999。 actions (., Larcker 1983。 Wallace 1997). This paper is the first to address whether aftertax accountingbased performance measures motivate managers to take actions that help lower their firms39。 Carnes and Guffey 2021。 Dhaliwal et al. 2021) and provides no evidence concerning aftertax pensation39。s tax liability. Extending this investigation to the SBU level is motivated out of the apparent conflict between arguments that taxes should be allocated to SBU for incentive pensation purposes (., McLemore 1997) with empirical observations that a majority of firms do not do so (., Douglas et al. 1996).4 The current investigation provides evidence concerning the incremental effectiveness of explicitly motivating CEOs and SBU managers to incorporate tax consequences into their operating and investment decisions. A mon issue in crosssectional studies that attempt to link a particular management accounting choice to an oute measure is that all sample firms may be optimizing with respect to the choice being investigated (Ittner and Larcker 2021).