【正文】 同樣，有特殊目的實體的投資可能會導致的暫時性差異也未反映在出口退稅上 (., Hanlon 2021)。因此，出口退稅當前被作為適當?shù)睦碚撚脕碓u價稅后會計績效為基礎(chǔ)的獎金計劃的效力 。第二個假設(shè)， 為另一種表現(xiàn)形式，如下： H2:對事業(yè)部經(jīng)理使用 會計為基礎(chǔ)的績效措施，將導致較低的出口退稅。 類似地， Mintz (1999, 2) 列舉了高露潔公司財務(wù)總監(jiān)關(guān)于稅后業(yè)績計量的說法： 是關(guān)于稅前收入的管理激勵， 公司在考慮將支付給員工多少獎金時得多注意稅收優(yōu)惠的影響?? 但是，由于激勵的報酬取決于稅后收益回報 ??當公司稅收降低會使經(jīng)理得到更多的報酬。在會議上傳達稅收籌劃效果對首席執(zhí)行官稅后獎金的重要性，從而對他們產(chǎn)生足夠的激勵，以使事業(yè)部經(jīng)理通過加倍努力來降低企業(yè)的出口退稅。 在調(diào)低出口退稅，增加稅后會計收益方面，怎么使事業(yè)部經(jīng)理更加的努力，增加稅收抵免，并導致應(yīng) 納稅所得額永久性差異的降低？高露潔公司首席財務(wù)官說“高露潔人提供學習的機會經(jīng)常留意海外 [從而導致更高的外國稅收抵免 ]時間匯款的方式，最大限度地提高研究和發(fā)展的稅收抵免” (Mintz 1999, 2.) 事業(yè)部經(jīng)理也可以幫助稅務(wù)專業(yè)人士制定轉(zhuǎn)移價格 (Ernst amp。第一個假設(shè) ，闡明的另一種形式是： 14 H1: 利用企業(yè)稅后業(yè)績?yōu)榛A(chǔ)來衡量首席執(zhí)行官的獎金計劃將導致出口退稅的降低。同樣地，在目前的研究中使用的出口退稅是利用計算器計算所得稅費用總額，從而排除了臨時 繳稅財產(chǎn)清單和稅率 差異的影響。s ETR differs from the statutory rate only to the extent it has opportunities to take actions that either increase or decrease taxable ine or tax credits (Mills et al. 1998). Consistent with prior research (., Newman 1989。s tax burden or to evaluate a firm39。 Guidry et al. 1999). Compensating a firm39。s accountingbased bonus plan signals tax planning39。s SBU managers in the identification of taxplanning opportunities, but also their cooperation in developing and executing strategies to capitalize on such opportunities. In the context of lowering the ETR and increasing aftertax accounting ine, how do SBU managers participate in efforts that increase tax credits and lead to permanent differences that lower taxable ine? ColgatePalmolive39。s taxplanning opportunities and the decision whether to use aftertax earnings in CEO bonus plans, but measures planning opportunities using only realized tax credits and absolute values of firms39。 II. 假說發(fā)展 Newman (1989), Cares and Guffey (2021), and Atwood et al. (1998) 調(diào)查作為稅后盈利企業(yè)對首席執(zhí)行官獎金計劃包含變量的選擇。 該文章的過程如下： 下一節(jié)闡述了在這 項研究中測試的假設(shè)。 敏感性測試有助于進一步排除了稅收職能外包的比例，作為另 一種解釋， 統(tǒng)計上和經(jīng)濟上顯示事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的稅后報酬和出口退稅呈負相關(guān)。因此，本研究著重于在管理者的基礎(chǔ)上實現(xiàn)的稅后補償效益，但不提供相關(guān)的成本，規(guī)模的證據(jù)。對未來的發(fā)展模式是稅務(wù)策劃人與業(yè) 務(wù)部門緊密合作完成的。要包括一個特別措施在經(jīng)理人的薪酬合同中，這一原則要求持有一個衡量預期收益和負責任的經(jīng)理 7 更加努力工作來規(guī)避所支付的附加工資之間的額外風險。 以某個側(cè)面來研究出口退稅與管理層薪酬的共同課題，衡量的結(jié)果是所有樣本公司可優(yōu)化關(guān)于被調(diào)查的選擇 (Ittner and Larcker 2021)。 Atwood et al. 1998。 Healy 1985。盡管有這一局限性，出口退稅還是被用來衡量稅收功能性支出的有效性（米爾斯， 1998）和企業(yè)各部門稅務(wù)績效（道格拉斯， 1996）。 關(guān)鍵 詞 稅收計劃 ； 性能指標 ； 內(nèi)源性的 處理 效果 6 引言 有效的 稅收籌劃， 根據(jù) 斯科爾斯等人的定義（ 2021） ，稅收籌劃 ， 即 最大限度地提高公司的預期稅后 凈 現(xiàn)金流 量，要求管理者要考慮他們的決定 所造成的 稅后 結(jié)果 。 choices of aftertax earnings as the contracting variable in CEO bonus plans. These studies hypothesize that firms with greater taxplanning opportunities, consistent with the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle, are more likely to use aftertax performance measures. Using proxies for taxplanning opportunities, these 5 studies collectively find that multinational status, number of operating segments, firm size, and capital intensity are positively associated with aftertax CEO pensation. Atwood et al. (1998) also presents evidence that leverage is negatively associated with this choice. 企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對報酬的激勵作用（上） 約翰 D potential ETRlowering actions that could have ambiguous effects on cash flows and aftertax profits are not driving this result. Further sensitivity tests help rule out the proportion of tax function outsourcing as an alternative explanation for the statistically and economically significant negative relation between after tax SBUmanager pensation and ETR. The results contribute to the accountingbased pensation literature by linking after tax accountingbased performance measures to SBUmanager involvement that is incrementally effective in lowering firms39。s SBU, increased tax examination costs, and increased tax authority scrutiny. Contrary to measuring aftertax pensation39。s actions can be expected to lower the ETR. Even if a manager39。s pensation contract, this principle requires that the expected benefits from holding a manager responsible for a measure must be greater 3 than the additional wage that must be paid to pensate the manager for the resulting additional risk and effort. Accordingly, an after tax performance measure should be used as a contracting variable in a manager39。s effectiveness in lowering a firm39。 ETR and does so at both the chief executive officer (CEO) and businessunit (SBU) manager levels. Prior aftertax performance measure research has focused only on the determinants of pensation CEOs using pre versus aftertax earnings (., Newman 1989。 Swenson 1999). Accounting research has addressed the relation between accountingbased pensation and managers39。 performance measures。 decisions to pensate managers on a pre versus aftertax basis. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that pensating businessunit managers, but not chief executive officers, on an aftertax basis leads to lower effective tax rates. KEYWORDS tax planning。 aftertax consequences. In this paper, I investigate whether aftertax accountingbased performance measures lead to lower effective tax rates (ETR), my empirical surrogate for tax planning The ETR, an inestatementbased oute measure calculated as the ratio of total ine tax expense to pretax ine, generally measures the effectiveness of tax reduction strategies that lead to higher aftertax ine. A lower ETR, however, can only proxy 2 for tax savings and does not always imply that aftertax ine and/or cash flows have been Despite this limitation, the ETR has been used to measure the effectiveness of spending on the tax function (Mills et al. 1998) and corpor